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ABSTRACT  
  
  
This project investigates the question of whether it is morally justifiable to use
genetic technology in order to bear a deaf child. Even though it may seem counterintuitive to
hearing people, deaf people often desire to have deaf children. Reasons for this vary, but
RIWHQLQFOXGHDGHHSORQJLQJWRKDYHDFKLOGZKRFDQIXOO\SDUWLFLSDWHLQRQH¶VOLQJXLVWLFDQG
cultural community. Many view using genetic technology to ensure or create a child with a
disability as harmful and a dereliction of parental duty; dismissing the desire for a deaf child
as misguided at best. I begin by situating this desire for a deaf child in historical context,
identifying and analyzing ethical claims regarding deaf education, eugenics, civil rights, and
cochlear implant surgery. Following this, three arguments are analyzed to consider whether,
in certain situations, it may be morally justifiable to use genetic technology to bear deaf
children. The first is a consequentialist approach to genetic selection, using a variation of the
Non-Identity argument to evaluate the potential harms and benefits to the child who is born
deaf. For genetic alteration, I evaluate an argument with roots in deontology that considers

viii
the notion of bodily integrity as a principle of human dignity and autonomy, expanding it to
include genomic integrity. The final chapter considers the question of deafness as a moral
harm, including the question of harm within the family unit and harm to society.
,FRQVLGHUWZRPDMRUREMHFWLRQVWRWKHVHDUJXPHQWVWKHFKLOG¶s right to an open
future, and conditions of exit. In the right to an open future argument, parents have a duty to
HQVXUHWKDWXQGXHUHVWULFWLRQVDUHQRWSODFHGRQWKHFKLOG¶VIXWXUH7KHFRQGLWLRQVRIH[LW
argument asserts that parents have a duty to prRWHFWDFKLOG¶VSRWHQWLDOIXWXUHLQWHUHVWLQ
exiting her cultural community. I conclude that these objections rightfully present challenges
to the three arguments I consider, but are currently insufficient to fully overcome them and
need further refinement.
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C hapter 1 Introduction
Introduction to the Problem
My dissertation evaluates the moral justification and permissibility regarding the
use of genetic technology in order to create a deaf child. Typically, the search for genes
that cause or contribute to an undesirable medical condition is motivated by the hope of
finding a cure for such a medical condition or eradicating the condition altogether.
Deafness differs from most other medical conditions in that it is not universally viewed as
an undesirable medical condition.1 Two contrasting views of deafness exist in
contemporary American society. The viewpoint shared by most people is that deafness is
the pathological condition of profound hearing loss2 and that deaf people suffer from a
sensory deficit. The minority viewpoiQWUHJDUGV'HDISHRSOHDVµYLVXDO¶SHRSOHZKRVH
primary orientation toward their deafness is based on shared cultural considerations, such
as language and values, instead of viewing deafness as a pathological condition.3
This is not to say that Deaf people deny their audiological status (as some authors
have mistakenly written) but to illustrate the primacy of culture over pathology.
Language choice is often used to distinguish members of these two groups ± Deaf people

Deafness is not unique in this respect ± other typically undesired medical conditions,
such as achondroplasia, may be considered highly desirable by persons with these
conditions.
2
'RUODQG¶V,OOXVWUDWHG0HGLFDO'LFWLRQDU\, 26th HGVY³GHDIQHVV´
3
I follow the standard convention used by many scholars of Deaf Studies where the use
RIXSSHUFDVHµ'HDI¶UHIHUVWRFXOWXUDODVSHFWVDQGWKHXVHRIORZHUFDVHµGHDI¶WRWKH
audiological and physical condition of deafness. I have chosen in most cases, to refer to
FKLOGUHQXVLQJWKHORZHUFDVHµGHDI¶VLQFHWKHLUFXOWXUDOLGHQWLW\PD\QRWEHGHYHORSHG
This is clearly the case for potential persons, and probably infants as well.
1

2
use a signed language primarily, where deaf people prefer to use the spoken language of
their community. I disagree with the use of this characteristic as the sole criterion:
language choice is not sufficient to distinguish Deaf people from deaf people, and to rely
on this as the sole criterion disregards the complexity of the deaf community. For
example, some deaf people use a signed language or system, but their primary orientation
is to the values and culture of the hearing world, and they do not consider themselves
culturally Deaf.4 Other deaf people are truly bilingual and bicultural, and float between
the Deaf and hearing worlds with ease, aligning themselves with both cultures and
identifying with both. My question and analysis focuses on those members of the deaf
community whose primary cultural affiliation is with the Deaf-World, and who consider
the property of being Deaf to be a highly desirable characteristic.5
It may seem to the reader familiar with Deaf Studies literature that I have taken a
vast leap by assuming that the Deaf community constitutes a separate culture, and
disregarded the many arguments against such a position.6 Without delving into the
controversial issue of whether Deaf people make up a culture or not, I would like to point
out that there is plenty of evidence that the Deaf community differs from the non-Deaf
community enough that it is considered separate from it. This distinction between the
non-Deaf community and the Deaf community is the point I wish to impress upon the

4

For the SXUSRVHVRIWKLVSURMHFW,XVHWKHWHUPVµ'HDIFXOWXUH¶DQG³VLJQLQJ'HDI
FRPPXQLW\¶WRVLJQLI\WKHSRSXODWLRQRIVLJQLQJDXGLRORJLFDOO\GHDISHRSOHZKRDUHPRVW
likely to consider using genetic technology in order to ensure a deaf child.
5
Carl Elliott, Bioethics, Culture, and Identity: A Philosophical Disease (New York:
Routledge, 1999), 42.
6
See Padden and Humphries, Inside Deaf Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2005), 3-10.
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reader -- my argument turns on the ways in which deafness is viewed by members of
these communities, and not on whether the Deaf community constitutes a full-fledged
culture.
At the risk of oversimplifying a complex topic, the difference between the two
community orientations boilVGRZQWRWKHµGHDIQHVVDVSDWKRORJ\¶YHUVXVµ'HDIQHVVDVD
FXOWXUDORXWORRN¶7 Hearing loss is a necessary condition for being Deaf, but not a
sufficient one ± a person with a profound hearing loss can be completely immersed in the
hearing world and may not even be aware of the existence of the Deaf community. At
least in practice, the use of a signed language as a primary or first language is not
sufficient for assigned status as Deaf. A hearing child of deaf parents may acquire a
signed language as her first language, but that child is not regarded as Deaf. (Some
scholars have noted the challenges of trying to combine a physical characteristic with the
cultural definition ± the work of Lennard Davis, a hearing Deaf Studies scholar and son
of Deaf parents addresses this).8 A consistent definition of what counts as Deaf is unclear,
and is a project beyond the scope of this project; for now, I will consider a person with an
unspecified degree of hearing loss and who uses a signed language as a primary language
to be Deaf.
The use of a signed language is a sociocultural marker. Members of the Deaf
community use a signed language, but contrary to popular belief, signed language is not

Charlotte Baker-Shenk and Dennis Cokely, A merican Sign LanguagH$7HDFKHU¶V
Resource Text on Grammar and Culture (Washington, DC: Clerc books, Gallaudet
University Press, 1981), 54.
8
/HQQDUG'DYLV³'HDIQHVVDQGWKH5LGGOHRI,GHQWLW\´ Chronicle of Higher Education,
January 7, 2007.
7

4
universal. In the United States of America and most of Canada, that language is
American Sign Language (ASL).9 Not all Deaf people in the United States learn ASL as
a first language, but all Deaf people hold tremendous respect for ASL and value it
highly.10 &RQQHFWHGWRWKHKLJKYDOXDWLRQRI$6/LVDµVDFUHG¶UHJDUGIRUWKHXVHRIKDQGV
in communication;11 consequently, the loss of the use of a hand is seen in much the same
way that hearing people regard the loss of the ability to speak. As is the case for members
of other minority groups existing in the larger culture, social relations in the Deaf
community are particularly treasured. Cultural values and behavioral mores found in
Deaf literature and stories are often transmitted in these social gatherings, as well as in
the home and residential schools.
Most members of sociolinguistic cultural groups harbor hopes for the continued
existence of their community. Deaf people are no different from others in this respect. I
propose to look at a somewhat unconventional use of genetic technology desired by some
Deaf parents, who hope to use these new technologies in order to assure the birth of deaf
RIIVSULQJ7KHGHVLUHWRHQVXUHWKDWRQH¶VFKLOGUHQVKDUHRQH¶VGLVDELOLW\PD\VHHPDELW
bizarre and easily dismissed as having no moral cogency. Yet, once this desire is
explained within the context of a minority group trying to maintain their language and
customs within a larger pluralistic society, it becomes more difficult to dismiss the moral
certitude of such a use of genetic technology as simply wrongheaded.
9

ASL is the signed language used in English speaking regions of North America. In
French speaking Canada, Langue des Signes Québéçoise (LSQ) is the commonly used
signed language.
10
&DURO3DGGHQ³7KH&XOWXUHRI'HDI3HRSOH´LQ A merican Deaf Culture: An Anthology,
ed. Sherman Wilcox (Silver Spring, MD: Linstock Press, 1989), 9.
11
Ibid.

5
Membership into the Deaf community typically occurs in two ways. A deaf child
may be born to Deaf parents and, by dint of these circumstances, be fully immersed in the
language and social behaviors of the community. A deaf child born to hearing parents
usually gains entrée into the community upon attending a residential school for the deaf
at an early age, though this has changed recently with the advent of charter schools. In
some cases, deaf individuals with hearing parents may not be immersed in the Deaf
community until they reach college ageWKHQDUUDWLYHRIµGLVFRYHULQJ¶WKH'HDI
community as a young adult is not unusual. Approximately five to ten percent of deaf
children have Deaf parents, even though Deaf people marry other Deaf people about
ninety percent of the time.12 Since the vast majority of deaf children have hearing parents,
the continued existence of the Deaf community depends to a great extent on the number
of deaf children born to hearing parents.
Not all deaf children born to hearing parents will go on to enter the Deaf
community; several factors influence the number of deaf children attending educational
institutions for the Deaf. The first of these is the language (and language mode) chosen
by the parents IRUWKHGHDIFKLOG,IDGHDIFKLOG¶VKHDULQJSDUHQWVGHFLGHWKDWWKHLUGHDI
child would be best served by communicating orally and aurally, that child will most
likely receive a cochlear implant and attend a school where the focus is on strengthening
spoken language skills. Some parents may decide against the cochlear implant, but still
opt to have their deaf child focus on learning to speak and speechread. Most recent data
Harlan Lane, Robert Hoffmeister, and Ben Bahan, A Journey into the Deaf-World (San
Diego: DawnSign Press, 1996), 30. Also Ross Mitchell, Travas Young, Bellamie
Bachleda, and Michael Karchmer³+RZ0DQ\3HRSOH8VH$6/LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV"´
Sign Language Studies 6:3 (2006), 312.
12
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suggests that this option has become less common; in most Western countries, cochlear
implants are the most common treatment for congenital deafness.13
In the past, many schools that emphasized oral and aural education were private
and costly, and DGHDIFKLOG¶VHGXFDWLRQDOSDWKZDVRIWHQGHSHQGHQWRQWKHPHDQVRIKLs
family.14 Parents with fewer resources sent their deaf child to the state school charged
with educating deaf children. A variation of this is seen today; deaf children from lower
income (hearing) families are less likely to obtain cochlear implants than those from
families with more economic resources.15 The effects of this on the demographics of the
signing deaf community remain to be seen.
Despite the swinging pendulum of deaf education at state schools that shifted
from signed language instruction to spoken language instruction and back again, deaf
children with hearing parents quickly learned to sign through their social interaction at
school with Deaf children of Deaf parents. By communicating with native signers, deaf
children with hearing parents acquired language transmission horizontally from their
Deaf peers. This method of language acquisition is unusual; most instances of language
transmission occur vertically, from adult (parent) to child. This horizontal pathway is also
used to some extent for transmission of cultural mores. The presence of Deaf adults in the
educational system, as residential dormitory supervisors, counselors, custodial staff,
teachers, and administrators also plays a role in the acquisition and transmission of
/LQGD.RPHVDURII³,QWURGXFWLRQ´LQSurgical Consent: Bioethics and Cochlear
Implantation, ed. Linda Komesaroff (Washington, DC: Gallaudet University Press,
2007), xi.
14
Carol Padden and Tom Humphries, Inside Deaf Culture, 18.
15
John B. Christiansen and Irene W. Leigh, Cochlear Implants in Children: Ethics and
Choices (Washington, DC: Gallaudet University Press, 2002), 112.
13

7
language and culture, though this may be highly variable depending on the number of
Deaf adults at the school and their amount of contact with children. Currently, there are
reasons to believe that this model for conveying sociocultural norms within the Deaf
community and mastering a signed language is endangered.
Two points are especially important for the reader to keep in mind: first, the low
rate of hereditary deafness that is passed on from parent to child sets up this situation, in
which parents who wish to have children like themselves are not likely to experience this
as others do through natural biological processes. Second, the uniqueness of horizontal
transmission of language and culture, which deaf adults of hearing parents respond to in a
variety of ways, including the desire to parent children who are likely to share their
cultural experiences. These experiences are not just confined to the physical experience
of being deaf, but include the cultural experiences found in schools for the deaf and
participation in horizontal transmission of language and culture, in addition to the vertical
transmission that would occur in the case of Deaf parents using a signed language and
conforming to sociocultural norms of the signing Deaf community. It is also notable that
hearing children of Deaf parents will, to some extent, also experience horizontal
transmission of culture, especially if they spend most of their pre-education years in the
signing Deaf community. It is not unusual to see a delay in spoken language acquisition
with these children, as well as some ignorance of social norms in the hearing
community.16

16

See Naomi B. Schiff and Ira M. Ventry³&RPPXQLFDWLRQ3UREOHPVLQ+HDULQJ
&KLOGUHQRI'HDI3DUHQWV´Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders 41: 348-358
(1976); Brenda C. Seal and Lisa A. Hammett, ³/DQJXDJH,QWHUYHQWLRQZLWKD&KLOGZLWK

8

T he Impact of Biotechnology on the Deaf Community Today
The current popularity of cochlear implant surgery among hearing parents of deaf
children, with its post-surgical rehabilitation emphasizing aural and oral skills, has led to
a reduction in the numbers of deaf children attending schools that emphasize signed
language. This has contributed to the closure of some state residential schools for the
deaf.17 When the FDA first announced the proposal in 1990 to provide children with
cochlear implants, the members of the Deaf community and Deaf organizations initially
reacted negatively and with a great deal of concern.18 In addition to ethical issues related
to performing elective and somewhat experimental surgery on a child who had not
consented to such a procedure, much was made of the potential for this surgery to
decimate the numbers of future Deaf people. Some members of the Deaf community
even referred to cochlear implant as ³cultural genocide´19
Nearly twenty years later, the ethical issues of cochlear implant surgery seem
almost quaint and outmoded given current developments in biotechnology. Looming on
the horizon is the newest potential threat to the continued existence of the Deaf
Hearing Whose Parents are Deaf,´A merican Journal of Speech-Language Pathology
4:15-21 (1995); and Jeanne M. Johnson, Ruth V. Watkins, and Mabel L. Rice, ³%LPRGDO
Bilingual Language Development in a Hearing Child of Deaf Parents,´Applied
Psycholinguistics 13: 31-52 (1992).
17
Carol Padden and Tom Humphries, Inside Deaf Culture, 16.
18
John B. Christiansen and Irene W. Leigh, Cochlear Implants in Children, p. 120. Also
'HV3RZHU³0RGHOVRI'HDIQHVV&RFKOHDU,PSODQWVLQWKH$XVWUDOLDQ'DLO\3UHVV,´
Journal of Deaf Studies and Deaf Education 10 (4): 451-459 (2005).
19
Harlan Lane DQG0LFKDHO*URGLQ³(WKLFDO,VVXHVLQ&RFKOHDU,PSODQW6XUJHU\$Q
Exploration into Disease, Disability, and the Best Interests of the Child,´ Kennedy
Institute of Ethics Journal 7 (3): 231-251 (1997).
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community: genetic technology. Widespread use of this technology has the potential to
profoundly affect future generations of the Deaf community, possibly leading to the
extinction or endangerment of this community.
In 1997, the discovery of Connexin 26, a gene for nonsyndromic deafness was
announced. This autosomal recessive gene was found to result in a one in four chance of
the birth of a deaf child if both parents were carriers. Connexin 26 is thought to be
responsible for 50%-80% of cases of hereditary deafness in some regions and populations
of the world, and 20%-30% of cases of deafness in the United States.20 The threat of
genetic technology, once seen as a matter for the distant future, became immediate upon
identification of this first gene for deafness. To date, more than one hundred genes for
syndromic and nonsyndromic deafness have now been identified.21 Currently clinical
screening is only available for the Connexin 26 (GBJ2) and Connexin-30 (GBJ6) genes,
though other screening may take place in research settings.22
In 2002, an Australian hearing couple undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF)
requested embryo screening or preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for the Connexin
26 gene. The couple, who were both carriers of the Connexin 26 gene, did not want a

20

Kathleen Arnos anG$UWL3DQG\D³*HQHVIRU'HDIQHVVDQG7KH*HQHWLFV3URJUDPDW
*DOODXGHW8QLYHUVLW\´LQ Genetics, Disability, and Deafness, ed. John Vickrey Van Cleve
(Washington, DC: Gallaudet University, 2005), 115.
21
Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man, OMIM (TM). McKusick-Nathans Institute of
Genetic Medicine, Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, MD) and National Center for
Biotechnology Information, National Library of Medicine (Bethesda, MD), accessed
December 10, 2010 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/omim/
22
$UWL3DQG\DDQG.DWKOHHQ$UQRV³*HQHWLF(YDOXDWLRQDQG&RXQseling in the Context
of Early Hearing Intervention and Detection´ Seminars in Hearing 2006 27 (3): 208.
Also per e-mail communication 15 July 2008 with Kathleen Arnos, plus genetics
counselors Anna Middleton and Rachel Belk in the United Kingdom.
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deaf child. Seven embryos were screened: one had two copies of the gene (deaf), five
had one copy of the gene (carrier), and one did not possess any copies of the Connexin 26
gene. The embryo without any copies of the Connexin 26 gene was implanted, but
pregnancy did not take.23
This case caused a furor in the Australian Deaf community, a community whose
numbers were already threatened due to the high percentage of cochlear implants taking
place ± one of the highest percentages for prelingually deaf children in the world at that
time.24 Many members of the Australian Deaf community felt that this was yet another
attack on the continued existence of their community and way of life.25 The Australian
,QIHUWLOLW\7UHDWPHQW$XWKRULW\UHVSRQGHGWRWKLVRXWFU\E\VWDWLQJ³6WULFWJXLGHOLQHV
would allow screening only when it would improve the health or physical condition of
the child. Deafness is a medical condition, not a frivolous or cosmetic use of
WHFKQRORJ\´26
The desire of hearing people to minimize the possibility of giving birth to a deaf
child may be part of what motivates Deaf people to consider the possibility of creating a
deaf child, since the numbers of potential Deaf community members would likely be
reduced by the use of PGD and other technologies. This is undoubtedly not the only
motivation, and it may not even be a primary motivation. Other reasons for wanting to
7RP1REOH³(PEU\RV6FUHHQHGIRU'HDIQHVV²a Quiet First for Australia´ Sydney
Morning Herald, July 11, 2003, accessed April 28 2004.
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/07/10/1057783286800.html
24
Personal conversation in February 2004 with Deaf Studies historian Breda Carty of
RIDBC Renwick Centre, University of Newcastle, Australia, who reports it was about
ninety percent at the time this story broke.
25
Power, 451-4.
26
Noble.
23
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have a deaf child center on what is perceived as best for the family unit, including the
best interests of the potential child and his parents.
The use of genetic technologies can also be used to select for deafness, and in
2002 a case in the United States drew much international media attention to this issue.
Two lesbian women, Sharon Duchesneau and Candace McCoullough, who wished to
have a deaf child, went to a sperm bank for artificial insemination (AI), hoping to acquire
sperm from a deaf donor:KHQQRWLILHGRIWKHVSHUPEDQN¶VSROLFLHVZKLFKIRUEDGHGHDI
donors, the women found a willing sperm donor in the Deaf community. Their donor, a
Deaf man with a family history of deafness spanning many generations, was autosomally
dominant for deafness, virtually guaranteeing that his offspring would be deaf.27 While
the approach used in this case was not PGD, but a low technology approach of µSOD\LQJ
WKHRGGV¶LQKRSHVRIFRQFHLYLQJDGHDIFKLOGLWSRLQWVWRWKHUHDOSRVVLELOLW\RI'HDI
parents wanting to use genetic and/or reproductive technology in order to bear deaf
children.28
The profession of genetic counseling places a high value on nondirectiveness, in
which the genetic counselor leaves all decisions regarding future reproduction up to the
parents.29 Rather than offering prescriptive suggestions about what the individual or
family ought to do, as is typical of other areas of medicine, genetic counselors are trained

/L]D0XQG\³$:RUOGRI7KHLU2ZQ´Washington Post Magazine, March 31, 2002.
I have chosen to refer to these (potential) children using the lower-FDVHµGHDI¶LQRUGHU
to emphasize the audiological status desired. In this situation, it is the case that, once
born, these children would be raised in the Deaf community, making them also culturally
Deaf.
29
Lynn B. Jorde, John C. Carey, Michael J. Bamshad, and Raymond L. White, Medical
Genetics, 3rd ed., (St. Louis: Mosby/Elsevier Science, 2003), 307.
27
28

12
to be value-neutral, and give their clients sufficient and accessible information so that
they may make an informed decision. Genetic counseling revolves around five themes:
risk determination, risk options, reproductive decision-making, medical management, and
support services.30 Potential parents consider information provided by genetic
counselors, but make decisions on their own.
Prior to the advent of genetic technologies such as PGD, some Deaf couples
sought genetic counselors in order to determine the chances of conceiving a deaf child.
At that time, hereditary pedigrees, plus limited knowledge of syndromic and nonsyndromic causes of deafness, were the only information available to genetic counselors
about which to inform their clients about the likelihood of having children with certain
genetic conditions. Despite the scanty amount of evidence available, some deaf couples
who availed themselves of the services at the Genetics Center at Gallaudet University and
elsewhere, decided to discontinue their relationships after learning of the slim to
nonexistent possibility of conceiving a deaf child rather than a hearing child.31 For these
couples, the possibility of using genetic technology in order to increase the chances of
having a deaf child would be welcome, given the high value assigned to the desire to
have deaf children. Services offered by such programs as the Genetics Center at
Gallaudet University now make it possible to determine much more accurate odds for
couples wishing to learn more about the types of hearing status likely to occur in their
potential offspring.

30
31

Ibid., 313.
$UQRVDQG3DQG\D³*HQHVIRU'HDIQHVV´-119.
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Now that the Human Genome has been mapped and more than one hundred genes
correlated to deafness have been identified, it is possible in many cases to determine
whether an embryo has a particular gene for deafness. Predicting the degree of hearing
loss is another matter. Hearing status among individuals can vary even when it is
attributable to the same genetic cause; it is not always possible to predict this since it
depends on a number of factors, some of which are not completely understood. Even
though hearing loss is a necessary condition for membership in the Deaf community, the
degree of loss may have some bearing on how a deaf child interacts with the community.
Current technology for selecting the physical trait of genetic deafness is relatively crude
and is not sophisticated enough to allow potential parents to determine degree of
deafness.
In addition to PGD, other technologies may soon be available to people wanting
to have deaf children, such as gene reSODFHPHQWWKHUDS\LQZKLFKDµQRUPDO¶JHQHLV
inserted into a somatic (body) cell, correcting a loss-of-function mutation; and gene
blocking therapies, which correct gain-of-function mutations.32 In other words, deafness
could be created by inserting a deaf gene where the absence of such results in hearing, or
deafness could be created by blocking the effects of a gene that causes hearing. Another
possibility is germline therapy, in which a genetic modification for deafness is injected
into an embryo, altering all cells of the body, including the gametes, which are
responsible for passing the genetic material on to the next generation.33 At this point,
human germline therapy is highly experimental and is not funded by the National
32
33

Jorde, Carey, Bamshad and White, Medical Genetics, 296-300.
Ibid., p. 301.
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Institutes of Health in the United States.34 However, since this could potentially omit deaf
genes from the genome altogether, I predict that this will become a great concern to the
Deaf community as this technology is refined.
In November 2007, Deaf people worldwide became aware of the potential impact
of genetic technology on signing Deaf communities when a clause prohibiting the use of
3*'WRVHOHFWIRUGLVDELOLW\ZDVLQFOXGHGLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶VSURSRVHG+XPDQ
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill (HFEB). Clause 14(4) (9) states:
Persons or embryos that are known to have a gene,
chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality involving a
significant risk that a person
with the abnormality will have or develop²
(a) a serious physical or mental disability,
(b) a serious illness, or
(c) any other serious medical condition,
must not be preferred to those that are not known to have
such an abnormality.35
This clause raises two issues of concern for deaf people living in the United Kingdom
(UK). The first deals with issues of reproductive liberty; under this clause, deaf people
who possess genes associated with deafness may be prevented from being gamete donors,

Help Me Understand Genetics Handbook, (Washington, D.C.: Lister Hill National
Center for Biomedical Communications, U.S. National Library of Medicine, 2011), 129.
35
United Kingdom Parliament, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL] 2007-08
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2007-08/humanfertilisationandembryology.html
(accessed 17 May 2008).
34
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or in some instances, have restrictions placed on their access to government supported
reproductive technology services. The second concern involves the question of what
kinds of people get to exist, or more precisely, government sanctioned preferences as to
who can be born. The language of this clause explicitly states that certain kinds of
embryos are preferable to others.
Additionally, explanatory note 109 to the HFEB specifically references deafness,
as seen below.
Clause 14(4) contains a provision that relates to the
provisions on embryo testing (see note on clause 11).
New sections 13(8) to (11) amend the 1990 Act to make
it a condition of a treatment license that embryos that are
known to have an abnormality (including a genderrelated abnormality) are not to be preferred to embryos
not known to have such an abnormality. The same
restriction is also applied to the selection of persons as
gamete or embryo donors. [ This would prevent si milar

situations to cases, outside the U K, where positive
selection of deaf donors in order deliberately to result in
a deaf child have been reported (italics added)].
Comments made during the discussion of this clause in the House of Lords indicated that
the case of Duchesneau and McCullouch motivated the inclusion of preference against
disability in this clause, prompting dialogue that to choose a fertilized egg/embryo that
was genetically compatible with disability was immoral and undesirable. This is
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supported in the discussion transcript of the second reading of the HFEB, where Baroness
Deech, of the House of Lords and former head of the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority for the UK stated, ³,KRSHWKDW\RXU/RUGVKLSVZLOOEHSOHDVHGWKDW
the deliberate choice of an embryo that is, for example, [ likely to be deaf] will be
prevented by Clause 14´ LWDOLFVDGGHG 36
The response from the Deaf community in the UK to the HFEB was swift. In
December 2007, the British Deaf Association issued a letter to the House of Lords asking
that Clause 14 (4)(9) be dropped.37 Deaf community members in the UK created a
website, Stop Eugenics, which received considerable attention, leading to international
press coverage featured by the London Times, BBC, CNN, and Der Spiegel, among
others.38
While this is the first law specifically addressing the issue of preference for and
against disability regarding appropriate uses of contemporary genetic technology, it is not
likely to be the last. Many of the questions and issues raised in the public debate and
discussion of the HFEB are taken up in the following pages. The next section provides an
outline of how these are addressed.
A n O verview of the Dissertation
Although my research focuses narrowly on the moral justification for Deaf
parents wanting to use genetic selection in order to have children who are deaf, this

36

UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill.
$OLVRQ%\UDQ³+)(%%'$'UDIWOHWWHUWR3URIHVVRU0DUFXV3HPEUH\´
http://www.grumpyoldeafies.com/2007/11/hfeb_bda_draft_letter_to_profe.html,
(accessed 17 May 2008).
38
Stop Eugenics, www.stopeugenics.org (accessed 17 May 2008).
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question has broader implications as well. People with achondroplasia, or little people,
have also gone to genetic counselors in order to determine whether they might have
children with achondroplasia.39 Genetic selection, which is prohibited in many parts of
the world, is currently done in the United States in order to selecWDQHPEU\R¶VVH[DVZHOO
as to select out certain kinds of disease or conditions, such as cystic fibrosis and Fanconi
anemia. Evidence suggests that, at least in some cases, sexual orientation may have a
genetic component;40 if so, this may be another area of gene selection ± one in which gay
or lesbian parents could potentially select for sexual orientation.
The obvious difference between these examples and deafness is that deafness is
the absence of the ability to operate one of the senses. Abilities related to sensory organs
are often given special status and separated out from other physical abilities or attributes
such as height. It is not immediately obvious why this is the case, or whether this is
something grounded in culture, physiology or perhaps both. The other cases listed above
do not involve the restrictions of sensory limitation; instead, other restrictions may exist,
VXFKDVQRWKDYLQJWKHSKHQRW\SHUHTXLUHGWRSOD\IRUWKH1%$RUQRWEHLQJµZLUHG¶IRU
traditional means of sexual expression or procreation. The similarity between these
examples and deafness is that gene selection motivated by sociocultural reasons held by
individuals may not mesh with the sociocultural expectations of the larger society, and
39

In the past, people with achondroplasia have been known as dwarves, which is
FRQVLGHUHGRIIHQVLYHLQVRPHFRPPXQLWLHV³/LWWOHSHRSOH´LVWKHSUHIHUUHGWHUPDWWKH
time of this writing.
40
Stella Hu, Angela M. L. Pattatucci, Chavis Patterson, Lin Li, David W. Fulker, Stacey
S. Cherny, Leonid Kruglyak and 'HDQ++DPHU³Linkage Between Sexual Orientation
and Chromosome Xq28 in Males But Not in Females,´Nature Genetics (1995) 11: 248.
doi:10.1038/ng1195-248.
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this is the question that I wish to press regarding the use of genetic technology in order to
bring about the birth of deaf individuals. The arguments I cover in Chapters Three, Four,
and Five have relevance for the use of reproductive genetic technology that extend
beyond the signing Deaf community and may be of use regarding the other issues I have
mentioned above.
One distinction that I have glossed over until now is the question of whether there
LVDQµDFWLYH¶RUµSDVVLYH¶GLVWLQFWLRQregarding the use of genetic technology in the
pursuit of a particular kind of child. (In this, I have something in mind analogous to the
moral GLVWLQFWLRQRIµDFWLYH¶DQGµSDVVLYH¶HXWKDQDVLDWKDWDSSHDUHGLQHDUO\ELRHWKLFV
literature, though that particular distinction is not widely held today).41 In the previous
section, I note that a Deaf couple could use PGD to select an embryo with genes
associated with deafness. This appears to be different in kind from altering the potential
auditory status of an existing µKHDULQJ¶embryo to become a µdeaf¶ embryo. The latter is
an action resulting in the creation of a deaf individual, where the former involves

selection among choices provided by nature.
It may be that this analogy only goes so far. One could make the argument that it
is logically possible for any genetic mutation to occur in nature, collapsing the distinction
I have set up between active as human genomic intervention and passive as natural
genomic process. Although this is correct, the reality of what is biologically possible and
what is biologically probable differ enough that this classification works as a practical
matter. As such, I have used these categories to frame my discussion.
6HH-DPHV5DFKHOV³$FWLYHDQG3DVVLYH(XWKDQDVLD´ New England Journal of
Medicine 292:78-80 (1975).

41
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I think a significant practical distinction exists between processes that are mostly
caused by human action and those likely to occur naturally with human facilitation.
However, I believe that the crux of the question of moral justification of using genetic
technology to create a deaf child is less reliant on the manner in which such a child is
created, and heavier weight should be given to the potential harm to that child. This harm
should be based, in part, if not wholly, on his status as a deaf person in the world.
In the case in which a deaf child is born to non-signing hearing parents, the deaf
child can be said to suffer a variety of harms ranging from partial access to language in
the family home and society, the inability to hear environmental noise, the inability to
fully participate in the culture of the hearing world, and so forth. This is the argument
attended to by many bioethicists, who acknowledge the existence of a Deaf culture, but
who gloss over what it means to be a Deaf child in a Deaf community.42 I hope to add a
different voice to the literature on this topic by offering a carefully nuanced explanation
of this cultural experience, and working through these arguments in light of this
background information.

42

To the best of my knowledge, few authors arguing for what I shall call the Deaf
FRPPXQLW\YLHZUHJDUGLQJWKHXVHRIELRPHGLFDOWHFKQRORJ\WRµFXUH¶GHDIQHVVKDYH
extensive personal experience with the Deaf community. Many articles by bioethicists
arguing against this issue offer superficial treatments of the Deaf community that indicate
an academic knowledge of the community at best. At worst, the picture they paint of the
Deaf community looks like a caricature of the Deaf world that I inhabit and live in. This
is not an essentialist claim that only Deaf people can understand the experience of what it
is to be Deaf, but simply an observation that a more comprehensive understanding of the
community, including direct engagement with many members, is likely to lead to
discussion of arguments that are more representative of those being articulated within the
community.
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In general, the current philosophical and bioethical literature is prone to two
mistakes in addressing the use of genetic technology as a means to having deaf children.
First, it conflates the experience of being deaf with the experience of being Deaf. While
there is some overlap, this territory is not carved out satisfactorily. The second mistake is
to neglect to provide sufficient cultural context for these kinds of decisions made by Deaf
parents. I shall argue that many of the same arguments concerning harm applied to deaf
child born to hearing parents are far less cogent when applied to a deaf child born to Deaf
parents. This opens up the possibility of providing a moral justification for the use of
genetic technology by Deaf parents in order to create a deaf child.
In Chapter Two, Historic Context and the Signing Deaf Community, I attempt to
sketch out a history of ideas about deafness that will provide a foundation for subsequent
chapters. First, I offer an overview of Deaf history, focusing on a few select events that
have shaped discourse about what it means to be deaf and how this is perceived by
mainstream (hearing) society in the United States. I argue that an understanding of this
history, and particularly the ways in which signing Deaf people have been discriminated
against or dismissed, is imperative to unpacking the desire for a deaf (Deaf) child.
Second, I consider the issue of cochlear implant surgery on prelingually deaf children and
offer an analysis of several ethical arguments related to the practice of this surgery. In
doing this, I attempt to establish that the arguments related to new biotechnologies, such
as genetics, are part of a historic chain of resistance and self-determination in the signing
Deaf community. I also note that identification and analysis of the arguments used in the
discourse on cochlear implants, in some cases, can be extended to genetic technology.
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&KDSWHUV7KUHHDQG)RXUUHIOHFWWKHDFWLYHSDVVLYHGLVWLQFWLRQ,¶YHQRWHGHDUOLHU
Chapter Three, Genetic Selection: Choosing Deaf Babies, takes on the issue of genetic
selection. By genetic selection, I include all instances of choice regarding existing genetic
material. Technologies covered under this classification include prenatal genetic
screening as well as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). In this chapter, I have
chosen to focus on genetic selection through PGD, applying a version of philosopher
'HUHN3DUILW¶V1RQ-Identity Problem. The Non-Identity Problem adopts a utilitarian
ethical analysis as to whether it is morally justifiable to implant an embryo that possesses
genes for deafness. By weighing the purported harm of disability against the benefit of
existence, Parfit concludes that in many cases, the net amount of harm is such that it is
justifiable. After considering challenges to the Non-Identity Problem, namely Dena
'DYLV¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIWKH&KLOG¶V5LJKW7R$Q2SHQ)XWXUH,H[WHQG3DUILW¶VUHDVRQLQJ
to the case of genetic deafness, and argue that argument remains a cogent approach to
genetic selection and as it currently stands, provides moral justification for genetic
selection of deafness.
Chapter Four, Genetic Alteration: Creating Deaf Babies, addresses the ethical
issue of altering genes in embryos and fetuses for the purpose of creating particular
physical characteristics in these individuals once they are born. In order to avoid the
QRUPDWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQVSURYRNHGE\WKHWHUP³JHQHWKHUDS\´,KDYHFKRVHQWRUHIHU
processes that modify genes as genetic alteration. Although it is the case that many of the
arguments I consider in Chapter Three could also be applied to genetic alteration, I do not
engage these arguments in Chapter Four. Instead, I consider a folk argument used
frequently in the signing Deaf Community discourse on cochlear implant technology.
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7KLVDUJXPHQWZKLFK,FDOO³7HQ)LQJHUV7HQ7RHV´PDNHVWKHFDVHWKDW D WKHGHDI
body is complete as it stands, and (b) attempts to fix or cure the deaf body are not morally
permissible for this reason. Since this is a folk argument and not an academic argument,
I have identified a philosophical concept within this argument, the notion of bodily
LQWHJULW\LQRUGHUWRGHYHORSDPRUHQXDQFHGDQDO\VLVRIWKLVDUJXPHQW¶VFRJHQF\
I begin by considering the question of bodily integrity in general, starting with an
evaluation of what it means for something to have bodily integrity, and noting under what
conditions this concept is typically employed. Following this, I hone in on established
DUJXPHQWVIRUFXOWXUDOO\DFFHSWDEOHSUDFWLFHVRI³QRQ-pathologicDO´ERGLO\DOWHUDWLRQ
such as male circumcision, in trying to determine cogent reasons justifying cultural
SUDFWLFHVRIFKLOGUHQ¶VERGLO\DOWHUDWLRQ3DUHQWVDUHJLYHQFRQVLGHUDEOHODWLWXGHLQWKH
NLQGVRIGHFLVLRQVWKH\FDQPDNHUHJDUGLQJWKHLUFKLOG¶VEody; typically the state only
LQWHUYHQHVZKHQWKHFKLOG¶VOLIHLVDWULVN5HFHQWO\ERG\-altering practices such as
female circumcision have called into question the issue of parental decision-making
regarding the extent to which parents control their chiOGUHQ¶VERGLHV,VVXHVRIWKHFKLOG¶V
µULJKW¶WRERGLO\LQWHJULW\VTXDUHRIIDJDLQVWWKHSDUHQW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIZKDWNLQGVRI
physical alterations are important for a good life. While the argument for parental
decision-making in the case of life-saving medical intervention is cogent and can override
the argument for bodily integrity, this is not as clear for non-essential practices carrying
partial or no medical benefit.
$QREYLRXVTXHVWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKLVDSSURDFKLVZKHWKHUDOWHUDWLRQRIRQH¶V
genome counts as bodily alteration. I argue that it does by providing an argument of
composition as partial justification for this claim ± LQVKRUWVLQFHRQH¶VJHQRPHLVD
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SK\VLFDOSDUWRIRQH¶VERG\LWLVFRQVLVWHQWWRFRQVLGHULQGLYLGXDOgenetic or genomic
integrity43 as an extension of bodily integrity. I also consider the philosophical issue of
identity-determining bodily alteration raised by philosopher Jeff McMahan, placing it in
the context of the bodily integrity debate. Following this is a section on Ravitsk\¶V
conditions of exit argument, in which the moral permissibility of genetic alteration is
HYDOXDWHGLQWHUPVRIDFKLOG¶VULJKWWREHORQJWRDQGH[LWDFXOWXUDOFRPPXQLW\,
conclude that the bodily integrity approach, while initially promising, ultimately raises
more questions than it answers, and that if this approach is to be helpful in answering
questions of moral justification for genomic alteration, much work remains to be done.
Chapter 5, my final chapter, sketches out a long range view of the implications of
my work regarding the question of whether it is morally justifiable to use genetic
technology in order to bring about the birth of a deaf child. I address the issue of deafness
as a harm in two ways. I start by considering the philosophical question of whether
deafness is a harm, and what sort of difference an answer to this question might make for
my project. Next, I outline some of the potential social and political issues ensuing from
the consequences of using genetic technology in order to cause the birth of a deaf child.
In addition to connecting my work to the practical questions of bioethics, this move also
broadens the question of harm from my focus on the individual to questions about
potential harm to the group and society. This move is akin to the elective disability
43

The terminology here is challenging. Genetic integrity is typically used to refer to
maintain the genetic composition of a species; this is sometimes synonymous with
genomic integrity. As I understand it, genome refers to the range of normal genetic
expression within a species; it appears that genetic integrity can apply to an individual or
cluster of individuals within a species. I will use genetic integrity to refer to the genetic
material of a species, and genomic integrity to refer to an individual.
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argument used in the debate over cochlear implants. The elective disability argument,
which is first introduced in the cochlear implant discussion in Chapter 2, assumes that
people who have chosen to remain disabled, or who have not actively pursued measures
for ameliorating disability, have not lived up to their responsibility to society. In the case
of genetics, this argument turns on the responsibilities of the parents to society, and less
so on the deaf child, who had no choice regarding her particular genetic composition and
thus bears no responsibility for existing with this particular characteristic.
While this chapter concludes my dissertation, it reaches no neat or singular
conclusion regarding the moral justification of using genetic technology in order to bear a
deaf child. Rather, the contributions of this chapter, and those preceding, rest on the
detailed (and sometimes novel) ways which the broad question is parsed and evaluated. It
is my hope that I leave the reader with a roadmap offering several avenues for continuing
the discussion of this question in depth.
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C hapter 2 H istoric Context and the Deaf Community
T he Desire for a Deaf C hild
A preference for a deaf child over a hearing child does not occur in a vacuum, but
in a particular context that is influenced by historical and contemporary social factors.
The desire to have a deaf child is often dismissed as one propelled by ignorance or a lack
of experience; underlying this dismissive and somewhat paternalistic attitude is the
assumption that if the potential (Deaf) parents had experiential knowledge of the ability
to hear, all things being equal, they would never consider deliberately bearing a deaf
child. One unstated premise in this argument is that it is better to hear than not to hear,
but this is seldom argued for and usually viewed as a prima facie claim. I will take up this
argument again in the final chapter; at this point I wish to impress upon the reader that
this claim has yet to be argued. Another issue seldom considered in depth when
discussing the preference of some Deaf people for deaf children is the importance of the
KLVWRULFDOUHFRUGLQVKDSLQJ'HDISHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVWKHLUFXOWXUDOFRPPXQLW\DQG
by extension, ideas about tKHLURZQSODFHDQGWKHLUIDPLO\¶VSODFHZLWKLQWKLVFRPPXQLW\
In order to develop an understanding of why Deaf parents might wish to have
Deaf children, it is helpful to understand some of the history of the signing Deaf
community, as well as narrative themes and arguments used by this community in the
past. My aim in this chapter is twofold: first, to provide a brief overview of the historical
background with an analysis of how certain key events and responses to those events
have shaped the current desire and preference for deaf children. Second, to provide an
analysis of some of the arguments used in the evaluation of the ethical issues related to
cochlear implant surgery for prelingually deaf children, a topic that bears many relevant
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similarities to the issues regarding uses of genetic technology for the signing Deaf
community. My discussion of these topics assumes the sociocultural framework of the
Deaf-World, a concept popularized by Bahan, Lane and Hoffmeister in their book A

Journey into the Deaf-World.44 The Deaf-World refers to the international signing Deaf
community, who view themselves as part of a transnational sociolinguistic community
with a shared ownership and direct connection to multi-national historical events
involving or affecting signing Deaf people.
I will focus the next three sections on events that have definitively shaped the
signing Deaf community (Deaf-World), starting with a sea change in the education of
deaf children. The story of Deaf education is enshrined in a folk narrative that begins in
the mid-HLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\ZLWKDFKDQFHPHHWLQJEHWZHHQWKH$EEp'HO¶(SpHDQG two
deaf sisters, which led him to found the first school for the deaf using signs.45 The Abbé
'HO¶(SpH¶VOHJDF\RIHVWDEOLVKLQJVFKRROVIRUGHDIFKLOGUHQ that stressed signed language
as the best means for educating these children was rejected in 1880, when educators of
the deaf at the 1880 World Conference for the Deaf in Milan voted to educate deaf
children through the oral method.46 After considering the effects of this policy on deaf
educational practices, I follow this with a look at the concomitant eugenics movement,
which had an equally powerful impact on the signing Deaf community, devaluing signed
languages and users of signed languages for what I believe are similar reasons. Another
seminal event in the signing Deaf community takes place approximately one hundred
44
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years later: the Deaf President Now (DPN) protest at Gallaudet University. This event
marks a significant transition in how the signing Deaf community defines its community
and frames its arguments, rejecting the pathological definitions of deafness focusing on
the burden of deafness in favor of a sociolinguistic communitarian definition that
emphasizes justice and civil rights claims. This change in thinking is also reflected in the
initial response of the signing Deaf community to the emergence of cochlear implant
surgery on prelingually deaf children as a potentially effective treatment for deafness,
which occurs around the same time as DPN, and which I address in my final section.
Each of these historic events is notable because of the alterations in discourse that
emerged around these particular contexts ± shortly after the Milan conference we see an
emphasis on the use of normative language proclaiming the superiority of educating deaf
children through spoken language and relying on the calculus of benefits and burdens oft
cited by supporters of eugenics. Prior to this, many professionals associated with deaf
education and signing deaf people relied on an ethical framework that prioritized
recognizing the human dignity inherent in each individual. This is exemplified in Abbé
'HO¶(SpH¶VGHFLVLRQWRHGXFDWHGHDIFKLOGUHQVRWKDWWKH\FRXOGPRUHIXOO\SDUWDNHLQWKH
life of the community including participation in religious rituals, which was the primary
LPSHWXVEHKLQG'HO¶(SpH¶VDFWLRQV47 A little more than a century later during the DPN
SURWHVWDW*DOODXGHW8QLYHUVLW\LQWKHVLJQLQJ'HDIFRPPXQLW\¶VGLVFRXUVH
transformed from consequentialist leanings regarding the burdens of being a signing Deaf
person in and to society, shifting to ethical arguments stressing claims of fairness and

47

Harlan Lane, When the Mind Hears (New York: Random House, 1984), 58.
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justice derived from civil and human rights. This rights-based discourse also emerges as
one of the primary themes in the debate about cochlear implant surgery on prelingually
deaf children. Admittedly, these arguments may be a bit too neatly categorized, and I
acknowledge that there is more to the story than the labels I have assigned; still, these
classifications serve as a useful shorthand for evaluating the impact of key historical
HYHQWVRQWRGD\¶VVLJQLQJ'HDIFRPPXQLW\
I devote the final section of this chapter to an argument analysis of the ethics of
cochlear implant surgery on prelingually deaf children. Cochlear implant surgery is the
first instance of medical technology aimed at deaf children that has had a significant
impact on their lived experience as it relates to their ability to process sound. While
cochlear implants do not perfectly restore hearing, in some case children function well
enough with them to rely primarily on audition. Thus, by removing potential signers from
the community, cochlear implant technology has had a much more pronounced effect on
the signing Deaf community. Early community recognition of the potential impact of the
cochlear implant on the signing Deaf community resulted in position papers and other
written documents representing a variety of views expressed within the community;
among other things, dissemination of this information in written English provided a way
for scholars who did not know ASL to access these viewpoints and evaluate them.
Another class of cures for deafness deals with the treatment of diseases with the
potential for causing deafness as a secondary effect. Vaccines developed for preventing
the onset of rubella and mumps, while not initially aimed at reducing the number of deaf
children, created this effect by reducing the number of children who contracted these
diseases, and the secondary side effects, which could include deafness or hearing loss.
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The development of these vaccines, which occurred well before the civil rights
movement of DPN, did not engender the response that cochlear implant surgery did. One
reason is that as a preventive measure, the beneficiaries of these vaccines are viewed as
hearing, not as potential members of the signing Deaf community. Those who might have
become deaf are not identifiable, since it is not possible to know which children would
have contracted these diseases and become deaf as a result. This contrasts with cochlear
implant surgery, which is performed on children who are already deaf and therefore seen
as potential, even rightful, members of the signing Deaf community.
Awareness of the potential effects of genetic technology on the signing Deaf
community is starting to develop within the community; resources articulating these
issues, such as position papers, are just beginning to appear. As a case in point, the
impact of genetic technology was addressed for the first time in 2007 in a plenary address
at the 15th World Congress of the World Federation of the Deaf in Madrid.48 Since
knowledge of the potential consequences of genetic technology on the signing Deaf
community is just starting to become part of the public discourse in these communities
worldwide, philosophically complex arguments related to these issues has not been
widely circulated or delineated. In November 2007, the international signing Deaf
community became aware of proposed changes to the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Bill in England due in part to a letter released by the British Deaf
Association letter that expressed their concerns about a particular clause limiting genetic
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preference.49 The letter, drafted by deaf academics with scholarly expertise in
conjunction with the British Deaf Association president Francis Murphy, elicited lively
discussion in cyberspace on this topic.50 Since the effects of genetic technology on the
signing Deaf community are analogous in relevant ways to the effects of cochlear implant
surgery on the community, some of the arguments used to evaluate the ethics of cochlear
implant surgery on prelingually deaf children are likely to be indicative of the discourse
regarding ethical use of genetic technology within the signing Deaf community. Initial
review of internet discussion on vlogs, blogs, and popular media stories on the HFEB
appears to support this.51
Benefits and Burdens: Deaf E ducation in the 19th C entury
Starting with education, the signing Deaf community has experienced several
challenges to its continued existence. In addition to education, scientific campaigns to
relieve deaf people (and society) of the burden of deafness include the eugenics
movement occurring during the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, the
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development of cochlear implant surgery in the twentieth century, and WRGD\¶Vgenetic
technologies. Although the players in deaf education are starkly depicted as favoring the
use of signed languages or opposing them, the lines are less clearly drawn in biomedical
science. One complicating factor is that in some ways, projects aimed at curing deafness
can be seen as having a double effect. Researchers set on identifying a cure for deafness
may not hold the view that the signing deaf community ought to be eradicated, and may
in fact agree that signed languages have intrinsic and instrumental value.52 However, if
cures for deafness are pursued, the subsequent impact on signed language communities
may lead to the unintended consequence of reducing the number of potential signed
language users. Since linguistic communities need a critical mass of language users to
sustain the viability of a language, the secondary effect of medical cures for deafness on
signed languages is likely to be quite significant in the near future.
Whether working in the field of deaf education or biomedicine, researchers are
liNHO\WREHPRWLYDWHGE\DGHVLUHWRGRJRRGRUWRLPSURYHWKHTXDOLW\RIGHDISHRSOHV¶
lives. What is up for question is how good is to be defined; another challenge is
GHWHUPLQLQJKRZWRJRDERXWPHDVXULQJRQH¶VTXDOLW\RIOLIHLQFOXGLQJPDNLQJ
distinctions between those factors that are socially constructed and those that are much
more reliant on the physical aspects of deafness. One concept that has recently gained
popularity with social constructivists is audism.
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While there is some dispute over the range and depth of how audism should be
defined, I will set this aside and offer a working definition of audism for the purposes of
my analysis in this chapter. Audism deals with a kind of thinking analogous to racism or
sexism or ableism ± it refers to instances when members of a particular group are treated
in specific ways (usually discriminatory) based on beliefs about collective characteristics
possessed by members of the group. In the case of audism, these beliefs affirm a
preference for and assumeGVXSHULRULW\RIKHDULQJSHRSOHDQGKHDULQJSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRUV
over those of culturally Deaf people, though I argue elsewhere for a broader definition. 53
Some examples of these beliefs are that signed languages are not real languages, but
picture languages; that Deaf people are incapable of carrying out many of the duties of
citizenship; that it is better to be Hearing than to be Deaf; and that spoken languages are
always superior to signed languages.54
Institutional audism refers to institutional practices and assumptions that promote
audist attitudes, behaviors, and priorities. The professions of education, medicine, (and to
a lesser extent) religion, have contributed to institutional audism in their quest to
normalize, fix, cure, or heal deaf people. The devaluation of both signed language and
social mores and behaviors within the signing Deaf community is frequently associated
53
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with these professions; I am not fully persuaded that the cause and effect of these
judgments is necessarily as straightforward as some have claimed.55 It may be the case
that the patronizing and belittling attitudes aimed towards Deaf people simply reflect
attitudes already present in Hearing society and do not originate within these professions.
At minimum, advocating for the primacy of spoken language over signed language and
codifying this belief into professional practices likely reinforces audist attitudes about the
capabilities of Deaf people. Genetic technology is viewed by many members of the
signing Deaf community as one morHVWRU\LQWKHQDUUDWLYHRIPDLQVWUHDPVRFLHW\¶V
oppression of Deaf people, or audism.
Education of the deaf was one of the first spheres of contention against audist
attitudes and practices, and in many ways, continues to be the site of similar discourse
today. 'HEDWHVWLOOUDJHVWRGD\UHJDUGLQJZKRµRZQV¶DODQJXDJHZKRVKRXOGKDYHWKH
authority to decide how a deaf child is best educated, and what educational and
biomedical pathways are best suited for deaf children (and less so a particular deaf child).
From the eighteenth century into the mid-nineteenth century, deaf education was mostly
manualist. Primarily conducted in signed systems and signed languages, this changed
radically in 1880 at the infamous International Congress of Educators of the Deaf in
Milan.
This movement against the use of fully accessible signed communication and
language in deaf education is forever marked by the decision made at the Milan
Congress, which decreed that educational instruction in signed languages should be
H-'LUNVHQ%DXPDQ³$XGLVP: Exploring the Metaphysics RI2SSUHVVLRQ´Journal of
Deaf Studies and Deaf Education 9.2 (2004): 241.
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forsaken in lieu of an oral/aural approach to education that focused on speaking and
speechreading. Due to some political outmaneuvering, teachers who were themselves
deaf were not permitted to vote on the instructional recommendation to change from
manualism to oralism; after the International Congress passed its resolution, educators of
the deaf were forbidden to use signed languages in schools, though some countries
followed these practices more stringently than others.56 Members of the signing Deaf
community believed the move from a fully accessible language to a partially accessible
language to be burdensome rather than beneficial. Hearing educators of the deaf viewed
this differently, focusing instead on the benefits of knowing a spoken language, rather
than the difficulty of trying to function in mainstream society with only partial access to
spoken language.
As seen below, the language of the two resolutions passed at the Congress in
Milan offers reasons supporting these decisions.
1. The Convention, considering the incontestable superiority of speech over signs,
(1) for restoring deaf-mutes to social life, (2) for giving them greater facility of language,
declares that the method of articulation should have preference over that of signs in the
instruction and education of the deaf and dumb.
2. Considering that the simultaneous use of signs and speech has the disadvantage
of injuring speech and lipreading and precision of ideas, the Convention declares that the
pure oral method should be preferred.57
In addition to offering clear evidence for supporting audist beliefs that spoken
languages were better than signed languages and that deaf people were socially isolated
and less adept with language and clarity of thought, these resolutions resulted in two
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other consequences that greatly affected the signing Deaf community worldwide. First, it
removed signing Deaf people from educating deaf children, since the emphasis was now
on speech and sound which they could not access or assess. By taking this work away
from deaf people, the burden of deafness was reinforced. Second, it created
circumstances in which signed communication was discouraged and forbidden, driving
this method of communication underground in schools for the deaf, and to some extent,
elsewhere in the community that used it. Combating social isolation in mainstream
hearing society was a priority; encouraging social interaction among signing Deaf people
was not. The Milan legacy against signing as a pedagogical mode continued in deaf
education for more than 70 years, becoming part of the historical narrative that pitted the
mores and preferences of signing Deaf people against those who believed Deaf people
would be better off fully assimilated into the Hearing world. What those supporting the
Milan policy neglected to consider was that deaf people, no matter how skilled in
speechreading they might become, would never have the same level of access to spoken
language as a hearing person in the same situation. The deaf person would always be at a
disadvantage, effectively living as a second-class citizen in mainstreamed society due to
the consequences of missed and misunderstood information.
One reason the pendulum of deaf education had swung to oralism at that time was
because of the support of Alexander Graham Bell, a public figure and strong advocate of
oralism with several connections to the deaf community, including his early years as an
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educator of the deaf, and his deaf mother and wife.58 Bell used his bully pulpit to appeal
to the public in a variety of ways: offering public exhibitions showcasing the oralist
abilities of deaf people; founding the Volta Review, a journal advocating the oralist
approach; and establishing the American Association to Promote the Teaching of Speech
to the Deaf. This organization later became the Alexander Graham Bell Association of
the Deaf, an organization still in existence today that promotes oralist education as a
means of assimilating deaf and hard of hearing children into mainstream society.59
The primary argument offered for making the change from education provided
through signed language to oralist education was that deaf people would be better
equipped to assimilate into mainstream society, making sure that the deaf child was being
prepared for a future that fit the mainstream (Hearing) conception of the good life.60
Although this vision of the good life equated spoken language acquisition with economic
security and self-sustenance, many educators of the deaf considered spoken language
acquisition an unrealistic goal. In their view, the tradeoff for learning to speak and
speechread was too high ± countless hours that could have been devoted to the
acquisition of information that would help the deaf student better understand the world
she lived in would be sacrificed for hours spent on ensuring that a word was pronounced
correctly, a difficult task for one with no residual hearing.
The manualist viewpoint of the good life has deep roots in the history of
American deaf education. +DUODQ/DQH¶VVHPLQDOERRNWhen the Mind Hears: A History
Oliver Sacks, Seeing Voices: A Journey into the World of the Deaf (New York:
HarperPerennial, 1990), 27.
59
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of the Deaf, covers the story of deaf education by using surviving documents as a basis
for relaying this story from the viewpoint of Laurent Clerc. Clerc, a Deaf intellectual in
Paris during the eighteenth century, came to the United States at the behest of Thomas
Gallaudet, the founder of the first school for the deaf in America. The American School
for the Deaf in Hartford, Connecticut, established in 1817, not only provided instruction
in signed language that eventually became American Sign Language, but also established
a standard for deaf education in the United States. A signing Deaf man, Clerc developed
a strong belief informed by personal experience that education through the language of
signs was the best way to enlighten deaf students.61 His views are illustrated in this
entreaty to an audience of prominent Bostonians regarding the establishment of a school
for deaf children to provide instruction in signed language.
It is to speak to you more conveniently of the deaf and dumb, of those unfortunate
beings who, deprived of the sense of hearing and consequently of that of speech,
would be condemned all their life to the most sad vegetation if nobody came to
their succor, but who intrusted to our regenerative hands, will pass from the class
of brutes to the class of men.
It is to affect your hearts with regard to their unhappy state, to excite the
sensibility and to solicit the charity of your generous souls in their favor;
respectfully to entreat you to occupy yourselves in promoting their future
happiness.62
&OHUF¶VXVHRIWKHFRQFHSWVRIKDSSLQHVVDQGXQKDSSLQHVVKHUHDQGHOVHZKHUHXQGHUVFRUHV
the importance of framing education as not merely a means to gain admission to the
world of hearing people, but also reminds his audience that for deaf people, it is through
RQH¶VKDQGVWKDWWKHJRDORIEHFRPLQJIXOO\KXPDQFDQEHUHDOL]HG
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&OHUF¶VYLVLRQRIHGXFDWLRQFRQWUDVWVVKDUSO\ZLWKWKHRUDOLVWHGXFDWLRQDO
pedagogy offered sixty years later by the educators who proposed and passed the
resolution at the Milan Congress. These (mostly hearing) educators valued assimilation
into mainstream society most of all and believed that acquiring speechreading skills and
spoken language was the way to achieve this. This oralist-manualist debate continues in
deaf education today, and is far from over. The cochlear implant offers a contemporary
twist to this longstanding issue. Although it does not exactly replicate the sense of
unaided hearing, children with cochlear implants are much more likely to attend schools
that emphasize oral education. Typically, their ability to acquire spoken language with
the implant is better than attempting to do so without the implant. Thus, most parents
who opt to educate their deaf child using spoken language will also obtain a cochlear
implant for that child. Yet, recent evidence suggests that children with cochlear implants
who are exposed to both a signed language and a spoken language develop language
acquisition in both languages, and that signed language does not impair the acquisition of
spoken language.63 In fact, scholars now suggest that it may help spoken language
acquisition.64 Given this it will be interesting to see whether a bilingual approach for
children with cochlear implants becomes the standard.
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I have provided this background to provide context to the discussion of emerging
technologies that promise to cure or eradicate deafness. I contend that variations of the
questions surrounding the best way to educate children ultimately surface in discussions
about the uses of genetic technology related to the physical characteristics of hearing
variation - ranging from preference for species-typical hearing ability to preference for
audiological deafness. Questions about what constitutes the good life, what kinds of
opportunities and options are available to a signing Deaf person or oral deaf person, as
well as questions about the kinds of commitments one ought to expect from a just society
all play a part in this discussion. The historical record of this educational debate offers a
rich repository for evaluating and developing arguments related to genetic technology.
Unfortunately, this task lies beyond the scope of my dissertation, but it is worth noting
here and I hope that others will consider pursuing this project.
Benefits and Burdens: E ugenics and the Deaf Community
Around the same time that the Milan conference occurred, the pseudo-science of
eugenics was taking hold in Britain and the U.S., led by none other than the inventor of
WKHWHOHSKRQH$OH[DQGHU*UDKDP%HOOZKRDUJXHGIRUIRVWHULQJµSRVLWLYH¶HXJHQLFV
among deaf people, including signing Deaf people. Positive eugenics promoted mating
DQGPDUULDJHRIWKRVHRIµJRRG VWRFN¶QHJDWLYHHXJHQLFVUHVWULFWHGSURFUHDWLRQRIWKRVe
viewed as genetically unfit.
In 1883, shortly after the passage of the Milan Congress resolutions, Bell
published his address to the National Academy of Sciences titled Memoirs upon the

40
Formation of a Deaf Variety of the Human Race.65 This paper is said to have been
SURPSWHGLQSDUWE\%HOO¶VYLVLWs WR0DUWKD¶V9LQH\DUGZKLFKKDGDKLJKSHUFHQWDJHRI
deaf individuals living on the island due to a recessive gene brought over by an English
settler in 1694.66 %HOO¶VDGGUHVVLVRIWHQPLVLQWHUSUHWHGDVDZKROHVDOHDWWDFNRQWKHULJKW
of deaf people to exist; historian Brian Greenwald offers a more complex interpretation
RI%HOO¶VSRVLWLRQWKDWWDNHVLQWRDFFRXQWWKHVRFLDOPRRGRIWKHWLPHVDQG%HOO¶V
associations with deaf people, including those who used signs.67 Greenwald points out
WKDW%HOO¶VWKLQNLQJRQHXJHQLFVZDVGHYHORSHGDVSDUWRIKLVUHVSRQVHWRVXSSRUW%HOO¶V
already formed beliefs about the superiority of oralism and spoken language. Through
the promotion of hearing-deaf marriages such as his own and that of his parents, Bell
believed that fewer deaf children were likely to be born and the corresponding decrease
in numbers of deaf children would ultimately impact the sustainability of signed
languages, which he viewed as a major obstacle in the education of the deaf. Signing
Deaf people, of course, viewed the potential eradication of their language quite
differently.68
:KDWLVRIWHQRYHUORRNHGLQ%HOO¶VHXJHQLFVFRPPHQWDU\LVKLVDZDUHQess and
NQRZOHGJHRIWKHVLJQLQJ'HDIFRPPXQLW\%HOO¶VGHVLUHWRSUHYHQWWKHVSUHDGRI'HDI
culture was not borne of ignorance about the community ± he was well acquainted with
Alexander Graham Bell, Memoirs upon the Form ation of a Deaf Variety of the Human
Race (New Haven: National Academy of Sciences: 1883).
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the signing Deaf community and could sign and fingerspell. His address noted the many
ways in which deaf people were separated from the mainstream, positing this as a threat
to mainstream American society that was not dissimilar to the threat posed by immigrants
who clung to their language and customs instead of assimilating into the customs of their
new home.69
One of the objections often posed to arguments supporting the desire of Deaf
potential parents for deaf children is that hearing children of Deaf parents (CODAs) have
the same opportunity to partake of Deaf culture as deaf children do.70 Given this, one
could argue that a hearing child in a Deaf family obtains the benefits of Deaf culture and
a signed language without directly experiencing the burdens of audism. Yet, their
experiences are necessarily different because of their additional ability to enter
mainstream Hearing society in a way that differs from that of their Deaf counterparts.
This significant difference shapes the way in which hearing adult children with Deaf
parents view the signing Deaf community, leading to a variety of outcomes. It is striking
that one of the leading proponents of eugenics and opponents to the signing Deaf
community was not only the child of a deaf mother and hearing father, but also married a
deaf woman. I will provide a more detailed analysis of the issues presented by what I call
WKH&2'$REMHFWLRQLQ&KDSWHURIP\GLVVHUWDWLRQEXWDWWKLVSRLQW,¶GMXVWOLNHWRIODJ
the blanket assumption that hearing children of deaf parents will be honorary members of
69
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the signing Deaf community and act as ambassadors for this community within the
hearing world. The counterexample of Alexander Graham Bell serves to remind us that
this is not necessarily the case.
2QHRIWKHPRUHWUHQFKDQWREVHUYDWLRQVWKDW*UHHQZDOGPDNHVDERXW%HOO¶V
contributions tRWKH$PHULFDQHXJHQLFVPRYHPHQWLVWKDW%HOO¶VVWDWXVPD\KDYH
protected Deaf people from being subject to negative eugenics policies such as
sterilization.71 %HOO¶VSURPLQHQFHDVDQLQYHQWRUSOXVKLVH[SHUWLVHRQGHDIQHVVJDYHKLV
opinions credence in scientific circles. Even though many of the eugenicists Bell
interacted with supported negative eugenics measures, this effort was not constructed to
LQFOXGHGHDISHRSOH*UHHQZDOGRIIHUVWKHH[SODQDWLRQWKDW%HOO¶VWKRURXJKNQRZOHGJHRI
Deaf people helped forestall this by setting Deaf people apart from the groups that were
WDUJHWHGIRUVXFKSUDFWLFHV+HQRWHV³%HOONQHZWKDW'HDISHRSOHZHUHQRW
feebleminded, and he did not confuse the lack of intelligible speech or poor English
language skills with menWDOUHWDUGDWLRQ´6LQFHHXJHQLFLVWVUHOLHGRQFRQFHSWVVXFKDV
abnormality to determine what kinds of lives and people burdened state resources, with a
deaf wife, it is likely that Bell would have rejected the of abnormality label for deaf
people, substituting his vision of oralism as a more appropriate way for Deaf people to
gain normal status and persuading those around him of the same.72
Even though there were no laws on the books in the United States specifically
mandating the sterilization of deaf people, as there were for other kinds of people deemed
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unfit to reproduce, Deaf people were still subject to involuntary sterilization.73 Evidence
of sterilization of deaf people is difficult to obtain, though it is thought to occur more
often when the Deaf people were considered mentally unfit or deficient.74 Additionally,
UHVWULFWLRQRIGHDISHRSOH¶VUHSURGXFWLYHFDSDELOLWLHVZDVRIWHQOHIWDVDGHFLVLRQIRU
family members, who could make these decisions without the knowledge and consent of
the parties involved.75
In her book Signs of Resistance, historian Susan Burch recounts one of the most
egregious sterilization cases to come to light: the story of Junius Wilson, a Deaf AfricanAmerican man who was sent to the residential program in the Colored Department of the
North Carolina School for the Deaf and Blind in 1915 at age seven. After a series of
events, he moved back home, where communication was difficult since his family did not
know the sign dialect that he used. About a year after he returned home, Wilson was
accused of raping his aunt. Shortly afterward, Junius Wilson was found incompetent to
stand trial; Burch infers this was at least in part because no one could communicate with
him in the sign dialect he preferred. He was given indefinite housing at the State Hospital
for the Colored Insane. In 1931, after sterilization laws had been passed by the state of
North Carolina, Junius Wilson was castrated. He remained at the state hospital for
seventy-six years, until his social worker filed suit against the state of North Carolina for
wrongful incarceration based on hospital records in 1970 that identified Wilson as sane.
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(New York: New York University Press, 2002), 136.
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:LOVRQ¶VFDVHZDVVHWWOHGRXWRIFourt; he was given a small house to live in, with
provisions for his continued care on the grounds of the hospital where he had spent most
of his life.76
Burch makes two key points about the Junius Wilson case in her analysis. First,
she acknowledges that cases such as these are rare; second, she notes that stories such as
this reinforce concerns that members of the Deaf community are vulnerable to the
policies and practices of the dominant Hearing society. Medical attitudes towards the
moral permissibility of sterilizing deaf people with the intent of preventing the social
burden incurred by the birth of more deaf individuals were accepted well into the midtwentieth century; and this continues to be part of the eugenics narrative recounted in the
signing Deaf community.77 This ties into additional speculation within the Deaf
community that African-American deaf females may have been sterilized as an extension
of the socially accepted practices for sterilizing black women in the American South
during the mid-twentieth century,78 though this is currently undocumented as those
affected have not been willing to share their stories publicly.79
Prohibitions against using signed language in the schools and pressures on
procreative liberty through proposed legislation prohibiting the intermarriage of deaf
people were two strong social forces working against Deaf people from the late
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nineteenth century into the mid-twentieth century. Motivations for each practice stem at
least in part, from the desire to reduce the strain on social resources at the time and in the
foreseeable future. With this as the backdrop to the technological advances of science and
medicine of the twentieth century, it is no doubt easier to understand why the Deaf
community has not been eager to embrace technologies, such as cochlear implant
surgery, that purport to both fix them and simultaneously have the potential to threaten
the continued existence of their linguistic minority community.
Surprisingly, this issue of historical and contemporary context has largely been
ignored in the bioethics and philosophical literature surrounding the question of genetic
selection for hearing loss. Scholars from these fields typically frame the question in a
much simpler way, positing the desires of Deaf potential parents as primarily related to
wanting a child who is like the parents, without much regard for the motivations of the
Deaf potential parent or the complexity of the reasons underlying the desire for a Deaf
child. Reasons for neglecting the historical context of the signing Deaf community may
also stem from a general lack of scholarly philosophical analysis of parental reasons for
preferring a particular characteristic for their child. Cases such as sex selection have not
been as thoroughly examined in developed countries like the United States as they have
in countries, such as China, that have regulations indirectly encouraging the selection of
one sex over another. Analyzing the ascription of reasons to sex preference in the United
6WDWHVVXFKDVZDQWLQJDFKLOGZKRLVPDOHOLNHRQHVHOIIRUµIDPLO\EDODQFLQJ¶RU
preferring females because they are perceived as easier to raise, may prove fruitful in
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trying to flesh out a more complex picture of why parents desire certain characteristics in
their children.80
It is well known that the eugenics movement in the United States and Britain was
picked up by Germany in the early twentieth century. Initially, Germans viewed the
German Deaf community as WKHµPRGHOGLVDELOLW\¶LQSDUWGXHWRWKH*HUPDQSURSDJDQGD
film, Verrkannte Menschen, put out by the German deaf community in an attempt to
sidestep the racial hygiene policies that were being considered by Hitler and the Third
Reich.81 These commendatory attitudes towards Deaf people did not endure for long, as
documented in HRUVW%LHVROG¶VERRN Crying Hands: Eugenics and Deaf People in Nazi

Germany, which describes the impact of these racial hygiene policies on the Deaf
community. Some of his most striking claims are the high degree of collaboration among
educators of the deaf with the Nazi regime. These include supporting the eugenicist
policies of forced sterilization of Deaf people, of recommending Deaf people for
sterilization once they had married another Deaf person, and of forced abortions of deaf
ZRPHQ¶VIHWXVHV DQGWKHNLOOLQJRIGHDISHRSOH¶VFKLOGUHQ82 More widely known, but no
less disturbing, is the systematic killing of deaf people as a targeted group, including (but
not limited to) deaf Jews.
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%LHVROG¶VERRNDUHYLVLRQRIKLVGRFWRUDOGLVVHUWDWLRQFRQWUDGLFWVWKHFRPPRQO\
held belief that most teachers of the deaf worked to shelter their students against the
racial hygiene policies. He does not connect the decision of the Milan Congress to shift
deaf education from a manual emphasis to an oral education to the behavior of the
hearing educators of the deaf in Nazi Germany, but it is interesting to speculate as to
whether teachers of the deaf would have less likely to collaborate with the Nazi regime if
the educators of the deaf had been Deaf themselves.
Reasons offered for the establishment of eugenics practices such as sterilization
have been well documented.83 A partial list of the motivations includes the desire to
reduce the burden on society ± this is usually interpreted as direct economic costs, though
other kinds of costs could also apply.84 Biesold cites A. Abend, a teacher of the deaf,
who wrote the following words in his journal: ³7KHVHYHUHO\JHQRW\SLFDOO\ degenerate
GHDIFRQVWLWXWHDEXUGHQRQWKHSHRSOH7KHSHRSOH¶VQHHGFDQGHPDQGWKHSUHYHQWLRQRI
WKHLUUHSURGXFWLRQ´85 %LHVROGQRWHVWKDWSDUWRI$EHQG¶VPRWLYDWLRQIRUGHWHUPLQLQJ
deaf people as burdensome is tied to the ineffectiveness of deaf education.86 What is
interesting here is that this is not viewed as a social problem inasmuch as it is considered
A small sampling of sources includes Henry Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi
Genocide, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Horst Biesold,
Crying Hands: Eugenics and Deaf People in Nazi Germany, trans. William Sayers,
(Washington, DC: Gallaudet University Press, 1999); 'HDI3HRSOHLQ+LWOHU¶V(XURSH ed.
Donna Ryan and John Schuchmann. (Washington, DC: Gallaudet University Press,
2002).
84
Horst Biesold, Crying Hands: Eugenics and Deaf People in Nazi Germany
(Washington DC: Gallaudet University Press, 1999), 17.
85
$$EHQG³:DVVDJWGLH5DVVHQK\JLHQHGHP7DXEVWXPPHQOHKUHU´%OlWWHUIU
Taubstummenbildung (1925) in Horst Biesold, Crying Hands: Eugenics and Deaf People
in Nazi Germany (Washington DC: Gallaudet University Press, 1999), 19.
86
Ibid.
83

48
a problem that rests with the individual. Deaf education in Germany in the post-Milan
Congress era was oriented to an aural/oral approach, which likeO\FRQWULEXWHGWR$EHQG¶V
conclusions about the worth of deaf people.
The twentieth century framing of the social construction of disability challenges
this assumption that the problem of disability lies with the individual person, who ought
to be fixed. In the early twentieth century, before technologies such as cochlear implants
and genetic intervention became available, sterilization was a palatable option for many
ZKREHOLHYHGWKDWVRFLHW\¶VGXW\ZDVERWKWRUHGXFHWKHHFRQRPLFEXUGHQRQLWVHOIDQGto
prevent further human suffering. In some cases, the argument for sterilization was given
further justification by noting that in return for supporting sterilization of certain
populations, education and other services would be offered as a quid pro quo.87 Despite
contemporary scholarly attention to the social construction of disability and legislation
such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), this propensity to blame the person
with a disability rather than blame society for not assuming the responsibility of ensuring
access is still readily apparent even in policy discourse.88 Variations on this theme, such
as the elective disability issue introduced later in this chapter and also discussed in
chapter 4, are still considered viable options today.
Finally, any review of the effects of eugenics policy and practices on people with
disabilities ZRXOGEHLQFRPSOHWHZLWKRXWPHQWLRQLQJ+HQU\)ULHGODQGHU¶Vseminal book,
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policies initially DLPHGDWGLVDEOHGSHRSOHWRWKHFUHDWLRQDQGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHµ)LQDO
6ROXWLRQ¶E\VHWWLQJWKLVLQKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[W$OWKRXJK)ULHGODQGHU¶VERRNGRHVQRW
discuss the German Deaf community at great length, he subsequently authored an article,
³+RORFDXVW6WXGLHVDQGWKH'HDI&RPPXQLW\´ZKLFKDSSOLHVKLVWKHVLVDERXWWKH1D]L¶V
relationship to disability to the German Deaf community.89 Here, Friedlander cites the
sterilization law put forth by Hitler and his cabinet in 1933, the Law for the Prevention of
Offspring with Hereditary Diseases, which defined those suffering from hereditary
disease and qualifying for sterilization, including hereditary deafness. 90 The
implementation of this law and records kept as a result of sterilizations and the
subsequent Marriage Health Law made it easier to identify and locate disabled person
when a killing program aimed at disabled individuals was instituted in 1939. This
program, known as Operation T-4, started with the killing of disabled infants and
children, including those with hearing impairments. Later, disabled adults were added to
the list; in order to facilitate killing, gassing was used for the first time by the Nazi
regime.91 Friedlander concludes his account of the Operation T4 programs by noting that
WKDW³WRWKLVGD\WKH*HUPDQVWDWHKDVQRWIXOO\UHFRJQL]HGDQGFRPSHQVDWHGGLVDEOHG
SHRSOHLQFOXGLQJGHDISHUVRQVIRUWKHLUSHUVHFXWLRQLQWKH1D]LSHULRG´92
The history of eugenics in Germany and in the United States is living history;
survivors of these practices still exist as members of signing deaf communities. I believe
+HQU\)ULHGODQGHU³+RORFDXVW6WXGLHVDQGWKH'HDI&RPPXQLW\´LQ Deaf People in
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that skepticism and disregard for medical professionals present in signing Deaf
communities can be traced (at least in part) to their complicity in these practices. Just as
many African-Americans still remember the egregious practices by the United States
Public Health Service studies on the treatment of African-American men with syphilis in
Tuskeegee, Alabama, viewing health care research with some skepticism and caution,
signing deaf people evince a similar skepticism borne of long memories of less than
humane treatment by medical professionals. Many deaf people are still aware that the
professions of medicine and education essentially reified the status of signing Deaf
people as people placing a burden on society that could best be treated by assimilation,
repairing and curing. This set the stage for the civil rights movements discussed in the
next section ± which reframed the debate about how society should deal with deaf people
from the language of burdens and benefits to the language of justice and fairness.
Justice C laims and Rights: DPN and Cochlear Implant Surgery
Later in the twentieth century two movements emerged to powerfully affect the
signing Deaf community. The 1960s saw the return of signs to the classroom. This in
part reflected a change in deaf education including a willingness to consider that visual
communication in the form of signed communication systems and signed languages
could support better language acquisition for deaf children than purely oral methods. This
shift was supported by the groundbreaking scholarship of William Stokoe, who offered
an argument for considering American Sign Language (ASL) a full-fledged language in
its own right, having demonstrated visual equivalents of standard auditory linguistic
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features present in spoken languages.93 Another benefit of this pedagogical turn was the
return of more Deaf teachers to academic subjects in the classroom, providing an
opportunity for frank discussions about how to best structure signed communication in
the classroom.94
The return of signs to the classroom did not necessarily mean the return of natural
signed languages to the classroom. Instead, the trend was to use signed systems of
manually coded English, which borrowed signs from ASL and modified them to fit the
rules of these invented communication systems. According to Jankowski, deaf educators
initially were willing to compromise on the issue of language purity for a few reasons. 95
Some felt that this was a pragmatic approach to ultimately bringing natural signed
languages into deaf education; by introducing signed systems, which were easier to learn
and become adept with, the thought was that hearing teachers would be more willing to
later accept the transition from manually coded English to ASL. Additionally, once any
form of manual communication was permitted in the classroom, it became much easier to
hide the use of ASL than it was when all signing in the classroom was forbidden.
Deaf pride rose in the 1960s through the 1980s along with many other social
consciousness and civil rights movements of the era. Social awareness manifested in
several different ways within the signing Deaf community, including the development of
the National Theater of the Deaf, the professionalization of signed language interpreters,
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and the establishment of several federal laws that promised equal access to people with
disabilities, including deaf people.96 Padden and Humphries refer to this time period as
PDUNLQJWKHH[SORVLRQRIWKH³WHFKQRORJ\RIYRLFH´LQZKLFKGHDISHRSOH¶VPDQDJHPHQW
of spoken human voice interaction alters the ways in which discourse takes place,
including use of sign-to-voice interpreters.97 Each of these changes contributed in some
way to shape the signing Deaf community, but none was as visible on the national stage
as the Deaf President Now (DPN) protest at Gallaudet University in 1988.
*DOODXGHW8QLYHUVLW\LVWKHZRUOG¶VRQO\OLEHUDODUWVFROOHJHIRUGHDIDQGKDUGRI
hearing students, and is seen as the center of Deaf intellectual life in the Deaf-world. The
primary language of instruction is American Sign Language. Authorized as a college by
the United States Congress in 1864 with its charter signed by President Abraham Lincoln
during the United States Civil War, it has been a haven for manual communication since
its inception, even after the 1880 Milan Congress declarations, and is often referred to as
WKH³'HDI0HFFD´± a place signing Deaf people consider a metaphorical homeland.98
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Despite this, for more than one hundred years hearing administrators sat at the helm of
the university. Until 1988, Gallaudet University had never had a deaf president, although
its first president, Edward Miner Gallaudet, as the son of a Deaf woman, was fluent in
ASL.
In 1987, the sixth (hearing) president of Gallaudet University, Jerry C. Lee,
resigned. Shortly after this, the Gallaudet University Board conducted a search for a
university president. At the same time, several groups, including the FROOHJH¶V3UHVLGHQW¶V
Council on Deafness, an advisory and advocacy group of deaf faculty and staff members;
the National Association of the Deaf, and a loose-knit group of alumni known as the
Ducks, began various campaigns lobbying for a deaf president of the university.99 Upon
naming six semi-finalists, three of whom were deaf, advocacy efforts and strategies for
promoting a deaf president became more pronounced. In order to promote the general
idea of a deaf president without throwing support to one of the three candidates, the
Ducks sponsored a rally on campus. The flyer advertising this rally was one of the first to
use language that evoked civil rights struggles, comparing the appointment of a deaf
resident to other historic moments in higher education, including the selection of the first
woman president at Wellesley College in 1875, the first Jewish president at Yeshiva
University in 1886, and the first African-American president of Howard University in
1926.100
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The rally was a turning point; people on campus who were not particularly
convinced that Gallaudet University needed a deaf president became more open to the
idea in part due to structuring this claim as a civil rights entitlement.101 Shortly after the
rally the field of semi-finalists was narrowed to three finalists, two of whom were deaf.
The general sentiment on the campus was that a deaf president was inevitable; when
Elisabeth Zinser, the sole hearing finalist, was announced as the next president of
Gallaudet University, the campus erupted in protest.
Deaf people and their hearing allies, including hearing politicians, civil rights
advocates, postal workers (an occupation that has traditionally had a high proportion of
deaf employees), and neighborhood residents rallied around to protest the selection of
Zinser. After several days of protest, including two marches and extensive media
FRYHUDJH(OL]DEHWK=LQVHUVWHSSHGGRZQIURPKHUSRVWFLWLQJ³WKHLPSHUDWLYHIRUGHDI
people to be recognized in this way had risen through all of the other isVXHVWRWKHWRS´102
The subsequent selection of I. King Jordan as president continued this theme of civil
ULJKWVUKHWRULFZLWK-RUGDQUHPDUNLQJ³:HKDYHRYHUFRPHRXUUHOXFWDQFHWRVWDQGIRU
RXUULJKWV«WKHZRUOGKDVZDWFKHGWKHGHDIFRPPXQLW\FRPHRIDJH We will no longer
DFFHSWOLPLWVRQZKDWZHFDQDFKLHYH´103
The significance of DPN to the signing Deaf community worldwide should not be
overestimated. Unlike the eugenics movement and the oralism/manualism conflict, where
the signing Deaf community responded to outside challenges on their community as a
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whole regarding such fundamental issues as language use, marriage, and procreation,
DPN dealt with the issue of community leadership. This issue was easier for the general
hearing public to grasp, in part because the timing was right ± in popular culture, the
well-traveled Broadway hit Children of a Lesser God had been made into a movie and
Marlee Matlin, the deaf lead actress had picked up an Academy Award for her
performance; parents of children watched Linda Bove, another deaf actress, on Sesame
Street; and other public portrayals of the signing Deaf community served to make the life
of Deaf people intriguing rather than pitiful or tragic.
Numerous scholars have suggested that DPN serves as a seminal moment in Deaf
history. Christiansen and Barnartt have suggested that the use of frame extension, where
FLYLOULJKWVGLVFRXUVHLVH[WHQGHGWRWKH'HDIFRPPXQLW\¶VULJKWWRFKRRVHWKHLURZQ
OHDGHULQµ'HDIVSDFHV¶ZDVDFULWLFDOLQJUHGLHQWWRWKHVXFFHVVRIDPN.104 The civil rights
OHQVLVDOVRVXSSRUWHGE\6XVDQ%XUFK¶VKLVWRULFDODQDO\VLVDOWKRXJKVKHQRWHVWKH
complexity of the relationship between disability rights and the rights of the signing Deaf
community, which do not neatly map on to one another ± in part because of the Deaf
FRPPXQLW\¶VGHVLUHWRYLHZLWVHOIILUVWDVDOLQJXLVWLFFRPPXQLW\DQGVHFRQG LIDWDOO DV
disabled.105 -DQNRZVNL¶VDQDO\VLVQRWHVWKDW'31WUDQVIRUPHGWKHVHOI-image of the Deaf
FRPPXQLW\QRWLQJWKDW³WKHVWUDWHJLHVDGRSWHGE\'Haf people throughout the protest
effectively destroyed many of the negative images maintained by dominant discourses
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DQGVXEVWLWXWHGDQHZHULPDJHRIWKHDEOHFRPSHWHQFHRI'HDISHRSOH´106 This concurs
ZLWK-RKQ9LFNHU\9DQ&OHYH¶VYLHZ+HZULWHV
DPN then, was clearly in the mainstream of the history of American deaf
activism. It demonstrated that the principles of self-determination that played
such an important role after the first two decades of the nine-teenth century were
still important in the late twentieth century. The impetus for reform and change
came from deaf people themselves.107
Claiming a position that soundly rejected audism, replacing it with self-determination and
a positive community image founded on community self-definition, set the stage for more
cohesive and focused responses to threats against the signing Deaf community, including
those brought about by developments in biomedical technology.
The story of the cochlear implant controversy begins well before the events of
DPN. In the 1970s, several decades after the dissolution of the eugenics movement, the
pendulum of deaf education began to swing back to the manualist view, allowing and
encouraging the use of signs in the classroom. Despite the ban against signing in the
classroom, the international eugenics movement, and other legal discrimination
challenges (including driving rights), the signing Deaf community managed to persist as
a sociolinguistic community.108 Yet, another challenge to the survival of the Deaf
community was just around the corner. At the same time that deaf education was
opening up again to the signed languages of the Deaf community, researchers in France
and the United States (the two countries where the signing Deaf community was first
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nurtured and supported flourished hundreds of years ago) began work on a new
technology, the cochlear implant.
Initially cochlear implant surgery was performed on adult volunteers, most of
whom had been hearing, and who had expressed a preference for living in the hearing
world.109 This was not seen as a problem by most members of the Deaf community, who
felt that surgery on deaf people who were (for the most part) not members of the signing
Deaf community, did not threaten the existence of the Deaf community. At least, not in
the way that forbidding the use of signed language in schools and the practices of the
eugenics movement had affected the community.110
In 1977, two deaf children, ages 10 and 14, received cochlear implant surgery.111
This practice infuriated many members of the Deaf community, who felt that it was one
more attack on the continued existence of their community, due to the potential for
excluding the largest group of potential members of the signing Deaf community, deaf
children of hearing parents, from becoming acculturated into the community through
residential schools for the deaf, as had historically been the case. Since the post-surgery
standard of care recommended against exposing the child to a signed language or signed
system lest the ease of using on a visual system reduce their motivation for working to
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achieve spoken language communication, deaf children who were once considered
potential members of the Deaf community would no longer have that option.
The literature on the ethics of cochlear implant surgery, while limited, is richer in
discussion of ethical issues than the eugenics literature discussed earlier in this chapter. It
is generally assumed that the eugenics movement of forced sterilization and marriage
restrictions in the United States was immoral on grounds of violation of human rights,
individual autonomy, and human GLJQLW\OLNHZLVHIRUWKHµUDFLDOK\JLHQH¶SUDFWLFHVDQG
atrocities committed under Nazi policies in Germany. Given this assumption, ethics
discussion regarding eugenics focuses on questions of moral depravity and the banality of
evil, rather than differing sociocultural and biological constructions of what it is to be
³QRUPDO´ZKLFKLVWKHSULPDU\IRFXVRIWKHFRFKOHDULPSODQWGHEDWH
The decision to pursue cochlear implant surgery on deaf children marks the
emergence of WKHXVHRIµULJKWV¶ODQJXDJHWRGHIHQGWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKH'HDIFRPPXQLW\
as well as to defend the decision of hearing parents to obtain a cochlear implant for their
child. MRVWRIWKHDUJXPHQWVUHJDUGLQJWKHXVHRIJHQHWLFWHFKQRORJ\WRµFXUH¶GHDIQHVV
are framed similarly, appealing to the rights of the Deaf community, the rights of parents
WRGHWHUPLQHWKHµEHVWLQWHUHVWV¶RIWKHLUFKLOGUHQDQGWKHULJKWVRIWKHFKLOGWRDQµRSHQ
future. As seen in discussions of the HFEB, other issues in play are those of reproductive
ULJKWVVXFKDVDµULJKW¶WR,9)DQGWKHULJKWWRGHFOLQHVSHFLILFSUDFWLFHVLQUHSURGXFWLYH
medicine that could potentially result a in parent being forced to acquiesce to government
preference and practices regarding definitions of genetic normality.
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A n A rgument A nalysis of the E thical Issues in Cochlear Implant Surgery
The earliest articles offering a moral justification for cochlear implant surgery
were written by physicians and published in medical journals and symposia or conference
proceedings. Not surprisingly, these articles assumed a pathological view of deafness,
DQGW\SLFDOO\DUJXHGWKDWWKH³HIIRUWVWRGLVFRXUDJHWKHXVHRIFRFKOHDU implants in deaf
FKLOGUHQDUHQRWLQWKHEHVWLQWHUHVWVRIPDQ\FKLOGUHQRUWKHLUIDPLOLHV´112 Several
organizations of and for the Deaf released position papers arguing against allowing the
surgery on prelingually deaf children, but it was not until HarlDQ/DQH¶VERRN The Masks

of Benevolence: Disabling the Deaf Community, was released that more carefully
structured arguments were advanced against cochlear implant surgery for children.
Lane developed a two-pronged approach to this topic by looking first at the
physical risks of subjecting the child to elective surgery with purported little gain, and
then considering the psychosocial harm ensuing to the child who is between two worlds ±
WKHZRUOGRIWKH'HDIDQGWKHKHDULQJZRUOG/DQH¶VDUJXPHQWRQWKH risks of elective
surgery considers the usual risks involved with medical surgery and anesthesia, and also
lists complications specifically associated with cochlear implant surgery, such as damage
to the facial nerve, the structural damage to the cochlear required for placement of the
implant (essentially, the cochlea is destroyed), and the high percentage of children with
adverse reactions and complications.113
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Twelve years later, some of these arguments resting on empirical data are less
cogent due to improved medical techniques and technology. Additionally, the efficacy of
the cochlear implant, while far from perfect, has improved significantly. Children
receiving the implant today do much better on hearing evaluations, including open set
discriminatioQWHVWVZKLFKHYDOXDWHWKHFKLOG¶VDELOLW\WRXQGHUVWDQGVSHHFK114 Two
concerns that have yet to be fully resolved are the long term effects of long term electrical
stimulation near the brain (an issue paralleling current concern expressed about the
proximity of holding cell phones next to the ear), and studies offering evidence for
increased risk of bacterial meningitis in cochlear implant users.115 At this point, the
potential harm presented by these concerns is probably sufficient to maintain the cogency
RI/DQH¶VPHGLFDOKDUPDUJXPHQW,VXVSHFWWKDWVLPLODUDUJXPHQWVUHJDUGLQJWKHKDUPV
of using of genetic technologies to create deaf children will likely be advanced. A twist
on this would be that the use of existing technologies such as PGD used for screening out
deafness would likely not be included in such arguments based on medical risks for the
fertilized egg, but rather focused on the risks to the potential mother.
Lane acknowledges that his arguments resting on physical data may be less
persuasive over time, and offers a hypothetical syllogism argument based on the concept
RIDµSHUIHFW¶LPSODQWLQDODWHUDUWLFOHFRDXWKRUHGZLWKSKLORVRSKHU0LFKDHO*URGLQ
³(WKLFDO,VVXHVLQ&RFKOHDU,PSODQW6XUJHU\$Q([SORUDWLRQLQWR'LVHDVH'LVDELOLW\
&RPSDULVLRQRIUHVXOWVFLWHGLQ/DQH¶V The Mask of Benevolence, 220-5 and N.L.
&RKHQDQG6%:DOW]PDQ³&RFKOHDU,PSODQWVLQ,QIDQWVDQG<RXQJ&KLOGUHQ´LQ0D\R
17, 2 (1996) 215-s222.
115
Noel L. &RKHQ-7KRPDV5RODQG-U0LFKHOOH0DUULQDQ³Meningitis in Cochlear
Implant Recipients: The North American Experience´ in Otology & Neurotology:
(2004) 25 (3): 275-281.
114

61
aQGWKH%HVW,QWHUHVWVRIWKH&KLOG´116 The argument is summarized as follows: If the
FRFKOHDULPSODQWUHVWRUHVDFKLOG¶VKHDULQJSHUIHFWO\DQGFDUULHVQRPHGLFDOULVNWKHQWKH
cochlear implant is still ethically questionable since it fundamentally alters WKDWFKLOG¶V
psychological identity. Keeping in mind that the child with the perfect implant is still
deaf when the implant is turned off, Lane and Grodin offer several arguments by analogy
with varying degrees of cogency to justify their claim that performing cochlear implant
surgery on prelingually deaf children has dubious ethical merit.
One argument proposed in both of these of these pieces is the argument by
analogy that compares a deaf child of hearing parents to a black child living with her
adopWLYHZKLWHSDUHQWV/DQHDQG*URGLQDUJXHWKDWLIWKHFKLOG¶VGLIIHUHQFHDQGPLQRULW\
LGHQWLW\LVQRWDFNQRZOHGJHGWKHFKLOGUXQVWKHULVNRIGHYHORSLQJDµFXOWXUDO
KRPHOHVVQHVV¶LQZKLFKWKHGHDIFKLOGLVQRWIXOO\DPHPEHURIWKHsigning Deaf
community or the hearing world.117 There are several problems with this analogy. One is
WKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWELRORJLFDOGLIIHUHQFHLVVRPHKRZFRQQHFWHGWRRQH¶VFXOWXUDOKRPH
In the case of a child with phenotypic features associated with the American definition of
³EODFN´LWLVGLIILFXOWWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHUHDVRQLQJWKDWSRVVHVVLQJWKHVHIHDWXUHVLV
sufficient to determine sociocultural membership, which seems to be the point that Lane
and Grodin are attempting to make here. Still, the obvious disanalogy of the biological
ties of the deaf child to his hearing parents and the lack of those biological ties of the
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black child to her adoptive parents remains and ought to be considered when evaluating
this argument for cogency.
Additionally, I do not find this argument convincing given the premise of the
perfect implant, for it seems to me that the child with hearing perfected by the implant
would be able to fully participate in the hearing world, thus negating the argument. Yet
another issue at stake is the question of µIXOOFRPPXQLW\PHPEHUVKLS¶DVGHILQHGLW
seems to exclude the possibility that one could fully belong to more than one
sociocultural community. Alternatively, the assumption of full membership as good and
(one presumes) partial membership as bad or less good, is given and not rigorously
argued for. Considering the state of cochlear implant technology today, though, the
analogy holds up slightly better. In the absence of a perfect implant, an assumption that
Lane and Grodin hold throughout their argument, in some ways, it does makes sense to
ask these questions about community membership. The problem is that community
membership claims resting on language modes necessitated by physical variation are
quite different in kind from membership claims based on phenotypic differences such as
hair texture and skin color, which have no bearing whatsoever on language acquisition or
modality.
A different argument by analogy offered by Lane and Grodin compares the Deaf
FRPPXQLW\¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKHGHDIFKLOGWRWKHinterest of Native American communities
expressed in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, in which the courts must consider the
best interests of the tribe as well as the best interests of the child.118 A variation of this
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argument appears elsewhere, in which an appeal to the United Nations Declaration of the
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
as well as the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.119 By defining the Deaf community as a linguistic minority, Lane and
Grodin set up the analogy for minority community rights, including the right for a
community to secure its existence.
This is of course more challenging given the horizontal method of sociocultural
transmission in the signing Deaf community, since it leads to questions regarding
assumptions and claims as to how a child becomes a member of a cultural community,
and who is charged (implicitly or explicitly) with imparting such knowledge. As stated
earlier, in most cases sociocultural and linguistic transmission is vertical, occurring from
parent to child. (In cases of vertical transmission where parent-child transmission is not
the norm, such as children reared in a kibbutz, there are rarely physical barriers that
intervene with the ability of parents and children to communicate directly with one
another).
In the signing Deaf community, there are two notable differences when a deaf
child with hearing parents is brought into the community. First, is the role of horizontal
cultural transmission from child peer to child peer; second is the issue of non-familial
cultural transmission, whether from unrelated Deaf child to deaf child or unrelated Deaf
adult to deaf child. The role of family ties in determining sociocultural membership is
rarely questioned; the case of acculturation to the signing Deaf community is unusual and
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raises questions about what kinds of roles and duties are appropriate for Deaf adults to
assume with deaf children who are not their legal progeny. It also raises questions about
the role of hearing SDUHQWV¶ rights and interests regarding their deaf children. The use of
cochlear implant surgery, while not intended to decimate the numbers of the Deaf
community, results in fewer potential members for the Deaf community, reverts back to
the vertical model of language and cultural transmission of parent to child. The
widespread use of genetic technology, including PGD, would likely result in an even
greater effect on the Deaf community by reducing the numbers of potential community
members being born.
%RQQLH7XFNHU¶VDUWLFOH³'HDI&XOWXUH&RFKOHDU,PSODQWVDQG(OHFWLYH
'LVDELOLW\´DWWHPSWVWRWDFNOHWKHVHDQDORJLHVKHDGRQEXWIDLOVWRRIIHUD cogent
argument against them.120 She begins her article with an argument that Deaf culture is
QRWDWUXHFXOWXUH:KHWKHUWKHµFXOWXUH¶PRQLNHULVFRUUHFWVHHPVWREHDUHGKHUULQJ
though, for regardless of whether it is a Deaf culture or a Deaf community, there still
remains a group of people who share a language and set of social behaviors, and who
wish to see their community flourish and continue to exist. The outcry against the use of
cochlear implants on prelingually deaf children and the use of genetic technologies to
eradicate deafness comes from this community. Even though the Deaf community is but
a small percentage of the total population of deaf and hard of hearing people, this fact
does not invalidate their arguments.

%RQQLH7XFNHU³'HDI&XOWXUH&RFKOHDU,PSODQWVDQG(OHFWLYH'LVDELOLW\´ Hastings
Center Report (1998) 28 (4):7

120

65
7XFNHUZULWHV³$OWKRXJK'HDIFXOWXULVWVHTXDWHEHLQJGHDIWREHLQJ a member of
a racial or tribal minority, many deaf people find the analogy nonsensical. Deaf people
lack one of the five critical senses. True deaf people such as this author are physically
LQFDSDEOHRIWDONLQJRQWKHWHOHSKRQHDORQH«´121 Tucker makes (at least) two errors
here: she dismisses the Deaf community argument by analogy without offering much of a
reason for doing so, she also confuses the issue by conflating Deaf with deaf, which does
nothing to advance the dialogue, since it is the minority worldview of the Deaf that is at
issue against the majority view, which is held by deaf and hearing people. The concern
about cochlear implants for prelingually deaf children comes from the signing Deaf
community, who do not wish to see the existence of their community threatened.
7XFNHU¶VPRWLYDWLRQIRUGLVWLQJXLVKLQJµWUXHGHDISHRSOH¶IURPRWKHUV ZKRP,VXSSRVH
might be considered µinauthentic 'HDISHRSOH¶" LVSHUSOH[LQJEXWLWQLFHO\VHUYHVWKH
function of confusing the issue, since a less than careful reader of her article might
FRQFOXGHWKDWµWUXHGHDISHRSOH¶DGYRFDWHRQEHKDOIRIGHDIFKLOGUHQWRUHFHLYHFRFKOHDU
implants.
1RWDOORI7XFNHU¶VDUWLFOHLVWKLVGLVLQJHQXRXVLQIDLUQHVVWRKHUVKHRIIHUVD
more compelling argument on elective disability. The concept of elective disability is
developed from the concept that individuals must assume responsibility for their choices.
The argument relies on two premises, the first of which is that individuals must take
reasonable measures, such as cochlear implant surgery, to eliminate or minimize their
disabilities, and the second is that such measures are available to the individual. Neither
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of these hold true today in the United States -- the expense of the cochlear implant
surgery and rehabilitation is not covered by all insurance plans, nor can the risks of such
VXUJHU\FRXOGEHVDLGWRRXWZHLJKWKHEHQHILWVJLYHQWKHXQSUHGLFWDELOLW\RIWKHVXUJHU\¶V
VXFFHVV7XFNHUKROGVWKDWZLWKRXWILUVWWDNLQJWKHVWHSVWRUHGXFHWKHHIIHFWVRIRQH¶V
disability, the individual has no claim upon the state to provide accommodations for said
disability.
What is novel DERXW7XFNHU¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKHQRWLRQRIDSSO\LQJSHUVRQDO
responsibility to disability. Traditionally, disability has been viewed as an act of nature
far removed from the sphere of personal responsibility, as seen in this quote by Rawls:
Other primary goods such as [health and vigor] , intelligence and
imagination, are natural goods; although their possession is
influenced by the basic structure (of society), they are not so
directly under its control.122 [Italics mine].
7XFNHU¶VQRWLRQRIHOHFWLYHGLVDELOLW\VXJJHVWVWKHOLEHUDOVWDWHPLJKWDWVRPHSRLQWEH
able to refuse accommodations if the individual has refused to take steps to reduce his
burden on the state. Tucker allows for the possibility of an individual to refuse, say, a
cochlear implant due to personal or religious reasons, but she does not believe that this
UHIXVDOUHVXOWVLQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VHQWLWOHPHQWWRFHUWDLQJRRGVVXFKDVLQWerpreting
services or closed captioning, provided by the state or others.
,QSDUW7XFNHU¶VSDSHUZDVDUHVSRQVHWRDQDUWLFOHSXEOLVKHGE\5REHUW$
&URXFK³/HWWLQJWKHGHDIEH'HDI5HFRQVLGHULQJWKH8VHRI&RFKOHDU,PSODQWVLQ
Prelingually Deaf ChLOGUHQ´ZKLch argues against cochlear implants for the prelingually

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1971), 62.
122
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deaf child. Crouch does not use the approach suggested by Lane and Grodin of offering
DUJXPHQWVE\DQDORJ\LQVWHDGKHSURSRVHGWKHµULJKW¶RIWKHFKLOGWREHDIXOOPHPEHURI
a communityLQWKLVFDVHWKH'HDIFRPPXQLW\&URXFKDUJXHVWKDWDSDUHQW¶VGHFLVLRQ
QRWWRSURYLGHKHUFKLOGZLWKDFRFKOHDULPSODQW³)DUIURPFRQGHPQLQJDFKLOGWRDZRUOG
of meaningless silence, opens the child up to membership in the Deaf community, a
unique coPPXQLW\ZLWKDULFKKLVWRU\DULFKODQJXDJHDQGDYDOXHV\VWHPRILWVRZQ´123
Crouch acknowledges that the child with a cochlear implant (who is at best, functionally
hard of hearing) has the potential of being stuck between two worlds ± not having enough
hearing to fully participate in the give and take banter of the hearing world, but not
having the signing skills to move into the Deaf community. He writes,
«WKHGHFLVLRQWRSXUVXHFRFKOHDULPSODQWDWLRQDQGDXGLWRU\KDELOLWDWLRQ
IRURQH¶VFKLOGDOVRKDs burdens associated with it beyond the failure to
achieve oral competence. The child whose life is centered on disability
and the attempt to overcome it grows up in a context that continually
reinforces this disability, despite his or her own best efforts to hear and to
speak and despite the diligent work of the educators of the deaf and
hearing-impaired. These children are therefore always aware that they are
outsiders, and not merely outsiders, but outsiders attempting to be on the
inside. This narrative of disability within which the deaf implant-using
child lives is not the only one available to her. There is an alternative
narrative reference to which the child may judge her own life and it is the
one that exists within the Deaf community.124
I suggest that the two narratives offered by Crouch are correct; however, I am skeptical
that these may be the only choices for such children. Another alternative exists, that is, to
provide the implanted deaf child with two languages, a signed language and a spoken
language. In fairness to Crouch, this may not have been a formal option offered to
123
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parents of implanted children at the time he wrote his article. It is an option currently
offered by several programs and schools in the United States, although the structures of
such programs may vary.125
Although &URXFK¶VDUJXPHQWGHSHQGVRQWKHLQDELOLW\RIWKHFRFKOHDULPSODQWWR
restore hearing fully to its users, and at first blush seems to have little to do with the use
of genetic technology, I think that the argument he offers extolling the benefits of
belonging to the Deaf community is just the sort of argument that would be offered by
potential Deaf parents wanting deaf offspring. The question is: does the argument resting
on intangible benefits of community membership offer enough support to morally justify
Deaf parents making such a choice?
Arguments related to the ethical issues of providing cochlear implants to
prelingually deaf children can be grouped into categories. Those listed below have
particular relevance to the ethical arguments that may be used by the signing Deaf
community regarding moral justifications for using genetic technology to bear deaf
children. The first category contains arguments that deal with potential risks and benefits
± these include the risks inherent in the medical procedures themselves, as well as long
term harms and benefits. These concerns apply to many procedures used in genetic
technology; in particular, genetic screening, in vitro fertilization (IVF) with
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and gene therapy carry varying degrees of risks
for both the potential parents and the potential offspring. Significant setbacks in gene
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therapy research have contributed to it still being classified as experimental treatment at
this point in time.126
Another category of argument deals with identity. The notion of identity is itself a
complex topic ± determining what counts as an identity, who has the authority to
determine identity claims, and whether identity is fixed to specific criteria are some hard
questions associated with this concept. The particular topics raised in discussions about
FRFKOHDULPSODQWVXUJHU\HWKLFVLQFOXGHVXFKLVVXHVDVDFKLOG¶VULJKWWRIXOODQGXQIHWWHUHG
communication, and also the question of whetheUDSHUVRQ¶VELRORJLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDUH
sufficient to determine identity, and if so, how this determination is meant. In the
arguments by analogy listed earlier, a key premise of each argument relied on physical
difference between parents and their children. Implied in this category of argument is the
FODLPWKDWFXOWXUDOLGHQWLW\GHSHQGV DWOHDVWLQSDUW RQDSHUVRQ¶VSK\VLFDO
characteristics. This notion is fraught with many difficulties, not the least of which is the
question of how physical characteristics can influence or determine cultural identity
claims.
Variations of this question surface in several aspects of the signing deaf
community; a few of these directly bear on the question of whether using genetic
technology in order to ensure the birth of a deaf child is morally justifiable. Determining
who has standing as a full-fledged member of the signing Deaf community turns on
several factors, one of which is the physical characteristic of hearing loss. Hearing
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children of signing deaf parents, many of whom claim a signed language as their first
language, are often viewed as members of the community with mixed status. In Deaf in
America: Voices from a Culture, authors Carol Padden and Tom Humphries note that one
way that hearing children of deaf parents (CODAs) are treated differently than deaf
children of deaf parents is in sports leagues. Cultural convention restricts participation on
Deaf sports teams to those with measureable audiological indicators of hearing loss; thus
hearing children of Deaf parents cannot participate in one measure of community
activity. Padden and Humphries recount an instance in which a hearing child of this Deaf
parents tried to pass as hard of hearing in order to play for a Deaf basketball team; when
the individual was asked to prove this status by showing his audiogram, he was not able
to do so.127
The story above is but one illustration of the difficulty of determining
membership and identity in the signing Deaf community. Even though this situation
could be remedied by simply changing the rules to permit hearing children with signing
Deaf parents to participate in Deaf community team sports, this has not been done. I
suspect this is at least partly because deafness is a necessary condition for one to claim
full community membership, though it may not be the only such condition. In the case of
cochlear implant surgery on prelingually deaf children, some members of the signing
Deaf community argue that by virtue of their deafness, all deaf children have a right to
natural language acquisition. Since these children cannot hear at least some of the sounds
in spoken language and since speechreading alone is insufficient for natural language
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acquisition, this leaves signed languages as the only natural languages fully accessible to
deaf children without any medical intervention. One could extend the claims of the right
to a natural signed language argument further, interpreting this to mean that deaf children
have a right to membership in the signing Deaf community by virtue of their physical
characteristic of deafness.
,IJHQHWLFWHFKQRORJ\LVXVHGWRHQVXUHWKDWDGHDIFKLOGLVERUQWKHSDUHQWV¶
motivations for making such a choice are likely to be questioned. Different questions may
arise depending on which genetic technologies were used to obtain a deaf child. I have
stated in my Introduction my intention to cover these in detail in subsequent chapters that
sort out the issues according to same and different child choices. In particular, the
following two chapters focus on this issue, with Chapter Three considering the problem
of genetic selection as a different person problem and using harm as the primary measure
of ethical permissibility using a utilitarian framework of benefits and burdens. Chapter
Four evaluates the issue of genetic manipulation as a same person problem, inasmuch as
genetic determinism claims consider alteration of the genome a same person problem; it
also considers issues of identity and autonomy, both of which have been introduced in
this chapter.
In wrapping up this chapter, I hope that my presentation of a more detailed
account of the history of the signing Deaf community will remedy a gap found all too
often in accounts regarding the use of genetic technology in the signing Deaf community.
The history of a community that has dealt with various kinds of audism throughout recent
history, including the obstruction of fundamental rights claims related to language use,
marriage, and procreation is critical to understanding current debates about appropriate
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XVHVRIJHQHWLFWHFKQRORJ\LQWKLVFRPPXQLW\,EHOLHYHWKDW'HDISHRSOH¶VGHVLUHIRUGHDI
children goes beyond simply wanting children like themselves. In many cases, it also
reflects the complexity of what it means to be a member of a sociocultural group that has
historically experienced discrimination, and has been targeted, directly and indirectly, for
extinction. In conclusion, it is my hope that this chapter has at least partially satisfied my
goal of providing the reader unfamiliar with the signing Deaf community with a deeper
understanding of why Deaf people might be inclined to use genetic technology in order to
bear a child most likely to be a full-fledged member of their community.
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C hapter 3 G enetic Selection: C hoosing Deaf Babies
Augustus and Lydia are a Deaf couple. Augustus comes from a fa mily
with several Deaf fa mily members ± his mother, brother, cousins, and
grandparents are Deaf, and Augustus¶VIDWKHULVDQ$PHULFDQ6LJQ
Language (AS L) interpreter whose first language is AS L. Lydia 's
fa mily is hearing; Lydia was born hearing and beca me deaf at age 4 as
a result of contracting spinal meningitis. Lydia attended a
bilingual school for the deaf shortly after losing her hearing, and is
comfortable using AS L and written English. Augustus and Lydia both
treasure the signing Deaf community, spending most of their social
activities within this community ± from participating in sports activities
in deaf leagues to working in environments with mostly deaf people.
Regardless of whether their children are deaf or hearing, Augustus and
Lydia plan to raise their children in this community. However, for
many reasons that have come up in their discussions about this topic,
they would prefer a Deaf child.
In order to find out their chances of having a Deaf child,
Augustus and Lydia have seen a genetics counselor. As it turns out,
both Augustus and Lydia have a recessive gene that is correlated to
hearing variation, the GBJ2 gene (Connexin 26). Augustus has two
copies of this gene, which has caused his deafness. He will pass on one
copy of this gene to all of his biological children, barring any random
genetic changes.128 Although Lydia 's deafness is not genetic, she
happens to be a carrier with one copy of this gene.129 The odds are
fifty-fifty that she will pass this gene to her children. The chance of
Augustus and Lydia having a child with hearing (loss) variation is one
in two, or fifty percent. S ince Lydia has a fallopian tube anomaly,
Augustus and Lydia must use in vitro fertilization (IV F).
Because of their strong preference for a deaf child, Augustus
and Lydia ask their genetics counselor if it is possible to only i mplant
embryos that carry two copies of the GBJ2 gene. The counselor
mentions that it is technologically possible through preimplantation
genetic diagnosis (PG D) in which embryos are screened for certain
genetic characteristics before implantation. The question is whether the
medical staff would be willing to conduct PG D screening for this
purpose, given the ethical issues of choosing an embryo that codes for
disability over an embryo that does not code for disability. In other
words, is it morally perm issible to use PG D in order to ensure the birth
of a deaf child?
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This chapter addresses the question of whether or not it is morally justifiable to
select for the trait of hearing loss, or deafness. The question of moral justification is a
thin one, and leaves out the complexities that often arise in discussions about whether
deciding to continue pregnancies or implant embryos to begin pregnancies that will result
LQWKHH[LVWHQFHRILQGLYLGXDOVZLWKµDEQRUPDO¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVLVPRUDOO\KRQRUDEOH130
I will argue that selecting for deafness is morally permissible, and I will use the
Non-Identity problem as the basis for my claim. I further argue that what is widely
regarded as the strongest challenge to the Non-Identity problem, the concept of the Right
To An Open Future, has several problems, and as it is currently framed, does not
constitute a sufficient challenge to the Non-Identity argument, leaving the conclusions of
the Non-Identity problem standing. Namely, I argue that one of the reasons the Right To
An Open Future objection account fails is due to a profound misunderstanding of the
TXDOLW\RI'HDISHRSOH¶VOLYHV,DOVRDUJXHWKDWIUDPLQJWKLVSUREOHPDVDPDWWHURI
parental autonomy versus the autonomy of the child is too narrow, and this omits some of
the central issues of concern for the signing Deaf community, namely the social
construction of disability and the continued existence of the community. Finally, I
consider and reject the argument that choosing for existence is itself morally
impermissible.
Deafness and the Non-Identity Problem
It is important to be clear on the distinction between what I call genetic selection
and genetic manipulation, especially since the literature on this topic often lumps the
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process of selection for deafness together with what I will call designing or creating
deafness. I treat these as separate issues. This chapter focuses on genetic selection.
Simply put, this genetic selection involves decisions regarding genetic screening of
genetically intact and unaltered fertilized eggs, zygotes, and embryos. There are two
types of genetic screening: genetic screening of embryos, which occurs during
pregnancy; or preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) screening, which occurs prior to
implanting a fertilized egg into the womb. Currently, genetic screening for deafness is
possible for both prenatal and PGD types of screening; it is somewhat limited since not
all genes associated with deafness have been identified or have commercially available
tests. As mentioned in the example given at the beginning of this chapter, it is possible at
this time to conduct genetic screening for the GBJ2 gene (Connexin 26).
Another important point to keep in mind when reading this chapter is that the
focus on genetic selection of deafness does not involve any alteration of genetic material.
If we return to the example of the Australian couple in the introduction whose fertilized
eggs were screened for the presence of the Connexin 26 gene, the potential parents were
faced with making a choice to implant fertilized eggs containing their own genetic
material. All things being equal, it is within the realm of logical possibility that these
zygotes could have been conceived without the assistance of any reproductive technology
whatsoever, taking into consideration timing and other factors.
Selection for deafness can only occur when the potential parents already have
compatible genetic material that codes for deafness. This is an important point that bears
repeating: selection for deafness is only possible when both contributors of genetics
material, (the biological parents) possess genes compatible with hearing loss. This
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SURFHVVLVWREHGLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPWKHPDLQVWUHDPPHGLD¶VFRQFHSWRIGHVLJQHUEDELHVLQ
ZKLFKSRWHQWLDOSDUHQWVVHOHFWIURPJHQHVIURPWKHµJHQHWLFVXSHUPDUNHW¶131 to create the
child of their dreams. In other words, given old fashioned reproduction without
technological assistance, potential parents Augustus and Lydia could have a deaf child;
technology such as IVF with PGD shifts the odds from say, 1 in 2 to a near certain
possibility.
Creation for deafness, on the other hand, occurs when the potential parents who
wish to bear a deaf child do not have the genetic material necessary to bring this about.
We could imagine a case where each potential parent has a genetic basis for hearing loss,
but taken together these are not compatible with the birth of a deaf child. Consider this
simple example, where two parents possess the following pairs of genes: Parent 1 has
pairs Aa and B B , and Parent 2 has pairs A A and Bb. (Upper case letters signify dominant
genes, and the lower case letters represent recessive genes). Suppose each recessive gene
causes deafness, such as a and b. This will only be the case when there are two copies of
the same recessive genes. In this case, since recessive genes are paired with dominant
genes ( Aa and Bb), each parent is a carrier for a specific kind of genetic deafness, but is
not deaf. Parent 1 has two dominant B genes ( B B ) and no recessive b genes; Parent 2 has
two dominant A genes ( A A ), and no recessive a genes. Given this, there is no possible
way that deafness can ensue, since genetic deafness in this example requires two copies
of recessive genes, such as aa or bb, one copy from each parent.132
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As another example, imagine the case of two Deaf potential parents who wish to
have a deaf child, but since their hearing losses result from illness or accident they do not
possess genes that code for hearing loss. If they were somehow to create deaf children by
altering genes, this process could be associated with the previously mentioned notion of
³GHVLJQHUEDELHV´WKRXJKLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKLVLVDWHUPRQO\XVHGLQPDLQVWUHDP
media and popular culture, and is not formally associated with scientific, bioethical, or
philosophical nomenclature.
Genetic selection for deafness is impossible when the potential parents do not
have the genetic material necessary to bring about deafness. For these potential parents
to bring about a deaf child, the genome of the embryo must be altered by gene insertion
or deletion. Genetic manipulation, or gene insertion or deletion is currently experimental,
and has not occurred in order to create a child with hearing loss. The ethical issues related
to genetic manipulation, or the creation of a deaf child, will be discussed in the following
chapter, ³Genetic Alteration: Creating Deaf Babies´
Genetic Selection: Some Assumptions
In addition to establishing the difference between genetic selection and genetic
creation, I establish some assumptions regarding genetic selection. I make four
DVVXPSWLRQVLQRUGHUWRVKDUSHQWKHIRFXVRIWKHTXHVWLRQµ,VLWPRUDOO\MXVWLILDEOHWR
VHOHFWIRUGHDIQHVV"¶
First, I assume that the people wishing to select for deafness are Deaf. That is,
they have both the audiological condition of hearing loss and use a signed language. By

that it would only be considered as a philosophical logical possibility and not a possibility grounded in
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and large, Deaf people do not exist in isolation; they are members of a linguistic
community that uses a signed language such as American Sign Language. (This is in
contrast with deaf people, who have the audiological condition of severe to profound
hearing loss and who use the dominant spoken language of their community). While it is
possible that some hearing people may wish to select embryos with genes that are
associated with deafness, studies have indicated this is highly unlikely.133
Second, I assume that the potential parents have extended family and friends who
are proficient signers, ranging from fluency in ASL to the ability to use a signed system
such as signed English. This assumption is important because it assures that the child
will be surrounded by people who can communicate directly with the deaf child. By
ensuring that the deaf child has full access to a visual language, I am setting aside the
HWKLFDOLVVXHUHJDUGLQJGHDIFKLOGUHQ¶V partial or fragmented access to spoken language.
This is important because limited or partial access to the language used in the home can
DIIHFWWKHGHDIFKLOG¶VDELOLW\WRDFTXLUHODQJXDJHLQDWLPHO\PDQQHUGHDIFKLOGUHQZLWK
hearing parents often fall into this category because they are unable to fully access the
sounds of spoken language. This is not an issue for visual modes of language or
communication; provided the deaf child has no vision difficulties, he or she should be
able to acquire language naturally in much the same process as the hearing child
surrounded by spoken language users.
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Third, for the purposes of my discussion of genetic selection, I also assume that
audiological deafness is a harm. Although this assumption is usually taken as a prima
facie claim, it is not altogether clear that this is as simple as proponents of this view
assert. In order to assert this claim without prejudice, one must first provide a justifiable
definition of harm, followed by an examination of whether audiological deafness satisfies
this definition. I will take on this question in Chapter 5 of my dissertation; for now, I will
adopt the prevailing view that audiological deafness is a harm, which is the received view
on disability set forth in the general Non-Identity argument I adopt in this chapter. It is
important to note that if this assumption is problematic or incorrect, and audiological
deafness is not a harm, the impact on the cogency of the Non-Identity argument is
minimal.
Finally, I assume that genetic selection for deafness is limited to non-syndromic
genes that only cause hearing loss and are not associated with any other genetic anomaly.
My reason for this is that I wish to focus my discussion on the case of deafness, and do
not want to confuse or complicate the issue by bringing in other kinds of disability or
human variation. Although I do think these issues are worth considering at some point, I
believe it best to initially investigate the issue of genetic selection for deafness based on
single trait genes; it is likely that the answer to this question will influence and inform the
question of genetic selection for syndromic kinds of deafness.
T he Non-Identity Problem
When evaluating whether selection for deafness can be morally justified, there are
at least three questions under consideration:
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1) Is it possible to do harm to individuals who otherwise would not have
existed?
2) Is being deaf (a person with hearing loss) rather than hearing a harm?
3) Is being Deaf rather than deaf a harm?
Is it possible to do harm to individuals who otherwise would not have existed? It is
LPSRUWDQWWRUHPHPEHUWKDWWKLVLVQRWD³VDPHSHUVRQFKRLFH´ EXWD³GLIIHUHQWSHUVRQ
FKRLFH´,WLVQRWDPDWWHURIRQHLQGLYLGXDOKDYLQJWKHSRWHQWLDORIEHLQJERrn deaf or
hearing, but whether a given individual with a unique genome will be born at all.
Selecting a fertilized egg that codes for deafness confers the possibility of existence on
that particular egg, with all the characteristics inhered within. The issue at stake is
whether it is morally justifiable to select such an embryo and bring it into existence.
Reframing the question, I ask, has this selected individual been harmed by being brought
into existence? Remember, this specific biological individual could not have been born
hearing, given its unique genetic make-up.
Suppose that audiological hearing loss is a disability (not everyone accepts this
premise) and by virtue of being a disability, it is a harm. In Reasons and Persons, Derek
Parfit introduces this issue of disabled existence versus nonexistence as the Non-Identity
Problem.134 8VLQJDVOLJKWO\DOWHUHGYHUVLRQRI3DUILW¶VH[DPSOHLPDJLQHDZRPDQZKR
can become pregnant at time T1, knowing that the child she gives birth to will have a mild
disability, such as being colorblind, due to an temporary teratogenic environmental
factor. The same woman can wait until the teratogenic influence lifts one month later,
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and become pregnant at time T2 and give birth to a different child ± one who does not
have the mild disability. One could say that say that if the woman waits for a month to
get pregnant, her child will be born without a disability. But this is mistaken reasoning,
for the embryo conceived at time T1 could not have been born without being colorblind.
Therefore, the question is not whether this child could have been born without being
colorblind, but whether the child has been harmed by coming into existence. Would it
have been better for this child if the child had never existed? Parfit uses several versions
of Person-affecting Principles of Beneficence to argue that this cannot be the case. In
RWKHUZRUGV³LIVRPHRQHLVFDXVHGWRH[LVWDQGKDVDOLYLQJZRUWKOLYLQJWKLVSHUVRQLV
EHQHILWHG´
In the case of a person whose life is arguably not worth living, it could be claimed
that existence itself is a harm to the child. This argument has been advanced to support
the case of selecting against genetic conditions such as Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome, which
involves tremendous physical pain, a short lifespan, and self-mutilation. It is a more
difficult issue when a child is born in less than ideal circumstances, such as to an
uneducated teenage single mother or with a mild disability. Our common sense morality
tells us that in these cases, the child has been harmed. Yet, this is deceptive. Recalling
the example of the woman who goes ahead and gives birth to the colorblind child rather
than waiting a month to conceive ± the common moral view is that this child has been
harmed as a result of thHPRWKHU¶VZURQJDFWLRQWRFRQFHLYHDWWLPH71 rather than T2.
The philosophical problem is how to reconcile our common moral view that the woman
KDVDFWHGZURQJO\LQQRWSUHYHQWLQJKHUFKLOG¶VGLVDELOLW\ZLWKWKHYLHZWKDWLWLVEHWWHUIRU
the child with the disability to exist than not to have existed at all.
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Especially in the case of mild disability, it does not seem persuasive to argue that
WKHFKLOGZRXOGKDYHEHHQEHWWHURIIQRWH[LVWLQJ3KLORVRSKHU'DQ%URFNH[WHQGV3DUILW¶V
discussion of the Non-,GHQWLW\3UREOHPLQWRZKDWKHFDOOVWKH³ZURQJIXOKDQGLFDS´
FRQXQGUXP³$ZURQJIXODFWLRQPXVWEHEDGIRUVRPHRQHEXWDFKRLFHWRFUHDWHDFKLOG
ZLWKLWVKDQGLFDSLVEDGIRUQRRQH´135 6LQFHWKLVLVQRWD³VDPHSHUVRQ´FKRLFHEXWD
³GLIIHUHQWSHUVRQ¶FKRice, the disabled person who is born is not harmed, since she could
not have existed in any other way. In other words, the person with a disability may still
have a worthwhile life, one that is better than no life at all. The answer to my first
question, ³LVLWSRVVLEOHWRGRKDUPWRDFKLOGZKRRWKHUZLVHZRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQERUQDW
DOO"´VHHPVWREHQR)RU3DUILWDWOHDVWLWLVEHWWHUIRUDQLQGLYLGXDOWRH[LVWZLWKD
hearing loss, than not to exist at all.
Genetic Selection and W rongful H andicaps
The Non-Identity Problem focuses our attention on the child who gets to exist as a
result of this moral calculus. As mentioned earlier, Dan Brock offers a way out of this
puzzle by shifting the locus of morality from the child who has benefitted to a non
person- affecting analysis.136 With this analysis, the scope of the problem is widened to
include the effects of such a decision on the larger community. Brock supposes that these
effects would include any harm visited on the parents as a result of having to care for a
child with a disability, and any harm imposed on society, in which might include the
DOORFDWLRQRIDGGLWLRQDOUHVRXUFHVIRUWKDWFKLOG¶VFDUH

'DQ%URFN³7KH1RQ-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms ± The Case of Wrongful
+DQGLFDSV´ Bioethics 9 (3/4):271.
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In removing the child who has reaped the benefit of existence (as a deaf person)
from this analysis, Brock generates several non person-affecting principles, including the
principle of avoiding suffering or limited opportunity. By attaching the harm done to a
person, Brock claims this misunderstands the nature of the Non-Identity Problem ± the
core of a Non-Identity Problem is that no person is harmed, and the disability that ensues
is not a loss.137
Suppose that a deaf child has been created, and this is morally justified using the
reasoning from the Non-Identity Problem. This child benefits from existence, and even if
deafness is a harm, it is not such a great harm that the child is better off not existing. Yet
RQ%URFN¶VDFFRXQWWKH'HDISRWHQWLDOSDUHQWRXJKWWRFRQVLGHUWKHIROORZLQJQRQSHUVRQaffecting principle:
N: Individuals are morally required not to let any possible child or other
dependent person for whose welfare they are responsible experience serious
suffering or limited opportunity if they can act so that, without imposing
substantial burdens or costs on themselves or others, any alternative possible child
or other dependent person for whose welfare they would be responsible will not
experience serious suffering or limited opportunity.138
The Deaf potential parent who wishes to have a Deaf child may have many
reasons for wishing to have a Deaf child, but it is doubtful that the Deaf potential parent
YLHZVD'HDISHUVRQ¶VOLIHDVH[SHULHQFLQJVHULRXVVXIIHULQJRWKHUZLVHZK\ZRXOGVKH
want to have a Deaf child? (I will assume that the Deaf potential parent is like most
potential parents and wishes a full and happy life for her offspring). This illustrates one
problem with the non person-affecting principle ± how one defines harm. Serious
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suffering and limited opportunity are not universal concepts. The suffering from
discriminatory behaviors aimed at an Arab-American man as a result of Flying While
Arab (FWA) may be deemed serious depending on the duration and frequency of these
experiences, where the frustrations felt by the deaf person tend to be more along the order
of not being able to access her favorite television show on the internet due to a lack of
captions. Both are harms, but the degree and nature differ. The same holds for limited
opportunity, which may occur as a result of whatever properties one has won in the
genetic lottery, or may be a direct result of the opportunities proximal to where one lives.
Genetic Selection and Social A rguments
An argument by analogy likens the experience of being Deaf to the experience of
being a racial or ethnic minority. Levy and Anstey use this analogy to illustrate the
negative effects of being Deaf, and to assess whether the claim that harms experienced by
the signing Deaf community are relevantly similar to the harms encountered by members
of racial or ethnic minority groups.139 Since the harms experienced by members of racial
and ethnic minority groups are those of social injustice, the argument runs, so are the
harms experienced by members of the signing Deaf community.
Levy argues that this is a flawed analogy. The harm resulting from racial or ethnic
prejudice is not a consequence of physical appearance, but an artifact of it.140 The harms
created by social barriers to access are only part of the harm that a Deaf person would
experience. Even if society could eliminate all of the barriers and provide Deaf people a
.:$QVWH\³$UH$WWHPSWVWR+DYH,PSDLUHG&KLOGUHQ-XVWLILDEOH"´-RXUQDORI
medical Ethics 28:28-88 (2002). 1/HY\³'HDIQHVV&XOWXUHDQG&KRLFH´LQ-RXUQDORI
Medical Ethics 28: 282-5 (2002).
140
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fully inclusive experience in the public sphere, that would include captioning, sign
language interpreting, and other accessibility services, Deaf people would still not be on
an even playing field.
One reason for this, argues Levy, is that the logocentric nature of culture is
organized around the spoken voice. No matter what barriers are removed in the public
arena, the Deaf person will always be harmed by her inability to access information that
is spoken in certain fora. The (potential) deaf person who is genetically selected does not
only experience harmful discrimination via the negative effects of a society that has not
adequately addressed disability access, but also experiences harm as a result of being
somewhat alienated from mainstream non-Deaf social discourse.
I think that Levy is correct in pointing out the importance of the spoken voice in
everyday social discourse; however there is another element present today that may serve
to ameliorate this harm. I would argue that mainstream culture is more phonocentric
(based on sound) than logocentric, and that some of the logocentric nature of mainstream
non-Deaf culture discourse is now accessible to literate Deaf people through the variety
of social media that were not present when Levy and Anstey wrote their articles. In
particular, the casual nature of social discourse exchanged on social media sites like
Facebook and Twitter have had the effect of opening a window to Deaf people for what
used to be water-cooler chat. Other Web 2.0 services like blogs and their accompanying
comments section, signed vlogs, and other signed media present on sites like YouTube
have also contributed to breaking down some of the communication access barriers in
non-public domains. To be sure, there are still inaccessible aspects to the internet, and it
is likely that as new technologies emerge, accessibility to those technologies will always
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be somewhat behind. Yet the difference in the quality of life for Deaf people, due to more
direct opportunities for informal communication is significant and should not be
overlooked when performing the calculus of moral harm.
Levy and Anstey both rely on the disanalogy with the social argument to conclude
that genetic selection is morally unjustified. For Levy it is partly a matter of harm that
cannot be addressed by social policy, and partly a matter of the claim that Deaf potential
parents wish to bear deaf children so that they may share their rich culture with these
children. For Levy, the best solution to this is for Deaf people to have hearing children ±
children who will be able to participate in Deaf and non-Deaf cultural communities with
equal ease.
Anstey makes a similar suggestion after considering the argument that Deaf
people may also wish to use genetic selection as a tool for ensuring that the signing Deaf
community has sufficient critical mass to continue as a thriving linguistic community. By
noting that there is nothing that prevents hearing children of Deaf parents from learning
the signed language used in the home as a first language, Anstey argues that the genetic
selection for the continuation of community is not a sufficient reason. The nature of
reciprocity is also addressed, since whatever technology is used to select for deafness can
also be used to select against deafness. For Anstey, the burden of reasons for genetic
selection falls squarely on the potential Deaf parents ± they must move beyond the
harms/benefit calculus of the Non-Identity argument and establish reasons for genetic
selection that address the issue of imposing social harm on Deaf children.141
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Reproductive L iberty and Genetic Selection
Up to this point, the discussion has focused on the harms resulting from genetic
selection. American bioethics not only uses the consequentialist principles of
nonmaleficence and beneficence to assess the moral permissibility of actions, it also
considers principles of autonomy and justice. Several authors have argued that genetic
selection should be addressed as a matter of parental reproductive liberty; this section
takes a look at those arguments and weighVWKHPDJDLQVWWKHSRWHQWLDOFKLOG¶VDXWRQRP\
Julian Savulescu uses the example of McCulloch and Duschesneau (the Deaf
lesbian couple) to frame his analysis of genetic selection.142 He argues for a strong
parental claim to reproductive liberty for this case (which he notes is not precisely the
same as genetic selection), and concludes from this case that reproductive liberties should
be extended to all parents provided that the child is not harmed. Savulescu uses the Nonidentity argument as evidence that the children of McCulloch and Duschesneau were not
ultimately harmed by being born as Deaf since the benefit of existence outweighs the
harm of deafness.
In constructing an argument for reproductive liberty, Savulescu considers the
issue of access to genetic technology. He makes four claims: (1) that genetic tests should
be available to couples who wish to use them to select the child (of all possible options)
ZKRZLOOKDYH³WKHEHVWRSSRUWXQLW\RIKDYLQJWKHEHVWOLIH´  FRXSOHVVKRXOGXVHWKHVH
JHQHWLFWHVWVWRKDYHWKHFKLOGZKRZLOOKDYH³WKHEHVWRSSRUWXQLW\RIKDYLQJWKHEHVW
liIH´  FRXSOHVVKRXOGEHIUHHWRUHIXVHWRXVHWKHVHJHQHWLFWHVWVIRUWKHPVHOYHVRUWKHLU
-XOLDQ6DYXOHVFX³'HDI/HVELDQVµ'HVLJQHU'LVDELOLW\¶DQGWKH)XWXUHRI0HGLFLQH´
British Medical Journal 325: 772.
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offspring, provided that this does not result in harm to the child; and (4) couples should
be free to request and receive genetic testing, even if the child resulting from this does
not have average or better opportunities.143 This access to genetic technology does not
absolve the potential parents of any responsibility. Savulescu thinks that parents have a
moral obligation to use genetic selection to select the child ZLWKWKH³EHVWOLIHSURVSHFWV´
7KHTXHVWLRQKHUHLVKRZPLJKWRQHJRDERXWGHWHUPLQLQJZKDWWKH³EHVWOLIHSURVSHFWV´
are, and who gets to make this determination?
6LQFH6DYXOHVFX¶VSRLQWRIUHIHUHQFHLVWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPWKHLVVXHRIDFFHVVWR
genetic services is a matter of National Health Service policy. In the United States, access
WRJHQHWLFVHUYLFHVDQGWHVWLQJLVFXUUHQWO\DSDWFKZRUNWKDWYDULHVDFFRUGLQJWRRQH¶V
insurance company coverage; people can also opt to pay for these services out of pocket.
One of the challenges for policy makers is to determine what sorts of funding should be
provided to ensure reproductive liberties, especially if some of these choices may result
in more expensive costs to society. At this point, couples are free to refuse genetic
testing; there is no duty (legal or otherwise) that requires couples to undergo genetic
testing. Savulescu points out that this lines up with the tenet of non-directiveness in
genetic counseling.144
John Fletcher also argues for parental reproductive liberty using the Duchesneau
and McCulloch example, using the principle of fairness to ground his reasoning. He
ZULWHV³LISDUHQWVDUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUGHFLGLQJZKLFKJHQHWLFGLVRUGHUVDUHµVHULRXV¶LW
seems only fair that a deaf couple should bHDEOHWRGHFLGHWKDWGHDIQHVVLVQRWRQO\µQRW
143
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VHULRXV¶EXWLVDFWXDOO\SUHIHUDEOHLQWKHLUIDPLO\VLWXDWLRQ´145 Fletcher and Savulescu
both note that parental reproductive liberty is constrained somewhat by the concept of
causing harm to the child. The Duchesneau and McCulloch case, while not specifically a
case of genetic selection, shares the feature of the deaf child emerging from a natural
combination of genetic material (no genes were altered) and the deaf child receiving the
benefit of existence.
TKHTXHVWLRQRI³EHVWOLIHSURVSHFWV´ZDVUDLVHGEXWQRW\HWDQVZHUHG
satisfactorily by Savulescu. Fletcher offers a partial explanation for this by situating the
QRWLRQRI³EHVW´ZLWKWKH'HDISDUHQWVDQGWKHLUDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHLUIDPLO\)RU)OHWFKHU
the desire to have a deaf child is not so much motivated by selfishness as it is by the Deaf
parents claim that they could be better parents to deaf children than to hearing children.
Unfortunately, this claim is merely stated, not defended. So how might Deaf potential
parents come to this conclusion? Hearing children of Deaf parents learn signed language
as their first language, figure out how to get their parents attention using Deaf cultural
norms, and experience (all things being equal) a home life that would not seem to have
any significantly different features than it would were this a household of Deaf children.
Two considerations come to mind. The first is that Deaf parents believe that they
can be good parents to hearing children, but better parents to Deaf children. They may
feel a special obligation to parent Deaf children because they are Deaf ± they can provide
the vertical transmission of language and culture from parent to child that is rare in the
signing Deaf community and have the satisfaction of knowing that they have passed on
145
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their cultural values to children who are very likely to remain attached to the signing
Deaf community. Even if the Deaf children at some point decide to situate themselves
partly in the non-Deaf world, the fact of their physical status as deaf, plus their original
enculturation, makes it very likely that these children will not leave the signing Deaf
community entirely. This is not always the case for hearing children of Deaf parents.
The other issue is one of potential harm to the hearing children living in a Deaf
family. By virtue of their ability to understand and communicate directly in a signed
language and in a spoken language, hearing children are often put in the position of
interpreting for their parents. One SRVVLEOHKDUPLVWKDWWKLVPD\GLVUXSWWKHSDUHQW¶V
power and authority ± when the parent has limited access to information and must rely on
WKHFKLOG¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKLVFDQFUHDWHSUREOHPV$QRWKHUUHODWHGLVVXHLVWKHFKLOG¶V
maturity level; a child is not a professionally trained interpreter and not an adult. Being
put into situations where that child is expected to interpret may cause harm to the child.
Even if the parent is vigilant and adamant about not placing the child in this position,
other adults may not respect this decision, putting the child in a quandary, especially if
say the child is dealing with two authority figures, such as a parent and a teacher, or a
parent and a grandparent. Other harms that may occur include overhearing negative or
GHURJDWRU\FRPPHQWVDERXWRQH¶VIDPLO\LQWKHSUHVHQFHRIRQH¶VSDUHQWVRUPDNLQJ
choices about what kind of information to convey to parents so as to avoid causing
further harm. In choosing to bear a Deaf child, the Deaf parents avoid bringing this harm
to their family.
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7KH&KLOG¶V5LJKWWRDQ2SHQ)XWXUH
A criticism that is often levied against Deaf parents who would consider the use
of genetic selection to have a deaf child is that this is a selfish decision that places unfair
limits on the chilG¶VIXWXUHFRQGHPQLQJWKHFKLOGWRIHZHURSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGOLIHVW\OH
choices. By deliberately choosing to bear a child with a genome that codes for hearing
ORVV'HDISDUHQWVKDYHIRUFHGWKDWFKLOGLQWRWKHLUQRWLRQRI³WKHJRRGOLIH´,Q.DQWLDQ
termsWKHFKLOGKDVEHHQXVHGDVDPHDQVWRWKHSDUHQWV¶HQGVDQGKDVQRWEHHQUHVSHFWHG
as an end-in-LWVHOI'HQD'DYLVXVHV-RHO)HLQEHUJ¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIDFKLOG¶VULJKWWRDQ
open future to critique selection for disability.146
7KHFRQFHSWRID³FKLOG¶VULJKWWRDQRSHQIXWXUH´SUHVXSSRVHVIUHHGRPRI
lifestyle choices. The more opportunities an individual has, the more open her future.
Liberal societies stress the maximizing of opportunity and offsetting the negative effects
RIWKH³QDWXUDODQGVRFLDO´lottery in order to promote individual autonomy and lifestyle
choice. Genetic selection seems to move against this project. Davis writes:
Good parenthood requires a balance between having a child for our own sakes
and being open to the moral reality that the child will exist for her own sake, with
her own talents and weaknesses, propensities and interests, and with her own life
to make. Parental practices that close exits virtually forever are insufficiently
attentive to the child as end in herself. By FORVLQJRIIWKHFKLOG¶VULJKWWRDQRSHQ
future, they define the child as an entity who exists to fulfill parental hopes and
dreams, not her own.147
,KDYHLGHQWLILHGDWOHDVWWZRZD\VLQZKLFKWRHYDOXDWH'DYLV¶VDUJXPHQWIRUD
FKLOG¶VULJKWWRDQRSHQIXture. First, one could assess whether her deontological move is
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sufficient WRFRXQWHU3DUILW¶VFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWFODLP± ,¶PQRWFRQYLQFHGWKDWLWLVEXW,
will set this aside for now in order to focus on the second approach, which is to determine
whether 'DYLV¶VDUJXPHQWIRUWKHFKLOG¶VULJKWWRDQRSHQIXWXUHKROGVZKHQDSSOLHGWR
the particular case of Deaf parents using genetic selection to select a deaf child. Davis
specifically addresses the case of selection for deafness, claiming:
If Deafness is considered a culture, as deaf activists would have us agree, then
deliberately creating a Deaf child who will have only very limited options to
move outside of that culture, also counts as a moral harm. A decision, made
before a child is even born, that confines her forever to a narrow group of people
DQGDOLPLWHGFKRLFHRIFDUHHUVVRYLRODWHVWKHFKLOG¶VULJKWWRDQRSHQIXWXUHWKDW
no genetic counseling team should acquiesce in it. The very value of autonomy
that grounds the ethics of genetic counseling should preclude assisting parents in a
project that so dramatically narrows the autonomy of the child to be.148
In this quote, Davis makes several assumptions. First, she claims that Deaf children will
have very limited options to move outside of the signing Deaf cultural community;
second, she claims that the Deaf child is confined forever to a narrow group of people;
and third, she claims that the Deaf child is restricted to a limited choice of careers. I
would like to evaluate each of these claims separately.
First, what might Davis mean when she claims that a created Deaf child (or deaf
person) will have very limited options to move outside the Deaf culture? What is the
basis for this claim ± is it a claim based on solely on restricted communication access to
hearing people, or is it a claim about the closed nature of the signing Deaf community,
making this analogous to say, some kinds of religious communities that have strong rules
DJDLQVWFRQWDFWZLWKRXWVLGHUV"7REHFKDULWDEOH,¶OOWDNHLWDV a claim about restricted
access to the broader hearing community. So what might this mean for the Deaf child
148
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selected by Deaf parents? (This seems to be no different than for the Deaf child who just
happens to be born to Deaf parents, but that is another topic.) The deaf child born to
Deaf parents has an advantage over most other deaf children who are born to hearing
parents who do not know signed language. So the Deaf child with Deaf parents has the
advantage of parents who can communicate with her frRPWKH³get go.´ The Deaf child
with Deaf parents is likely to spend much of her time with other Deaf people, but this in
itself does not entail limited options to move outside the signing Deaf community. In
fact, it might entail the opposite, as the Deaf child here is able to acquire social
experiences under the condition of full access to language. This knowledge of social
interaction could provide a basis for building the social and interactive skills necessary to
move outside of the community. Additionally, consider what kind of Deaf person might
pursue genetic selection for deafness? It is likely to be a Deaf person who believes a
culturally Deaf existence to be worth living, and is sophisticated enough to be aware of
the possibility of genetic selection/technology as a means for bearing a deaf child. While
these factors are not necessarily correlated to the ability to move between the deaf
community and the hearing world, I suspect in practice there is a high correlation. Deaf
people live in a hearing world; Deaf parents teach their Deaf children how to manage in
the hearing world.
'DYLV¶VVHFRQGFODLPWKDWWKH'HDIFKLOGLVFRQILQHGWRDQDUURZJURXSRISHRSOH
is perplexing because I cannot determine what she means by this. Is it an essentialist
claim about the nature of Deaf people and the signing Deaf community? Is it a claim
about the restrictions that the disability of hearing loss places on people and their life
projects? The Deaf child with Deaf parents who spends most of her time in the Deaf
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community could meet a variety of Deaf people, ranging from blue collar to white collar
professional, to artists and writers, of a variety of ethnic and education backgrounds. It
seems that this claim ignores that the Deaf community is as richly diverse as the hearing
world, including people with a wide range of views and broad and varied experiences.
The restriction to a narrow group of people seems more likely to be a reflection of the
SDUHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHVDQGQRWRIWKHQDWXUHRIWKHVLJQLQJ'Haf community. But perhaps I
have missed her point.
Finally, the constraint imposed on a Deaf child in terms of limited career options.
&RPPHQWDWRUVZULWLQJRQWKHRSHQIXWXUHTXHVWLRQDQG'HDIQHVVXVHWKLVµDUJXPHQWE\
H[DPSOH¶SUROLILFDOO\JHQHUDWLQJOists of the kinds of career opportunities foreclosed to
Deaf people. Unfortunately, they mistakenly take their beliefs and assumptions of what
counts as employment restrictions on Deaf people for facts. In the course of my research,
I have learned of the following restrictions on Deaf people: ³QRGULYLQJOLPLWHG
participation in sports, no piloting, no membership of the armed forces, no capacity to
HQMR\PXVLFDQGVRRQ´149 (This quote is taken from a 2004 article in the Journal of
Applied Philosophy, a reasonably well-respected peer-reviewed journal in the field.)
+HUH¶VWKHSUREOHP'HDISHRSOHGRGULYHWKH\GRSDUWLFLSDWHLQVSRUWVWKH\GRSLORW
planes, they have been members of the armed forces, they do have the capacity to enjoy
music. Scholars who write about the signing Deaf community, but who have little to no
experience with this community do not need to engage with the community ± they do
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have an obligation to verify their assumptions and beliefs about what it must be like to be
a Deaf person. (This also goes for the peer reviewers). While this may seem like a minor
quibble about facts, there is a deeper issue at hand, which goes to epistemic authority.
Deaf people do know what it is like to experience life in a signing Deaf community; they
are also likely to be more aware of the experience of life in a non-Deaf spoken language
community.150
I think that the question of limited employment opportunity is a good question,
however, and it deserves a more careful analysis. Just what kinds of careers might really
be foreclosed to Deaf people? These would be jobs that depend on the combined abilities
of hearing and voice, such as opera singer, 911 call center person, air traffic controller,
soldiers on the frontlines of battle, and perhaps military pilot. These can be roughly
categorized into 2 groups: jobs with aesthetic requirements based on sound (ability to
judge and produce sound of a specific quality) and jobs where ability to hear is integral to
safety. Now, my next suggestion may sound a bit farfetched, but given the advances in
technology, some of these jobs where the ability to hear is related to safety issues may
not be out of the realm for a deaf person the future, given voice recognition technology
and shifts to text-based communication. I think the limit on jobs with aesthetic
requirements based on the ability to judge and reproduce sounds is a much more difficult
REMHFWLRQWRRYHUFRPHDQG,WKLQNLWVWDQGV<HW,¶GOLNHWRIROORZXSZLWKDTXHVWLRQ
related to aesthetic experience and the concept of an open future. A deaf person whose
deafness was genetically selected may be precluded from participating in certain kinds of
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DHVWKHWLFH[SHULHQFHVEDVHGRQVRXQG%XWLVWKLVVXIILFLHQWWRFODLPWKDWWKHFKLOG¶VULJKW
to an open future has been curtailed? If we consider the natural lottery alone, all people
are born with a particular set of physical conditions that preclude certain abilities, and
consequently, certain career options. So the task is to somehow separate the limitations
imposed by the natural lottery from the limitations imposed by genetic selection for
deafness. But if the number of careers limited by hearing loss is not significantly
different from those imposed by the naturally lottery, this objection seems to lose its
force. (A person who is tone-deaf may not have the ability to pursue a career in music
that requires the ability to judge and reproduce a sound ± how is this person different
from the deaf person who cannot do this?) If we assess it in terms of the kinds of career
options that are foreclosed, such as those based on aesthetic requirements, the argument
carries more merit.
%\HYDOXDWLQJ'DYLV¶VDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHTXDOLW\RIOLIHH[SHULHQFHGE\'HDI
people, I hope to have shown two things: the first is an important point, though not a
SKLORVRSKLFDORQHZKLFKLVWKDWZKHQPDNLQJFODLPVDERXW'HDISHRSOH¶VOLYHVLWKHOSV
to get the facts straight about what Deaf people can and cannot do; the second, and I think

more important claim is to carefully evaluate what is meant by limitations on an open
future for Deaf people, separating out restrictions based on physical conditions from
those based on social barriers, which are far more onerous.
,¶YHEHHQOHDGLQJXSWRDILQDOREMHction about the right to an open future question,
which is what counts as an open future? Anita Silvers, a philosopher who writes on
disability issues and philosophy uses an analogy of a restaurant buffet:
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because the child has only one life to plan, the uOWLPDWHEHQHILWWRWKHFKLOG¶V
autonomy of having fewer life plan options from which to choose may be
negligible, more like having a varied menu with ten rather than twelve main
courses than like being a vegetarian in a steak house.151
I think Silvers is on the right track here, but she neglects another important
consideration. I argue that social barriers place far more restrictive limitations on an
open future for the Deaf person than the physical inability to hear. So it could be argued
that social limitations placed on Deaf people shore up the right to an open future
argument more than the physical fact of hearing loss. But this seems to be a dangerous
move, for many kinds of people face discrimination, not just Deaf people or people with
disabilities. White people have an easier time in our society than blacks, but the
recognition of social barriers against African-Americans does not imply that their
numbers should be reduced due to less open futures. Arguing against genetic selection of
deafness due to less open futures based on social constraints is not sufficiently
convincing.
,I³WKHULJKWWRDQRSHQIXWXUH´DUJXPHQWLVWRSUHYDLODJDLQVWWKH1RQ-Identity
Problem regarding genetic selection for Deafness/hearing loss, it must answer two
questions: first, it must carefully define an open future, and second, it must explain why
a truncated future is worse than no future at all. Until these questions are answered, the
conclusion of the Non-Identity Problem stands ± that is, that it is better to exist as Deaf,
than not to exist at all.
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Better Not to E xist?
I conclude my assessment of the arguments on genetic selection by briefly
considering a provocative claim by David Benatar, who argues that existence is a harm. If
this claim stands, then the benefits/harm calculus made in the Non-Identity Problem
FDQQRWKROG7REHFOHDU%HQDWDU¶VFODLPLVDJHQHUDOFODLPDERXWWKHKDUPRIH[LVWHQFH±
it is not directed at deafness or any other particular formulations of existence.
So what, exactly, is Benatar¶VFODLP"&RPLQJLQWRH[LVWHQFHLVDOZD\VDKDUPDQG
this rests on an asymmetry of judgments about pleasure and pain related to existence.
Benatar asks us to consider two scenarios ± of a person who exists and one who does not
exist. The person who exists will be in the presence of pain, which is bad; but this person
will also be in the presence of pleasure, which is good. The person who does not exist
will have the absence of pain, which is good; and also the absence of pleasure, which is
not bad.152 Therefore, it is better to have never existed than to exist.
%HQDWDU¶VDUJXPHQWIURPDV\PPHWU\UDLVHVVRPHREYLRXVSUREOHPVIRUP\ZKROH
project. If it is better to have never existed, then the nature of how one comes into
existence, whether genetically selected or altered as a Deaf person, does not matter. In
addition to this argument, Benatar also raises the question of whether there is a duty not
to procreate.153 The duty not to procreate can be grounded on the serious harm that is
conferred by existence. If there is such a duty, this also renders my project moot.
(YHQLIRQHDFFHSWV%HQDWDU¶VFRQFOXVLRQDERXWWKHKDUPWKDWLVFRQIHUUHGRQ
individuals as a result of coming into existence, the duty not to procreate may be too
152
153

David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been, (Oxford; Oxford University Press), 38.
Ibid, 95.
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demanding. While it can be agreed that sometimes humans have a duty not to create ±
under certain circumstances, including some of the arguments offered against permitting
Deaf children to be deliberately brought into existence, the idea of a universal duty not to
procreate seems quite harsh. The human drive to procreate (as distinguished from the
drive to have coitus or the drive to parent) is a strong one.
+RZPLJKWRQHFKDOOHQJH%HQDWDU¶VFRQFOXVLRQV"2ne possible response is to
argue that the harms of coming into existence are not as great as Benatar claims. (Benatar
claims that our lives are very bad, and that many of us are in psychological denial about
this, believing that our lives are not so bad as they actually are).154 Still, even if most
people have very bad lives, not everyone has a very bad life. So one way to escape the
conundrum that Benatar has created is to allow for the possibility of procreation for those
whom it is not anticipated will have very bad lives. Justifying this against the harms of
being deaf ± whether a result of social construction, a lack of species-typical functioning,
or the absence of a sense ± is a formidable project.
Summary
I have provided a context for genetic selection, distinguished between genetic
selection and genetic alteration, and offered an argument for genetic selection, the NonIdentity argument. I have considered the objections to the Non-Identity argument, namely
'DQ%URFN¶VQRQ-person-DIIHFWLQJSULQFLSOHDQGDOVR'DYLG%HQDWDU¶VDUJXPHQWWKDW
existence in itself is a harm. I have also considered other arguments regarding genetic
selection, including an analogy of social discrimination and the right to reproductive

154
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DXWRQRP\$GGLWLRQDOO\,KDYHH[SOLFDWHG'HQD'DYLV¶VYDULDWLRQRQ)HLQEHUJ¶V5LJKWWR
an Open Future, providing an analysis of these claims.
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C hapter 4 G enetic A lteration: C reating Deaf Babies

Genetic Alteration Case Study
Bennett and Io are both Deaf. Bennett was born to a
hearing family and beca me deaf at age 2 as a result of
contracting meningitis. He has no family history of
deafness, and his genetic screening test results do not
indicate any genes associated with deafness. Io¶VIDPLO\
has some Deaf members and some hearing members. Her
genetic screening results indicate that the presence of the
GJB2 gene (Connexin 26), which is assumed to be the
FDXVHRI,R¶VGHDIQHVV,R and Bennett are both active
members of the signing Deaf community and feel so
strongly about having a deaf child that they have discussed
not having children at all if they cannot have Deaf
children.155 Soon after getting their genetics testing results,
Io and Bennett learn about a successful attempt of gene
therapy that changes the genes of a fertilized egg. Since
their genetic profiles indicate a very high chance that they
will bear a hearing child, they have inquired about the
possibility of using gene therapy to alter the genes of their
potential child so that it will be born deaf.
In 2005, a team of scientists published an article reporting a successful gene
therapy protocol that restored hearing to a group of guinea pigs whose hearing was
deliberately destroyed from antibiotics.156 This news led to speculation in the signing
Deaf community as to whether a similar procedure could be done before conception or in

utero to create deaf offspring. For many in the signing Deaf community, altering genes
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This is an uncommon view within the signing deaf community; in a study conducted at
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was viewed as a substantially different ethical issue than deliberately causing a hearing
child to become deaf, most notably because it involved changing a physical characteristic
before birth. This chapter will explore this moral intuition by addressing the question: are
considerations of moral justification for genetic alteration substantially different than
genetic selection?
Genetic A lteration V ersus Genetic Selection
In the case of genetic selection through preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)
discussed in the previous chapter, the fertilized egg is selected for implantation in the
womb based on specific criteria, such as the presence of genes associated with deafness.
The cogency of this variation of the Non-Identity argument relies on the fact that the
fertilized egg is not altered in any way, save for what processes might affect it during
PGD.157 The potential parent selects a particular genomically intact embryo to be brought
into existence, rather than playing the odds in hopes of producing an embryo with the
desired genetic trait. Genetic selection is thus an option only available to potential
parents who have genetic traits that are mutually compatible with producing a deaf child
through normal old-fashioned reproductive techniques. PGD can be used to
tremendously boost the odds of having a child with hearing loss; it does not create these
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odds. As such, the use of this reproductive technology to bear deaf children will only
apply to a subset of potential parents in the Deaf community.158
Geneticists studying on population genetics in the Deaf community have argued
that rates of intermarriage among deaf individuals (assortative mating) in the United
States over time have likely increased the occurrence of recessive genes such as those
associated with deafness in the Connexin 26 gene locus.159 This is not unexpected; in
communities where individuals choose their own mates it is not unusual to select a mate
ZKRVKDUHVRQH¶VODQJXDJH+LVWRULFDQGUHFHQWVWXGLHVFRQGXFWHGRQGHDILQGLYLGXDOVDQG
marriage show high rates of intermarriage among deaf individuals ranging from seventyfive to ninety percent; computer simulation models using historic mating data about deaf
individuals have indicated that assortative mating has ³has doubled the frequency of
')1%GHDIQHVVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´160 For many Deaf couples in the U.S., genetic
selection for deafness is a possible option ± at least in regards to possessing compatible
genetic material.
What about Deaf potential parents, such as Io and Bennett in the case study at the
beginning of this chapter, who long for a Deaf child, but who do not have mutually

:DOWHU1DQFH³7KH*HQHWLFVRI'HDIQHVV´LQ Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities Research Review, Special Issue: Infants and Children with Hearing Loss, Part
One, (2003) 9 (2) 109-119. DOI: 10.1002/mrdd.1006
159
W. Nance, X. Liu, and A. Pandya, ³Relation between Choice of Partner and High
Frequency of Connexin-26 Deafness´LQ The Lancet, (2000) 356 (9228): 500-501.  
160
S.H. Blanton, Nance, W. E., Norris, V. W., Welch, K. O., Burt, A., Pandya, A. and
Arnos, K. S., ³Fitness Among Individuals with Early Childhood Deafness: Studies in
Alumni Families from Gallaudet University´LQ Annals of Human Genetics, (2010)
74: 28-9. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-1809.2009.00553.x
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compatible genetic material necessary to produce a child with hearing loss?161 There are
at least two options are available to them if they wish to use some of their own genetic
material. If one or both of the potential parents have genetic material that is compatible
with producing a deaf child given a different partner, one option is sperm or egg donation
using donor material that is compatible with the SRWHQWLDOSDUHQW¶VJHQHWLFPDWHULDOFRGLQJ
for hearing loss.162 For purposes of this discussion, set aside the fact that many clinics
and sperm banks will eliminate sperm and egg donors with this trait ± a very real
problem, to be sure, but one that does not make any difference for the purpose of
analyzing methods of how infants with hearing loss could be conceived. This would
result in the genetic selection scenario previously described.
If neither potential parent has genetic material compatible with producing a child
with genetic hearing loss, then genetic selection is not an option. If one potential parent
has genetic material that is compatible with producing a child with genetic hearing loss
and the potential parents are insistent on bearing a child with genetic hearing loss that is
biologically related to both potential parents, genetic selection is also not feasible. For
potential parents who are unable to conceive a child with hearing loss, genetic
intervention therapy (genetic alteration) offers an opportunity to bear a child with hearing
ORVVZKRLVELRORJLFDOO\UHODWHGWRERWKSDUHQWV,QWKLVFDVHWKHHPEU\R¶VJHQHWLF
makeup would be altered so that its genes would constitute a genotype consistent with
hearing loss. This could be done through either germline gene transfer or somatic cell
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162
Mundy, W22.

105
JHQHWUDQVIHU,QRWKHUZRUGVDQHPEU\RZLWKWKHSRWHQWLDOSKHQRW\SLFVWDWXVRI³KHDULQJ´
would be genetically altered in utero, resulting in the phenotypic status and physical
presentation of ³KHDULQJORVV´RQFHERUQ
The moral permissibility of such a move is unclear. Unlike the problem of
JHQHWLFVHOHFWLRQZKHUHDQHPEU\R¶VVKRWDWH[LVWHQFH YLDVHOHFWLRQDQGLPSODQWDWLRQ 
depends on parental preference for a given physical charateristic or phenotype generated
by the presence or absence of a particular genotype, in this case there is a particular
embryo already in utero that does not possess the desired genetic trait as detected by
genetic screening. The potential parents have three options available: (1) continue the
pregnancy despite the absence of the desired trait of hearing loss; (2) terminate the
pregnancy due to the absence of the desired trait of hearing loss; or (3) continue the
pregnancy provided that the desired trait can be produced through genetic alteration.
Adding the variable of genetic modification transforms the issue from a different person
problem, involving the choice of one embryo over another, to a same person problem that
weighs two potential kinds of existence for the same person (with or without hearing
loss) and the option of nonexistence.163 The metaphysical question of whether an
individual remains the same if a different kind of existence is chosen is no easy question,
and will be taken up later in this chapter.
If the same utilitarian reasoning used in the genetic selection case study is applied
to the genetic alteration case study, the benefit of existence once again trumps
163

:KLOH,DPDZDUHWKDW,¶YHPDGHDVLJQLILFDQWFRQFHSWXDOOHDSE\FRQVLGHULQJtwo
slightly different genomes to be assessed as the same person, for now I will assume the
OD\SHUVRQ¶VYLHZWKDWVLQFHDOORWKHUIDFWRUVUHPDLQWKHVDPHWKLVLVRQHDQGWKHVDPH
person, who may exist with hearing or exist with hearing loss.
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nonexistence whether or not the potential child is born with hearing loss or born able to
hear. For the person who accepts the cogency of the Non-Identity class of utilitarian
arguments, the analysis of moral justification stops here. Following the conclusions of
&KDSWHU7KUHHLQWKHVHWZRFDVHVWKHEHQHILWRIH[LVWHQFHRXWZHLJKVWKHµKDUP¶RI
KHDULQJORVVRUWKHµKDUP¶RIEHLQJDKHDULQJFKLOGLQD'HDIIDPLO\UHQGHULQJWKH
question about the morality of modifying an embryo moot, overridden by the NonIdentity utilitarian calculus.
There are other grounds on which to consider this question of the moral
justification of genetic alteration and these are these issues I will press for this chapter.
Regarding changing the question from a different person choice to a (seemingly) same
person choice, new issues are presented. Two key issues now at hand are whether a
potential person has any claim to a particular kind of existence, and whether transforming
DSRWHQWLDOLQGLYLGXDO¶VSK\VLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVEDVHGRQDVXUURJDWH¶VGHFLVion can be
morally justified.
T en Fingers, T en Toes
As prHYLRXVO\PHQWLRQHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIFKDQJLQJDSRWHQWLDOSHUVRQ¶VJHQRPH
raises a number of substantive issues in philosophy and bioethics. These include
questions about attributing rights to a potential person to questions regarding the
inviolability of the body and, by extension, the genome. One of the challenges I was
faced with in writing about genetic alteration in the deaf community was how to situate
my analysis. Should I ground it in the historic dogma of American bioethics, principlism?
Or would it be best positioned as a project with roots in the history of philosophy? On the
RWKHUKDQGPD\EHLWZRXOGEHEHVWWRWU\DELRHWKLFVµWRSLFV¶DSSURDFKWRERGLO\LQWHJULW\
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including surrogate decision-PDNLQJDQGFKLOGUHQ¶VULJKWV(DFKRIWKHVHDSSURaches held
some appeal, yet none of them seemed quite right. In order to establish an analysis of a
question that mattered enormously to a specific population, it seemed to make sense to
consider this population. Ultimately, I decided to look to the American Deaf community
in order to identify a starting place; my personal experiences and academic knowledge
suggested that the philosophical notion of bodily integrity would best represent what I
understood as a common perspective shared by many in the community.164
One of the most frequently occurring sentiments in the signing Deaf community is
the idea that deaf children are whole and not in need of medical intervention. In
numerous conversations with signing Deaf adults about whether prelingually deaf
children ought to be given cochlear implants, one expression came up frequently, which I
JORVVDV³7(1),1*(567(172(63(5)(&7´LQ$PHULFDQ6LJQ/DQJXDJH7KLV
H[SUHVVLRQDSSHDUHGWRV\PEROL]HWKHZKROHQHVVRIWKHGHDIFKLOG¶VERG\WKHLGHDWKDWD
child born deaf was as whole as a child with ten fingers and ten toes, that is a child who
ILWWKHVLJQHU¶VYLHZRIQRUPDOF\7KHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWHQILQJHUVDQGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI

164
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the hands and fingers to signing Deaf people is well documented; there is a high value
attributed to body parts necessary for the production of language.165
This description can be viewed as a folk argument against the medicalization of
deafness. More nuanced versions of these arguments are well articulated in the discussion
regarding moral justifications for providing prelingually deaf children with cochlear
implants, those opposed to this procedure call for a rejection of this elective surgical
procedure by appealing to principles of human dignity, autonomy, and bodily integrity. 166
Positing Deaf people as complete and whole individuals contrasts with the pathological
view of deaf people as individuals with broken ears in need of repair, offering a different
theoretical lens through which to view this problem.
7KLVDUJXPHQWWKDWDFKLOG¶VEody is inviolable runs into trouble when considering
JHQHWLFDOWHUDWLRQ,IWKHFKLOG¶VERG\RXJKWQRWWREHDOWHUHGEDVHGRQDGHVLUHWRDOORZ
that child to have autonomy over her body, or to preserve her dignity, or to uphold her
right to bodily integrity, how is it possible to maintain this position and also maintain that
LWLVPRUDOO\MXVWLILDEOHWRDOWHUDSRWHQWLDOFKLOG¶VJHQHWLFPDWHULDO",UDLVHGWKLVTXHVWLRQ
many times in my discussions with signing Deaf adults who held strong views against
cochlear implants for prelingually deaf children, but also held the view that Deaf parents
ought to have the ability to create (as well as select) potential offspring who would
possess the characteristic of being deaf. Maintaining the simultaneous positions that
upheld the notion of bodily integrity for deaf children while allowing for genetic

Carol Padden and Tom Humphries, Deaf in America, 119.
Crouch, ³/HWWLQJWKHGHDIEHDeaf,´ 18-20; Lane and Grodin, ³(WKLFDO,VVXHVLQ
&RFKOHDU,PSODQW6XUJHU\´
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alteration that would cause potential hearing children to become deaf seemed to be an
inconsistency. It was not clear to me initially whether this indicated a confusion in
reasoning or a deeply coherent position based on moral intuition held by members of the
signing Deaf community. Given the possibility of different cultural mores in the signing
Deaf community, I decided to explore this position further in hopes of unearthing the
reasoning offered by many members of the signing Deaf community in support of genetic
alteration for deafness. The question of whether a potential being could be deaf versus the
deaf/hearing status of an actual being seemed to be the point on which this argument
turned.
0RGLI\LQJJHQHWLFPDWHULDOSULRUWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VH[LVWHQFHLVZLWKRXWSUHFHGHQW
and raises difficult, though not necessarily unique, questions about the moral
permissibility of such procedures. Under what circumstances, if any, might it be
DSSURSULDWHWRPRGLI\DSRWHQWLDOSHUVRQ¶VJHQHWLFPDWHULDO":KRKDVWKHPRUDOZDUUDQW
to make this decision and how is this determined? Are there limitations on what kinds of
genetic alterations are permissible? In order to consider these questions, several concepts
must be unpacked. First, there is the notion of a potential person who is (by definition)
incapable of making a decision at this point and whose moral standing not at all clear;
second, there is the issue of surrogate decision-making on the part of the potential
parents, which includes the issues of the scope and grounds for their decisions; third,
there is the issue of genetic essentialism, and whether our genes constitute the essence of
our person. The science of genetic alteration is still in its infancy, but the concepts
embedded in these questions are not new; they have a rich and complex history in both
philosophy and bioethics. I will sketch out my analysis with a look at the scope and
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limitations of parental surrogate decision-making as informed by the notion of bodily
integrity, returning to the issues of the moral standing of potential persons and genetic
essentialism at the end of the chapter.
At first glance, the Ten Fingers Ten Toes argument seems to suggest a possible
inconsistency in how reasoning about bodily integrity is applied in the Deaf community
regarding cochlear implant surgery and genetic alteration. The issues here are
complicated by the question of what counts as bodily alteration. It seems clear that a
macro level invasion and shifting of bodily tissues counts as bodily alteration; what is
visibly changed to the naked eye ± even if it is just a scar and a lump ± is evidence that
something has been altered. A change of function from pre-alteration to post-alteration
also offers us such evidence.
In the case of genetic alteration, this question is more difficult on a number of
OHYHOV)LUVWWKHUHLVWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKDWFRXQWVDVD³ERG\´",VLWDQ\PDWHULDO
substance with the potential of becoming a human being? This would seem to include any
biological material with a complete copy of human DNA, the blueprint for a particular
human being. If this definition is too general, one might want to consider the idea that it
must be a cohesive and integrated substance with the potential of becoming human, such
as a zygote, blastocyst, embryo, or fetus. Again, there are objections, since a zygote has
not yet attached itself to the uterus, and has not yet established a way of sustaining itself,
making it similar in some ways to a human hair cell flaked off during hair brushing. The
requisite information for life is present, but the potential for this information to be
embodied as life involves the artificial work of a laboratory instead of the natural process
of human conception.
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Suppose for the reasons above, we opt for defining the body in the following way:
as an integrated biological substance with human genomic properties that has the
potential to become human through natural processes. This definition would include both
the embryo and the fetus. Biologically speaking, the distinction between the two
involves a change from the emergence of specific body structures to the development of
said structures. Or perhaps it is possible that the most cogent definition of what counts as
a body is not just what is material, but what most closely resembles a living human being.
In this case, the fetus would qualify as having met this definition.
Once the question of defining the body is settled, the next question is at what
point, practically speaking, can gene therapy or genetic alteration of the body occur? Is it
a matter of some options, such as sex cell genetic alteration pre-zygote stage, being
practically foreclosed ± though not logically so? Or rather, is it a matter less of options
being logically foreclosed as it is a matter of determining what counts as a human body?
This is important in the matter of bodily integrity if the position of noninterference put
forth in the Ten Fingers Ten Toes argument is to be consistent. If the genetic alteration
does not happen to a body, the issue of bodily integrity does not apply.
Bodily Integrity and Bioethics
Before tackling the analysis of bodily integrity and genetic selection, it is
important to remember a key difference between the analysis of the genetic selection case
described in the previous chapter and the genetic alteration case described at the
beginning of this chapter. In the genetic selection case, the problem is assessed through a
teleological lens; benefits and disadvantages are weighed in order to reach the conclusion
WKDWWKHDGYDQWDJHVRIH[LVWHQFHRXWZHLJKWKHµKDUP¶RIGHDIQHVVHVSHFLDOO\ZKHQJLYHQ
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the alternative of nonexistence. It is certainly possible to use this approach of weighing
the benefit of existence against the harm of disability for genetic alteration, generating a
similar conclusion. One could imagine a scenario in which a couple, intent on bearing a
deaf child and unable to avail themselves of PGD, would pursue the only means of
technology, genetic alteration, in order to have a deaf child possessing biological material
from both parents, but would terminate any pregnancy that was inconsistent with these
goals.
Adding the possibility of altering the genetic material of an embryo or fetus raises
the question of bodily or genomic integrity. In addition to the Non-Identity problem
redux suggested in the previous paragraph, this opens up a deontologically-oriented line
of ethical inquiry. There are two reasons why such an analysis may be useful: first, I
believe that a deontological analysis of the question of whether children with hearing loss
ought to be created is likely to expose a different set of ethical issues for consideration;
second, despite the marked difference between teleological and deontological methods in
applied ethics cases, it is not unusual for their conclusions to be similar. Exploring
possible responses from a deontological orientation to determine whether similar
conclusions to the Non-Identity argument are also reached in this case or whether a
different answer results may shed some light on the Ten Fingers Ten Toes folk argument
used in the signing Deaf community.
(YHQWKRXJK,¶YHQDUURZHGP\IRFXVLQWKLVFKDSWHUWRGHRQWRORJLFDODQDO\VHVRI
bodily integrity, this still leaves considerable leeway with regard to what kinds of
deontological analysis might be most appropriate for this case. Here, I have found the
mid-level bioethics approach of principlism helpful, but not for the usual reasons. As
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developed by Beauchamp and Childress, principlism relies on weighing and balancing
four core bioethics principles with roots in traditional western moral philosophy. These
principles are: nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice, and autonomy.167 Nonmaleficence
and beneficence roughly correspond to teleological approaches; justice and autonomy are
usually associated with deontological theories, especially if the principle of justice is
defined to include rights-based theory. I have chosen not to apply the whole of
principlism to the question of genetic alteration, but to focus on the two deontologically
based principles of autonomy and justice as a starting point for my analysis of bodily
integrity.
The principle of autonomy in American bioethics is most often constructed as
respect for persons (so long as their actions do not harm anyone else) or as the right of
QRQLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKRQH¶VDXWRQRPRXVDFWLRQV168 In the first version of the principle of
DXWRQRP\DERYHWKHHPSKDVLVLVRQUHVSHFWIRUDSHUVRQ¶VGHFLVLRQVDQGDctions,
provided their action does not cause harm to others. This permits the possibility that one
may harm oneself, but prevents one from causing harm to others. In contrast to this, the
second definition of autonomy asserts that all people have a right not to be interfered
with, provided that their actions are autonomous. In mainstream Anglo-American
bioethics, concepts of bodily integrity are often subsumed under autonomy and typically
defined in one of two ways, 1) respect for persons (and by extension, respect for their
bodies) or 2) self-determination. In contrast, European bioethics and biolaw specifically
Tom L. Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, (oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 13.
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mention integrity as a primary principle of bioethics,169 including bodily integrity within
this broader concept.
Dekkers, Hoffer and Wils suggest that western philosophy defines bodily integrity
as person-oriented and body-oriented.170 The distinction between the two relies on how
the body is regarded; in person-oriented bodily integrity, the body is considered the
property of the person, and only the person to whom the body belongs has authority and
control over what can be done to the body. Locke expresses this as a right of
QRQLQWHUIHUHQFHZULWLQJµHYHU\PDQKDVDSURSHUW\LQKLVRZQSHUVRQWKLVQRERG\KDV
DQ\ULJKWWRH[FHSWKLPVHOI´171 In body-oriented bodily integrity, a person is charged
with the duty to maintain her body as a whole. This notion of bodily integrity, as seen in
Aquinas and Kant, argues that the intrinsic value of the human body restricts the class of
morally permissible actions that can be done to the body.
Person-O riented Bodily Integrity
The concept of self-determination over the body is well established in medical
ethics as the principle of autonomy.172 A person is granted considerable latitude
regarding his health care decisions, even to when those decisions are thought to lead to
harm, so long as that person maintains decisional capacity. This right to selfdetermination over the body is constrained for surrogate decision-makers, who are
169
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charged with making decisions UHJDUGLQJDQRWKHU¶VERG\XVLQJHLWKHUWKHVWDQGDUGRIWKH
SHUVRQ¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWVRUVXEVWLWXWHGMXGJPHQW,QWKHFDVHRISDUHQWVPDNLQJGHFLVLRQV
DERXWWKHLUFKLOG¶VERG\VLQFHWKHFKLOGKDVQRW\HWGHYHORSHGDFDSDFLW\IRUMXGJPHQW
the required standaUGLVWKDWRIWKHFKLOG¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWV173 If parents are perceived to be
DFWLQJLQDPDQQHURWKHUWKDQWKHLUFKLOG¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWVWKHLUVWDQGLQJDVVXUURJDWH
decision-makers can be revoked (legally, if not morally).
Locke notes that parents are given only temporary rule and jurisdiction over their
children until the children have reached the age of reason. Until this occurs, parents have
³DQREOLJDWLRQWRSUHVHUYHQRXULVKDQGHGXFDWHWKHFKLOGUHQWKH\KDGEHJRWWHQQRWDV
their own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own maker, the Almighty, to
ZKRPWKH\ZHUHWREHDFFRXQWDEOHIRUWKHP´174 The duty of parents is to preserve and
HQODUJHWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶VIUHHGRPXQWLOWKHFKLOGUHQFDQWDNHLWRQWKHPVHOYHV3DUHQWVDUH
thus constrained in the FKRLFHVWKH\FDQPDNHUHJDUGLQJWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶VERGLHVDQGPD\
QRWLQWHUIHUHZLWKWKHFKLOG¶VOLIHRUSURSHUW\LQFOXGLQJWKHLUERGLHV175 While some may
WDNHLVVXHZLWK/RFNH¶VSUHPLVHWKDWSDUHQWVDUHXOWLPDWHO\DFFRXQWDEOHWR*RGIRUWKHLU
behavior towards their children, it is not necessary to accept this premise in order to
accept the argument that bodies belong to those who inhabit them, and that parents ought
WRKDYHDOLPLWHGVD\LQZKDWFDQEHGRQHWRWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶VERGLHVIRFXVLQJRQO\RQ
those decisions necessary to preserve life. Consequently, these constraints extend to all
DOWHUDWLRQVRIWKHFKLOG¶VERG\H[FHSWWKRVHQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQRIOLIH
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The tenets of self-ownership and self-determination offer a highly restricted view
RIPRUDOO\SHUPLVVLEOHGHFLVLRQVWKDWSDUHQWVFDQPDNHUHJDUGLQJWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶VERGLHV
one challenge is that this does not accurately reflect the range of parental decisions that
actually occur and are permitted under law, if not social custom. These range from only
permitting life-saving intervention to cosmetic body modification. Autonomy as selfdetermination is widely accepted as a central principle governing American bioethics, yet
in practice, parental preference frequently supersedes childreQ¶VDXWRQRP\DQGERGLO\
LQWHJULW\,QVRPHFDVHVDFKLOG¶VERG\PD\EHLQWHUYHQHGZLWKLQRUGHUWRUHGXFHSDLQ
and suffering; these are potentially justifiable interventions because they improve the
quality of life. Purely cosmetic body alterations of the child, such as ear piercing, are
widely practiced, though these seem to be clear cases where parental authority has
overstepped its bounds and are not morally justifiable according to the principles of selfdetermination and self-ownership. Determining the moral justification for parental
FRQVHQWWRPRGLI\LQJDFKLOG¶VERG\IRUFXOWXUDOUHDVRQVZRXOGDOVRVHHPWRIDOOXQGHU
this category, even when psychological and physical benefits may occur as a result of
such procedures. I will consider two such cases, cochlear implant surgery and
circumcision.
A person-oriented analysis of cochlear implant surgery must keep in mind the
following facts: cochlear implant surgery is elective and not medically necessary;
children receiving cochlear implants at a young age are much more likely to benefit from
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them in terms of language acquisition;176 and cochlear implant surgery, as with all
surgical procedures, bears a certain amount of risk. The parent considering cochlear
implant surgery for her prelingually deaf child will need to consider the issue of bodily
integrity, since the process of the surgery involves removing parts of the cochlea from the
body, damaging part of the (possibly still functioning) auditory apparatus, and replacing
it with an artificial mechanism tKDWSHUPLWVVRXQGWREHSURFHVVHG7KHFKLOG¶VSK\VLFDO
appearance is not noticeably altered when the child is not wearing the external processor,
though attentive people may see a slightly raised area where a magnet has been placed
under the skin to facilitate the connection between the internal and external components.
Functional capacity for hearing is likely to improve after the cochlear implant surgery;
though this outcome is not guaranteed, the psychological benefit that the child receives
from being able to hear something is thought to be sufficient justification for parental
XVXUSDWLRQRIWKHFKLOG¶VFODLPWRVHOI-determination.
If we take a strict Lockean view of self-ownership and self-determination, parents
should not have the authority to consent to cochlear implant surgery for their prelingually
deaf child since it is not a matter of life and death. Yet this is a minority view, though
one supported by a vocal segment of the signing Deaf community. Instead, the default
position in mainstream hearing American society is that parents have the moral authority
to consent to this procedure on behalf of their children, despite the elective nature of the
procedure. Timeliness of the procedure is often cited as one reason for permitting parents
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to make this decision, since early implantation increases the chances of spoken language
comprehension and production.177 Parental conceptions of the good life and human
flourishing are also cited as justificatory reasons, though strictly speaking these are not in
accord with the narrow Lockean interpretation used above.
In the United States, infant male circumcision is routinely practiced and parents
KDYHWKHDXWKRULW\WRFRQVHQWWRWKHDOWHUDWLRQRIWKHFKLOG¶VERG\,IZHFRQVLGHU
circumcision solely through the lens of self-determination, setting aside religious
considerations, it seems that this is a decision that ought to be made by the child once he
is capable of making this decision. Unlike elective cochlear implant surgery, there is no
absolute medical indication conferring an advantage to this surgery occurring before the
boy is able to express his preferences regarding his body, though medical evidence
suggests that some medical advantages of circumcision are related to sexual activity and
there may be some advantage to this procedure occurring before sexual activity
commences.178 Person-centered bodily integrity does not support infant male
circumcision, since this is an elective surgery that involves the removal of healthy body
tissue. Yet the default position on circumcision in mainstream American society is that
SDUHQWVDUHJLYHQWKHPRUDODXWKRULW\WRDOWHUDFKLOG¶VERG\ZLWKRXWWKDWFKLOG¶VFRQVHQW
From the narrow Lockean perspective, this is morally unjustifiable, despite the potential
medical and cultural benefits.
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One final consideration for the person-centered notion of bodily integrity is
whether any limits ought to be placed on what a person with full decisional capacity may
do with his body. The child in each case above may opt for a cochlear implant or
circumcision once he reaches the age of reason, and these decisions are largely viewed as
within the bounds of autonomy and self-determination of the body, perhaps in part
because these already exist as socially accepted practices within the signing Deaf
community. Does the right of self-determination extend to any and all action, or are some
constraints necessary? Once children have reached the adulthood and/or the age of
reason, are they permitted to do whatever they want with their bodies? One answer is the
nod Locke gives to madmen ± those without reason. Locke claims that one can do
ZKDWHYHURQHOLNHVZLWKRQH¶VERG\VRORQJDVLWGRHVQ¶WIO\LQWKHIDFHRIUHDVRQ%XW
how is this standard of reason measured? Locke defines it by equating reason with the
GHVLUHWRPDLQWDLQRULPSURYHRQH¶VFRQGLWLRQ³QRUDWLRQDOFUHDWXUHFDQEHVXSSRVHGWR
change his condition with an intention to be worse.´179 7KLVGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\FOHDUXS
PDWWHUVIRURQHSHUVRQ¶VLPSURYHGORWPD\EHDQRWKHU¶VZRUse. This is sharply
delineated in the recent discussion of apotemnophilia, bodily integrity, and Body
Dismorphic Disorder in Scotland, where the decision of surgeon Robert Smith to honor
WZRLQGLYLGXDO¶VUHTXHVWVIRUOLPEDPSXWDWLRQDQGVXUJLFDOO\UHPRYHtheir limbs after
psychiatric evaluation, was met with outrage and immediately banned.180 It also opens
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the door for preferring some kinds of bodily alterations over others, such as those that
confer enhancement in the form of increased functioning or improved aesthetics.   
Body-O riented Bodily Integrity
Body-oriented bodily integrity requires a person to abide by the duty to maintain
her body as a whole. This argument is not as well articulated argument in the literature on
bodily integrity as person-oriented bodily integrity. I speculate that this may be due to
more widespread acceptance of the concepts of self-ownership and self-determination;
body-oriented bodily integrity relies on philosophical projects that articulate duty in ways
that are less familiar in contemporary mainstream American discourse. The philosophical
grounding of this duty is dependent on particular definitions of duty ± whether Kantian or
otherwise.
)RUWKHVDNHRILOOXVWUDWLRQFRQVLGHU.DQW¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIDXQLYHUVDOLPSHUDWLYH
RIGXW\³DFWDVLIWKHPD[LPRI\RXUDFWLRQZHUHWREHFRPHE\\RXUZLOODXQLYHUVDOODZ
RIQDWXUH´181 In The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant provides four
examples of how one ought to apply this imperative, including the case of suicide. This
case has particular relevance for the issue of bodily integrity because it calls on a
principle of self-love. In the case of suicide, Kant argues that the principle of self-love is
not sufficient to count as a universal law of nature or a perfect duty. The principle of selfORYHWKDWZRXOGHQFRXUDJHRQHWRHQGRQH¶VOLIHZKHQLWLVYHU\GLIILFXOWFDQQRWXSKROG
the duty to further life. Engaging in the variouVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI.DQW¶VDQDO\VLVLV
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beyond the scope of this project; instead, I offer a brief sketch of how the principle of
self-love might play out in a discussion of duty and body-oriented bodily integrity.
Assume that the principle of self-love is grounded in the desire to experience
pleasure rather than pain (physical or psychological). One might infer that this includes
WKHFDSDFLW\WRORYHWKHZKROHRIRQH¶VSK\VLFDOERG\SURYLGHGWKDWWKHH[SHULHQFHRIWKH
body is more pleasurable than painfuO6XSSRVHWKLVLVQRWWKHFDVHDQGRQH¶VERG\LV
subject to more pain than pleasure. Kant has argued that the principle of self-love cannot
be employed to support a duty to commit suicide, since it is inconsistent with the law of
nature, i.e. sustaining OLIH,IWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQRIRQH¶VOLIHGHSHQGVRQEUHDFKLQJWKH
wholeness of the body, this would invalidate the principle of self-love as a candidate for
supporting a universal duty to maintain the wholeness of the body. From this example, at
least, it seems that the duty of body-centered bodily integrity cannot be a perfect duty that
is contingent upon the individual at all times.
In most cases, bodily integrity is not a matter of life or death, but a matter of
ZKHWKHURQHRSWVWRH[LVWZLWKRQH¶VERG\unaltered or altered. In the two cases of
cochlear implant surgery and neonatal circumcision, a straightforward interpretation of
body-centered bodily integrity suggests that body parts, such as hair cells within the
cochlea or the foreskin, cannot be removed, altered, or damaged. In sketching out the
reasons why body-oriented bodily integrity is not a perfect duty, I have left open the
possibility that it may be an imperfect duty ± one that applies under some conditions, but
is not universal. One way to assess this is to enumerate the conditions upon which one
might be justified in breaching the duty to preserve the wholeness of the body.
Preservation of life appears to be an excellent candidate for this list of conditions
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(provided that one accepts the premise that the preservation of life is, all things
considered, generally a good thing). What other criteria might count as good reasons for
breaching the wholeness of the body? In particular, for those who are not able to consent
for themselves, such as children or those otherwise incapacitated, what reasons could be
appealed to by surrogates making decisions based on body-oriented bodily integrity in
order to satisfy a duty to preserve the wholeness of the body?
One approach is to consider how wholeness of the body is defined. If this means a
strict accounting of the presence of physical components at birth or another designated
moment in time, body wholeness is simply a matter of counting. But wholeness of the
body need not be limited to anatomical parts. If wholeness of the body is defined as
functional rather than anatomical, and functional is further defined as species-typical
functioning, this opens up other interpretations. Consider the cochlear implant, which is a
medical procedure designed to restore species-typical functioning. By this interpretation,
FRFKOHDULPSODQWVXUJHU\FRXOGEHYLHZHGDVDQDWWHPSWWRUHWXUQWKHERG\¶VIXQFWLRQWR
ZKROHQHVVWKHUHE\VDWLVI\LQJWKHGXW\WRPDLQWDLQRQH¶VERG\DVDZKROHWKURXJK
functioning.
Yet another interpretation of body-centered bodily integrity could rely on a
cultural conception of what it means for the body to be whole. The Jewish ritual of Brit
Milah, in which infant males are circumcised eight days after birth, considers the act of
circumcision a sign of the covenant between the male descendants of Abraham and God.
The uncircumcised body is viewed as incomplete or flawed from this cultural conception,
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since the male who is not circumcised is outside of the community.182 Through the act of
circumcision ± a body altering act ± the infant becomes whole, that is, a full-fledged
member of the community.
This brief treatment of body-oriented bodily integrity shows that this approach
needs further refinement and analysis. Imposing a duty of bodily integrity relies on an
DGHTXDWHO\DUWLFXODWHGDUJXPHQWRIZKDWLWPHDQVWRKDYHDGXW\WRZDUGRQH¶VERG\KRZ
that duty is justified, and accounting for the scope of that duty. It also requires that terms
VXFKDV³ERG\´DQG³ZKROHQHVV´DUHGHOLQHDWHGDQGFRQVLVWHnt with the concepts of duty
that are employed.
The discussion of bodily integrity has focused on the macro level of the body.
Procedures such as cochlear implant surgery and male infant circumcision result in
changes that are visible to the naked eye or by equipment that allows one to view the
internal workings of the body, such as X-ray equipment or magnetic resonance imaging
machines. There is no reason why discussions of changes to the body should not also
include changes that are quite small; surgeries using microscopes and or lasers can also
change the body from its original state ± including at the cellular level. Does this extend
DOVRWRRQH¶VJHQHV"*HQHWLFPDWHULDOLVSK\VLFDOFKDQJHVLQWKLVPDWHULDOFDQEH
observed with the proper equipment. Do genes, by virtue of their properties, deserve
special consideration?
If an argument of composition is employed, the answer to the question of whether
bodily integrity extends to genes is a solid yes. Genes are part of the physical substance
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of the human body; as physical parts of the human body they are also subject to bodily
integrity, regardless of whether person-oriented or body-oriented frameworks are
employed. Setting aside the question of whether genes ought to be accorded special status
for now, how might this notion of genomic integrity play out in the context of bodily
integrity? Are there any issues unique to genomic integrity that do not occur with bodily
integrity?
The bodily integrity discussion up to this point has focused on the bodily integrity
of actual persons. Whether those persons are adults who are capable of making decisions
in accordance with reason or children who are incapable of making decisions, their moral
status as individuals whose claims, present or future, to self-ownership, selfdetermination, and autonomy, are readily granted from a rights-based perspective. By
GHILQLQJWKHERG\WRLQFOXGHWKHZKROHRIRQH¶VJHQHWLFPDWHULDOGHFLVLRQVDERXWWKLVIRU
DFWXDOSHUVRQVLQFOXGLQJFKLOGUHQZKRDUHVXEMHFWWRVXUURJDWH¶VGHFLVions regarding
their bodily integrity, would be subsumed under the criteria of bodily integrity, whether
person-oriented or body-oriented. To distinguish genetic alteration from all other body
DOWHUDWLRQVOHW¶VFDOOWKLVJHQRPLFLQWHJULW\-XVWDVthis holds for those with bodily
integrity, individuals who possess genomic integrity are considered to have selfdetermination and self-ownership over their genetic material. Granted, ownership of
RQH¶VRZQJHQHWLFPDWHULDOLVDFRQWHQWLRXVDQGXQVHWWOHGLVVXHLn the courts and is an
issue that extends beyond the scope of this project. For the purposes of the discussion of
JHQRPLFLQWHJULW\DVVXPHDVLPSOHFODLPWRRQH¶VJHQHWLFPDWHULDODVRQH¶VRZQVHWWLQJ
aside issues of whether an individual who adds his work can lay claim to this as well.
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If genomic integrity is viewed as simply a subset of bodily integrity, the
discussion of genomic integrity could be framed according to bodily integrity issues ±
self-RZQHUVKLSRIRQH¶VJHQHWLFPDWHULDOVHOI-determination, and a duty to wholeness.
Actual persons making decisions about whether to modify their genetic material could
appeal to some or perhaps all of these concepts in working out their reasoning. Surrogates
making decisions for actual persons, such as children, could also appeal to these concepts
for justification. Parents considering genetic enhancement for their children could appeal
to these concepts. How bodily integrity, or genomic integrity, might apply to potential
persons and those making decisions for potential persons is trickier. The following
section offers some suggestions for exploring this issue.
Moral Standing of Potential Persons
Bodily integrity arguments do not completely foreclose or expressly permit moral
justification to culturally Deaf parents who wish to modify the genetic material of their
potential offspring. The person-oriented approach to bodily integrity emphasizes selfdetermination, autonomy, and a right to not to be changed without consent. The bodyoriented approach to bodily integrity emphasizes wholeness of the body, but various
answers emerge, depending on whether that wholeness is constructed through notions of
duty, anatomical wholeness, functional wholeness or cultural wholeness.
The discussion of bodily integrity up to this point has relied on several concepts
that may not be a good fit when applied to the issue of genetic alteration. The most
important question is whether the issue of bodily integrity and genomic integrity can be
said to apply to a potential person. If the answer to this is yes, culturally Deaf potential
parents making decisions about whether to modify genetic material of a fetus, embryo,
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blastocyst, morula, or fertilized ovum could consider these concepts in determining the
moral justification for their decision. In this section, I attempt to sketch out of the
reasoning that needs to be evaluated in order to answer this question.
To start, working definitions of a potential person, surrogate decision-maker, and
actual person must be established. Once the criteria for defining for a potential person are
addressed, the issue of when a person assumes the role of a surrogate decision-maker can
be addressed. Parental surrogate decision-making regarding bodily alterations of their
children typically occurs in the context of actual children, not potential offspring, but this
is not always a bright line. Bioethical discussions surrounding consent procedures for
fetal surgery have raised questions about autonomy ± VSHFLILFDOO\ZHLJKLQJWKHZRPDQ¶V
autonomy claims and bodily integrity against the fetus.183 At the present time, fetal
VXUJHU\LVUHVHUYHGIRULQWHUYHQWLRQVWKDWDUH³OLIH-saving´ though even the use of this
term is problematic, since it disregards the fact that the fetus is not capable of sustaining
life on its own and therefore does not yet have a life to be saved. Fetal surgery could be
considered a potential violation of bodily integrity, if this concept applies to potential
persons.
In the special case of applying genomic integrity and genetic alteration to
potential persons, this analysis is limited to the fetuses, embryos, blastocysts, morulas,
zygotes and fertilized eggs (before and after implantation). For purposes of this
discussion, assume the physical matter of the fertilized ovum, zygote, morula, blastocyst,
embryo, or fetus is concomitant with the concept of potential person. Additionally,
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assume the potential person is incapable of an independent existence at the time of
genetic alteration.
Some literature on the moral status of potential persons deals with the distinction
between same person problems and different person problems.184 Since genetic alteration
must, by definition, deal with a particular clump of cells, for now I will treat this as a
same person problem, holding off on the question of whether some genetic alterations
might be significant enough to transform this into a different person problem. (The
section immediately following this one will address that issue.)
At this point, a working definition of a potential person includes the existence of
conjoined living human tissue that has the capacity to develop into a human being,
provided that it is placed in an environment that permits this development, plus the
inability of this conjoined living human tissue to sustain itself independently before its
development reaches fruition or is born.
Assessment of the moral standing of such a potential person can be conducted at
various stages of development. I will start at the most primitive stage of development,
reasoning that if moral standing can be given to a fertilized egg, then the argument for
this can be extended to more developed forms such as zygotes, morulas, blastocysts,
embryos, and fetuses.185 Arguments that claim the moral standing of potential persons
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existence as a unique individual.
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occurs at the moment of conception begin with the fertilized egg. One class of these
arguments appeals to the sanctity of human life, claiming that the moral standing of a
fertilized egg is equivalent to that of an adult human being. Given that there is no clear
point along the continuum from conception to human biological maturity that demarcates
the start of personhood, one should regard the entity at the earliest stage of human
conception as having the same moral status as adult humans.
This argument is vulnerable to several challenges. The first is that there is a
significant difference between a zygote and an adult human being, analogous to the
difference between an acorn and an oak tree.186 Another objection is that the inability to
identify a specific moment in time when personhood is conferred does not entail that
fertilized eggs are human beings. Even the answer that personhood begins at birth is not
sufficient, since this opens up the objection of the moral permissibility conducting
medical research on a late term fetus, i.e. one that is less than 24 hours from its due
date.187
Other arguments that attempt to confer moral standing are consequentialist in
nature. S.I Benn proposes using infants as the entity that is granted moral standing and
reasoning backwards to extend this standing to fetuses. His reasoning runs like this - if
infants are treated with love and consideration, this will result in the good consequences
IRUWKHPDVDGXOWV-RHO)HLQEHUJH[SDQGV%HQQ¶VDUJXPHQWWRLQFOXGHWKHUHGXFWLRQRI
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harm ± noting that those infants who are treated with love and consideration are less
likely to cause harm to others.188
:KDW,ILQGPRVWLQWHUHVWLQJLV%HQQ¶VPRYHIURPWUHDWLQJLQIDQWVZLWKVSHFLDO
consideration to treating the fetus with special consideration. Strong notes that Benn
UHVWULFWVWKLVWRWKDWPRPHQWLQZKLFK³ZHFDQUHDVRQDEO\DVVRFLDWHWKHZD\ZHWUHDWWKHP
with the way we treat babies ± at a stage, that is, at which we think of them, vividly
HQRXJKDVDEDE\LQWKHZRPE´189 $WZKDWSRLQWGRHVRQH³UHDVRQDEO\DVVRFLDWH´
treatment of a zygote, morula or embryo with the way one treats babies? Given that the
heartbeat of an embryo can be ascertained at seven weeks and potential parents avail
themselves of frozen embryo adoption services, this is less clear than it was when Benn
developed his argument. For some of these potential parents, listening to the heart beat of
their embryo initiates the point at which they begin to think of them as babies; for others,
this point may be marked by the decision to preserve unused embryos (which are
WHFKQLFDOO\QRWHPEU\RVEXWEODVWRF\VWV LQKRSHVRIKDYLQJWKHPEH³DGRSWHG´E\ORYLQJ
families.190 While it may be that the loving and considerate treatment accorded to infants
is most often extended to late term fetuses, the language used by those working with
frozen embryo (blastocyst) donors seeking to place their embryos (blastocysts) with
families that will provide homes where the formerly potential child is loved and cared for
suggests that this is not easily delineated.
&DUVRQ6WURQJ³7KH0RUDO6WDQGLQJRI3UHHPEU\RV(PEU\RV)HWXVHVDQG,QIDQWV´
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 463-4.
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AGULHQQH$VFK¶VZRUNRQWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQDQ\HPEU\RDQGSDUWLFXODU
embryos provides another useful lens for interpreting this. In writing about
preimplantation genetic diagnosis and screening for traits associated with disability, Asch
argues that acquiring knowledge about the traits of a blastocyst or an embryo influences
how that potential parent will regard it. Prior to the acquisition of this knowledge, the
potential parents regard the blastocyst or embryo as an unopened book, albeit one that is
dHVLUHG7KLVLVUHIHUUHGWRDV³DQ\´HPEU\R2QFHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWRQHRUPRUH
physical traits is revealed, the potential parents may shift their thinking about their
potential offspring based on its particular traits.191
For some potential parents, genetic testing of a blastocyst before implantation
(preimplantation genetic diagnosis) might be the moment at which they begin to regard
their potential offspring with love and consideration. The conception of a savior sibling one selected for specific genetic material whose body tissues could be harvested to save
the life of an already existing sibling ± might be regarded in this way. Parents who have
lost their only two children to a recessive genetic condition might regard their
successfully implanted and screened embryo with love and consideration, especially if it
is thought this may be their last chance at biological parenthood. One could envision a
culturally Deaf couple making a similar argument for genetically altering their embryo to
obtain genes associated with deafness, based on the love and special consideration that
particular child would receive as a cherished member of the signing Deaf community.

$GULHQQH$VFKDQG(ULN3DUHQV³7KH'LVDELOW\ Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic
Testing´ in Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights, ed. Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch,
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 15.
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The consequentialist argument is subject to at least one more objection, which is
the difference between regarding something with love and consideration and treating
something with love and consideration. Regard is a one-way street; regarding something
with love and consideration can be passive, or at least not require that specific action(s)
take place. Treatment seems to imply action and reciprocity ± one treats, and another is
the recipient of that treatment. One can demonstrate love and consideration by certain
actions with an infant ± ensuring that the infant is not hungry, or is dry, or is warm. It is
arguable that treatment of a fetus is also possible ± pregnant women often note that
certain environmental conditions are correlated to increased fetal movement and will
respond to this by changing those conditions. As an example, one may note that being in
the presence of very loud rock music is correlated with increased fetal activity; this
activity settles down to a more normal level when the music is turned off. Infant and fetus
behavior can be quickly assessed in response to actions that are treated as loving and
considerate. Actions that are loving and considerate and occur before quickening cannot
be measured for reciprocity at that time. While this does not demolish the
consequentialist argument, it does point out the need for a more refined distinction
between the acts of treating something or someone with love and consideration and
regarding something or someone with love and consideration.
Much of the remaining literature regarding the moral status of potential persons
centers on claims to existence, and not claims to bodily integrity or alteration. This is
particularly the case when the discussion focuses on living physical matter that is human,
such as fertilized ova, embryos and fetuses. The issue of existence is obviously an
important and related one for proponents of bodily integrity; if the physical material in
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question has moral standing as regarding claims to existence, whether rights-based or
founded through some other approach, the door is opened to bodily integrity arguments.
If the physical matter under evaluation is not granted moral standing, the (potential)
person-oriented bodily integrity approach as it currently stands fails, since to lose moral
standing relegates this physical matter to property status and property cannot assert
claims of autonomy or self-determination. The failure of moral standing does not
generate as clear results for the results for the body-oriented bodily integrity approach. As
traditionally defined, duties are incumbent only upon moral agents. However, moral
standing does not entail moral agency or even the potential for moral agency. One could
assert a body-oriented bodily integrity approach without requiring moral standing for that
body, appealing to a duty to maintain wholeness in certain kinds of living tissue, for
example.
I have reviewed three basic approaches to conferring moral status to potential
persons; the sanctity of life argument, the human development continuum, and a
consequentalist argument. Each of these arguments is subject to significant objections
when considering whether fertilized eggs, zygotes, blastocysts, morulas, embryos or
fetuses have moral standing. If the concept of bodily integrity and/or genomic integrity is
applied to potential persons, the above arguments for moral standing have not provided a
solid foundation.
Genetic Essentialism and Identity-Determining T raits
Are genes special? Genes are bits of physical matter that contain the blueprint for
building a human being. This is not to assume genetic determinism ± genes are not
always sufficient for creating a particular phenotype or physical expression, though under
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most normal conditions one can assume a genotype-phenotype pathway.192 Some of the
questions that are UDLVHGE\WKHXQLTXHQDWXUHRIWKHJHQHV¶IXQFWLRQLQFOXGHWKH
following: are genes our essence? Are some genes identity-determining? What constitutes
an identity-determining trait ± culture alone or a mixture of culture and biology? What
are identity-determining traits?
As a reminder, for the purposes of simplification, imagine all instances of genetic
alteration for deafness involve just the alteration of one gene, resulting in a fertilized egg
having the potential quality of becoming deaf rather than hearing. Jeff McMahan creates
a scenario in which he imagines genetic alteration occurring and that alteration is
identity-determining. Just what would an identity-determining genetic modification be?
McMahan notes that any genetic alteration that moves towards cure or normalcy
would be identity-preserving.193 In making this move, he has limited identity-determining
traits to those that are associated with disability. But is disability alone sufficient for
determining identity or must the trait associated with disability confer a significant
difference in functioning or capabilities? Colorblindness, while not satisfying the
conditions of species-typical functioning, is probably not identity-determining. Blindness,
on the other hand, just might be identity-determining. For one, the blind person is more
easily and immediately identified as different by the way in which she navigates her
environment; the colorblind person may be able to pass as having species-typical
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functioning until a specific instance occurs that reveals his colorblindness. If
colorblindness were caused by one gene, altering that gene would bring the colorblind
person closer to cure; this genetic alteration would be identity-preserving, to use
0F0DKDQ¶VODQJXDJH,IWKHEOLQGSHUVRQH[SHULHQFHGD gene replacement that allowed
her to become sighted, this too would be an action that brings the blind person closer to a
cure, and would also be considered identity-preserving. However, it is has also
significantly changed the way in which the formerly blind person experienced the world.
In this case, has the formerly blind person been replaced by a different person, or is the
newly sighted person one and the same person?
Perhaps this example is problematic because it deals with persons who are already
iQH[LVWHQFH/HW¶VPRGLI\WKLVH[DPSOHWRDEODVWRF\VWWKDWKDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWUDLWRIEHLQJ
colorblind, but that has been altered to have the potential for species-typical colorsightedness. The entity in question, according to McMahan, has had its identity preserved
through this alteration. Now imagine a blastocyst that carries a gene for blindness, and is
altered so that it has the gene for sightedness. In the absence of experience, the identitypreserving claim loses some of its force. How can an entity that is incapable of
experience preserve an identity when its potential properties have significantly changed?
One response to this question is that the concept of identity is centered on speciestypical functioning and not the act of changing one gene. 2QH¶VLGHQWLW\LVGHWHUPLQHGE\
KRZIDUDZD\RQH¶VDELOLW\WRIXQFWLRQVWUD\VIURPZKDWLVW\SLFDOIRUWKHVSHFLHV,PDJLQH
a circle in which the typical species members are in the core, and those with atypical
functions reside far away from this. By this account, the genetic alteration that brings one
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close to the center is curative and those alterations that cause one to diverge extensively
from the center are problematic.
Yet where one situates the center has much to do with experience and cultural
norms. In Deaf in America, Carol Padden and Tom Humphries provide an example of the

really hard-of-hearing woman. From the Deaf perspective, a really hard-of-hearing
person is someone who can use the phone and tends to behave more like a stereotypically
hearing person than a deaf person. From the hearing perspective, someone who is really
hard-of-hearing is much more like an audiologically deaf person (one who struggles to
hear). For the Deaf potential parents who use genetic alteration to ensure the birth of a
deaf child, the center is Deaf and the periphery is hearing.
Is identity determined only by functional characteristics or are other kinds or
physical characteristics also in the running for identity-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ"/HW¶VDVVXPHWKDW
an identity-determining trait is one that is on the periphery of species-typical functioning,
EXWWKDWDVHWRISRWHQWLDOSDUHQWVZLVKHGWRPDLQWDLQWKHLUHPEU\R¶VVSHFLHV-typical
functioning, but alter the potential physical appearance of their future child, giving the
child dark brown skin and eyes. The child is born in a location where prejudice based on
skin color exists. Has that child undergone an identity-determining alteration?
One of the difficulties in using the identity-determining concept is that the identity
RIFXOWXUHDQGWKHLGHQWLW\RIQXPEHUDUHRIWHQFRQIODWHG%\FKDQJLQJRQH¶VSK\VLFDO
appearance, one may experience a very different way of being in the world. Likewise, by
changing a significant functional trait, one may also experience a different way of being
in the world. And sometimes identity can have both a cultural and a physiological
component. In the case of gender, biological sex can drive identity.
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Adrienne Asch argues that one functional characteristic does not determine
identity, and that decisions to alter or abort an embryo because it carries one undesirable
trait are not well-founded since any individual, upon birth and gaining some experience
in the world, is going to have a compilation of species-typical and atypical functionality.
The decision to genetically alter those characteristics that are species-atypical expresses
an attitude about disability that Asch views as prejudicial and lacking respect for the
LQGLYLGXDO6KHGRHVQRWXVHWKHODQJXDJHRI³ERGLO\LQWHJULW\´\HWKHUFRQFHSW of respect
for the entire being seems to be not very far from the body-centered bodily integrity
discussed earlier in the chapter. Asch consistently applies this concept of respect for the
whole person, arguing that to use genetic alteration to create a person with a disability is
as wrongheaded as using it to create an able-bodied person, ultimately undermining the
willingness to accept all people and treat them with respect.194
The arguments of McMahan and Asch provide some answers to the question of
whether genetically altering an embryo to make it deaf is morally justifiable. On
0F0DKDQ¶VDFFRXQWVLQFHWKLVDFWLRQWDNHVWKHHPEU\RIXUWKHUDZD\IURPVSHFLHV-typical
functioning and does not move toward a cure, it is unjustifiable. For Asch, any act of
genetic alteration is morally unjustified, precisely because it is grounded in a lack of
acceptance and respect for people with differences, including disabilities. Even though
the couple wishing to use genetic alteration to bear a deaf child would seem to support
$VFK¶VFODLPDERXWUHVSHFWIRUGLIIHUHQFHVKHUDUJXPHQWLVWKDWXOWLPDWHO\DQ\IRUPRI
genetic alteration undercuts respect for human diversity.
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Conditions of E xit O bjection
The previous section evaluated the moral justification of genetic alteration from
the standpoint of the action of altering the gene, that is, genomic integrity. In this next
objection to genetic alteration, the moral evaluation is consequentialist. Determining
whether genetic alteration is morally permissible depends on the consequences available
to the person whose genes were altered.
Ravitsky argues that parents have been shaping children for a very long time;
genetic alteration is seen as just another tool by which parents can raise their children
according to their vision of what it means to have a flourishing life.195 William Ruddick
provides an analogy where parents are both guardians and gardeners.196 Ronald Green
offers a similar account, saying that parents are charged with protecting the future
interests of their children, but they also raise their children to satisfy aims of their own.
5DYLWVN\¶V Conditions of Exit argument requires parents to strike a balance ± allowing
WKHPWRVKDSHWKHLUFKLOGUHQXSWRDSRLQWEXWGUDZLQJDOLQHZKHQWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VIXWXUH
interestVDSSHDUWREHFXUWDLOHG8QOLNH'DYLV¶VDUJXPHQWDUJXLQJIRUWKH&KLOG¶V5LJKWWR
DQ2SHQ)XWXUH5DYLWVN\¶VVFRSHLVQDUURZHUDQGKRQHVLQRQZKHWKHUDFKLOGZKRKDV
been genetically altered would be able to leave her cultural community or whether her
altered genetic make-up would make this prohibitive.
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Ravitsky amplifies an argument about autonomy-based liberalism and
communities within liberal democracies from Joseph Raz, appealing to an argument
about Amish and ultra-orthodox childrearing practices to ground her argument. When a
FXOWXUDOFRPPXQLW\GRHVQRWSHUPLWVXIILFLHQWDXWRQRP\SDUWLFXODUO\DURXQGFKLOGUHQ¶V
future liberties, that cultural community has closed off the ability for children to easily
leave. Ravitsky proposes that the state has a duty to protect the chLOG¶VIXWXUHPRELOLW\
DGGLWLRQDOO\VKHIUDPHVWKHSDUHQWV¶REOLJDWLRQVDVPHGLDWLQJEHWZHHQWKHFKLOG¶VULJKWWR
EHORQJWRDFXOWXUDOFRPPXQLW\DQGWKHFKLOG¶VULJKWQRWWREHWUDSSHGLQWKDWFRPPXQLW\
as a adult.
Is the Deaf community one in which the genetically altered Deaf child might be
trapped? Consider the choices faced by the potential parents in the genetic alteration case.
If they decide against genetic alteration and continue the pregnancy, they will have a
hearing child who is born into the signing Deaf cultural community. This child would be
able to move into the non-Deaf community fairly easily, because she would have the
ability to hear and speak and interact directly with the non-Deaf community without any
assistance.197
If the Deaf couple proceeds with genetic alteration, they will bring a deaf child
into a signing Deaf cultural community. Provided that the child receives a bilingual
education, and acquires the ability to write and read and otherwise communicate in the
language used by the non-Deaf community, that child will also be equipped with the
cultural mobility skills needed to leave the signing Deaf community. Additionally, it is
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extremely likely that the Deaf child will learn from her Deaf parents how to navigate the
non-'HDIZRUOG7KH'HDIFDVHGLIIHUVIURP5DYLWVN\¶VUHOLJLRXVFDVHVEHFDXVHWKH'HDI
cultural community does not have a set of carefully prescribed norms as to how a Deaf
child ought to be educated; it also differs in that the lack of species-typical functioning
makes it more difficult for the Deaf child as a grown adult to function with ease in the
non-Deaf world.
There are two other practical options for the Deaf adult who wishes to enter the
non-Deaf world. One is to obtain a cochlear implant, which is an invasive surgical
procedure with all the risks surgery entails. Not all culturally Deaf people would be
willing to make this decision. The other option is a particularly American solution, which
is to use the federal laws that secure accessibility for Americans with disabilities
(including Deaf people), particularly for employment and educational situations.198 This
is another distinction (though not a moral one) between the religious cases and the Deaf
case; the Deaf have greater legal recourse should they want to gain access to the nonDeaf society.
F urther Considerations
I have not said much about reproductive liberty and genetic alteration. Part of the
reason for this is because this particular example of genetic alteration presumes that one
has reproductive capability. Unlike genetic selection, which relies on IVF with PGD, and
could pose a scenario of a couple who is faced with selecting no embryos for
implantation (since they all have genes that correspond with being deaf) or having a deaf
198
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child, the example of genetic alteration offers three different outcomes, none of which
constrain reproductive liberty. Either they opt for genetic alteration and bear a child who
is deaf (as they desire) or they opt to continue the pregnancy with the embryo intact
(hearing) or they opt to terminate the pregnancy. Unlike the genetic selection case, which
could deny reproductive liberty to the couple based on the genetic (deaf) status of each of
their embryos, insofar as the right to reproduce is concerned, reproductive liberty is not
threatened in the genetic alteration example.
I began this chapter with the aim of reconciling some of the arguments I have
seen used in the signing Deaf community, namely the Ten Fingers, Ten Toes argument
and the supporting right to bodily integrity, to see if these could offer moral justification
to genetic selection. After working through person-oriented and body-oriented bodily
integrity, the path to moral justification became more difficult. With person-oriented
bodily LQWHJULW\JURXQGLQJWKHULJKWWRKDYHRQH¶VERG\DOWHUHGZDVDFKDOOHQJHZLWK
body-oriented bodily integrity, the difficulty was generating an argument for the
ZKROHQHVVRIWKHERG\WKDWSURYLGHGFRQVLVWHQWUHDVRQLQJVXSSRUWIRURQH¶VGHFLVLRQWR
modify genetic material. I considered the concept of genomic integrity as a possible
extension of bodily integrity, and I identified several questions that must be addressed
regarding this issue. Additionally, several objections to genetic alteration were
considered, including the role of bodily integrity with genes that are possibly identitydetermining, and the question of how much parents may be morally justified in shaping
their child through physical and other means via the Conditions of Exit argument.
While utilitarian calculations weighing and balancing harms with benefits
generate the conclusion that genetic intervention to create hearing loss is morally
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permissible, Kantian and deontological approaches relying on notions of respect for
persons and bodily integrity generally lead to a different result. At this point, the answer
to the question, ³is it morally permissible to bring about the birth of a deaf child"´ is
mixed.
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C hapter 5: Deafness As Moral H arm
Deafness and Moral H arm
In Chapter One I held out a promissory note regarding the question of deafness as
a moral harm. This chapter is my attempt to satisfy this promise. Since I have limited my
analysis of genetic selection and genetic alteration to cases that involve culturally Deaf
potential parents who wish to bring Deaf children into the world, my discussion of harm
likewise focus on identifying potential harms experienced by or conferred upon the
signing Deaf population. This will, in some cases, include the potential harms associated
with the auditory classification of deafness, since I believe that audiological deafness is a
necessary condition of being Deaf. Even though there is a much larger population of deaf
people who are not associated with the signing Deaf community and who do experience
harm as a consequence of being deaf, the kinds of harms this population may experience
is not directly addressed. It should be noted that some of the harms experienced by
signing Deaf people are also experienced by oral deaf people, including those who use
cochlear implants.199
When signing Deaf people talk about the kinds of harms they experience, a term
that frequently emerges is audism, which is signed by the hands marking off a square
around an ear, first sketching the top and bottom of the square, then flipping to mark the
sides. In boxing off the ear, making it the sole and central focus, one begins to see how
members of the signing Deaf community might regard those who are outside their
community. For this population, the harm comes from being regarded by what one is
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missing, by what one cannot do with that boxed-off ear. The sign is in some ways just as
ambiguous as the question of whether deafness is a moral harm.
What exactly is harmful about deafness? Where is the harm located? Is it a moral
harm or some other sort of harm? Most discussions of this issue assume that the notion of
physical disability is sufficient for naming deafness as a moral harm.200 In asking whether
deafness is a moral harm, several questions are conflated into one. These need to be
unpacked and identified as discrete questions. The question may mean whether one is
harmed by being in the physical state of audiological deafness because one does not have
access to species-typical functioning. It may be that one is harmed because one does not
have sufficient access to information. It may be that one is harmed because one is a
member of a sociolinguistic minority group. It may be that one is harmed because one is
identified as a user of a different language mode (signed rather than spoken), a class of
languages that are frequently viewed as less than spoken languages. Indeed, they are
sometimes insultingly referred to as monkey languages, implying that the users are
subhuman.
Furthermore, the harms resulting from the experiences associated with the state of
being Deaf can be addressed in various ways. How one acquires the property of
audiological deafness, which is a necessary condition for being Deaf, is one angle from
which to evaluate this claim. That is, is harm partially located in how deafness is
acquired? This project has focused on genetic means of acquiring the state of
audiological deafness, yet deafness has many causes, including illness and accident, as
200
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well as those that cannot yet be explained. Whether deafness is imposed deliberately on
the individual once that individual begins to exist, as might happen through genetic
alteration if we take existence to begin at some point after conception, or whether
deafness is imposed prior to existence (if existence starts at some point after genetic
alteration takes place) is another issue that must be considered.
This brings me to the question of moral agency and its role in moral harm. If
moral harm requires an agent who deliberately acts to inflict harm, then only those cases
in which a decision occurs to bring about the birth of a deaf child are potentially harmful.
That is, provided that deafness is a harm. These cases would not only include genetic
alteration, but also any case in which biological parents contributing genes that they
know will result in the birth of a deaf child. Yet, if a couple know from genetic testing
and counseling that they will bear only deaf children, the reality for that couple today
(since genetic alteration is not possible at this point in time) is that they are faced with the
choice of either creating a deaf child or using biological material that is at least partially
not their own to create a child or not having children at all. If the couple does not have
the economic resources for pursuing reproductive technology, their options may be to
have a deaf child or to have no child. Questions of moral harm in this case not would
only extend to the potential harm caused to the deaf child but also to the potential
SDUHQWV¶UHSURGXFWLYHliberty.201
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What limitations or harms might be imposed by society? Other kinds of moral
harm associated with being Deaf are harms dependent on the social construction of
disability. If the society is set up in such a way that people with disabilities have access to
public activities and can participate in these without barriers, the effects of social harm
caused by disability status have been reduced. If, on the other hand, a society is
structured such that a Deaf person cannot vote, serve on a jury, drive, reproduce (due to
state-enforced sterilization or birth control), work, acquire an education, attend accessible
VSRUWLQJRUFXOWXUDOHYHQWVRUWUDYHORQRQH¶VRZQWKHVHDUHKDUPVFUHDWHGE\VRFLHW\DQG
not a logical consequence of deafness or the state of being Deaf.
If there is no agent culpable of inflicting harm, can the state of being deaf be
properly described as a moral harm? Once the cause of deafness has been identified and
attributed, another issue emerges ± the doctrine of double effect. This refers to the idea of
harm that is knowingly imposed, but it is an unintended consequence of another action.
An example of this is the infant who is deafened as a result of ingesting life-saving
antibiotics. The action of giving the infant life-saving treatment had an intended
consequence of saving her life, and an unintended consequence of causing her to become
deaf. Assigning moral responsibility here is tricky, since the consequence of deafness
could be predicted, but the reason for giving her antibiotLFVLVWLHGWRVDYLQJWKHLQIDQW¶V
life, not causing deafness.
There are other examples where the causation of deafness is not intended, but is
associated with the actions of individuals. These cases do not always satisfy the
requirements for the doctrine of double effect. Consider the child who becomes deaf in a
car accident, or a hearing couple who, unbeknownst to them, each carry a copy of a
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recessive gene for deafness. In the case of the child deafened by an automobile accident,
the cause of the accident may have been a mechanical failure or a driver operating under
the influence of mind-altering substances. If the accident was caused by a moral agent,
but unforeseen, it does not satisfy the conditions of the doctrine of double effect. This is
also the case for the hearing couple with no reason to think that they might bear a deaf
child. If the couple does not believe that there is a good reason to avail themselves of
genetic testing and foregoes this, yet acts in a way that results in the birth of a deaf
child.202
Another question is whether harm should be located in the experience of living as
a Deaf person. Are there harmful consequences resulting from belonging to the signing
'HDIFRPPXQLW\XQLTXHWRRQH¶VVWDWXVDVDPHPEHURIWKLVFRPPXQLW\"7KLVTXHstion
has been addressed in Chapter Three through via the Right To An Open Future argument,
and also in Chapter Four in the Conditions Of Exit argument. In the Right To An Open
Future argument, the harm of being Deaf is tied to the harm of belonging to a small and
limited social community, and consequently having limited opportunity.203 The
Conditions Of Exit argument locates harm according to the restrictiveness imposed by the
community.204 That is, if the child is shaped, physically or otherwise, in such a way that
she cannot leave the Deaf community and join another (Hearing) community, she has
suffered harm.
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I have offered specific objections to these accounts in Chapter 4, and so will not
repeat them. There is another important question to be considered with these objections ±
what does it mean to say that a Deaf person lives in the Deaf world? As this is described
by Davis, it depends on two assumptions: that Deaf people inhabit the Deaf community
and do not simultaneously inhabit Deaf and hearing worlds; and that Deaf people do not
leave the Deaf community on a permanent basis. It is unusual for a signing Deaf person
to cut off all ties with the Deaf community, but there are those who have made this
decision. More common is the decision of some Deaf people to obtain cochlear implants,
which enables them to move more easily between Deaf and hearing communities,
something Deaf people have done their entire lives. Others getting cochlear implants
decide to base the majority of their life experiences in the hearing world and significantly
reduce their contact with the Deaf community. Still others never consider leaving the
signing Deaf Community ± not because it is easier or more accessible, but because it is
home.
H arm C aused to the Deaf Individual
Just how might the moral harm of deafness be calculated? Is it the change of
audiological status from hearing to deaf that denotes harm? The loss of the capacity to
hear? The social prejudice (audism) experienced by Deaf individuals? The absence of
species-typical functioning? Each of these explanations has been proposed as a way of
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assessing the moral harm of deafness, but a careful analysis of the moral harm of
deafness and the state of being Deaf has been mostly neglected.205
One explanation for deafness as a moral harm is to consider any variation from
species-typical functioning as harmful. This could include a change in physical status
harmful, depending on the particulars. For example, a healed broken wrist that has healed
with a limited range of motiRQLVVXFKDKDUPJLYHQWKDWDSHUVRQ¶VDELOLW\WRIXQFWLRQ
have been constrained.
This is in many ways a good analogy for audiological deafness since it
emphasizes the concept of range, which is often neglected in discussions about genetic
selection and alteration. Most Deaf people have some residual hearing; profound
audiological deafness is rare. The person who experiences a change in audiological status
may go from being hearing to being moderately hard of hearing or to being severely deaf
over the course of several decades or in a matter of days. Species-typical functioning is
not static; functional abilities change over the course of a lifetime. Given this, how does
one measure species-typical functioning? Does this pose an incommensurability
problem? If harm is equivalent to loss, and loss is variable, how might the standard for
harm be calculated? Is deafness always a significant harm, or are there some
circumstances in which deafness might be considered a trivial harm?
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The question of who or what can experience a loss is another issue attached to the
issue of moral harm. In the case of genetic selection, there is no loss experienced by the
HPEU\RVHOHFWHGIRUH[LVWHQFH7KDWHPEU\R¶VJHQHWLFPDWHULDOLVXQFKDQJHGDQG
absence, not loss, is the proper description. With genetic alteration, change has taken
place, but the question now shifts to whether existence as a person or potential person is a
condition for satisfying the conditions of loss. This suggests that perhaps defining harm
in terms of loss is incomplete. Those who never experience a change of status from
hearing to deaf cannot claim to have lost something they never had. Their claim is better
described as an absence of species-typical functioning. Is harm more comprehensively
defined as lacking a species-typical function?
The absence of species-typical functioning in one capacity does not preclude
species-typical functioning in other capacities. It also does not foreclose the possibility
that one may attend more to other capacities ± in the case of deafness, the absence of the
sense of hearing may lead to increased awareness of the senses of touch and vision, both
sensory modes that convey some of the information that is typically obtained through
hearing. Additionally, evidence indicates that those who are Deaf and have used a signed
language since childhood have highly developed spatial abilities as a result of their use of
a spatial (signed) language.206 If deafness encourages the development of more attention
to certain ways of being in the world, including the acquisition of some skills that
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supersede special-typical functioning, how then is deafness to be measured as a moral
harm? Is deafness a difference or a disability?
Anita Silvers points to an exchange between blind philosopher Martin Milligan
and sighted philosopher Bryan Magee to highlight another issue, that of considering
whether having physical characteristics that are not species-typical are simply differences
or deficits that are intrinsically bad. She notes that the burden of proof for establishing the
difference claim is uneven, and usually falls on the person with a disability, such as
Milligan, who points out that blind people are likely to know more about sight and
sighted people than sighted people know about blind people.207 This is very likely true as
well for deaf and Deaf people, who must learn to make sense of hearing people and
sound in order to function capably in society. The claim that being Deaf is a moral harm
is likely to be best articulated by those who have spent considerable time thinking about
what grounds this harm. By disregarding the testimony of those who live as Deaf people,
a weaker argument ensues.
H arm W ithin the Deaf Family Unit
The Deaf child living with a signing Deaf family has full access to language. This
may change as she interacts with her extended family. In the genetic selection case
GHVFULEHGLQ&KDSWHURQHDVVXPSWLRQZDVWKDWWKHFKLOG¶VSULPDU\FRPPXQLW\RI
extended family and friends would be able to communicate with her using a signed
language or sign communication. In the case of a deaf child created through his Deaf
parents using genetic alteration, odds may be higher that he may have some relatives who
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are not able to communicate in signed communication. Is the child harmed by this, and
are there any unique features regarding to this issue of partial access to language
associated with deafness or his status as a Deaf person?
The analogy of a bilingual three generation (hearing) immigrant family may be
helpful for understanding this issue of harm as it is connected to access to language.
Assume the oldest members of this family are not proficient in the language of their new
country (language A); the second generation is close to holding true bilingual status, with
fluency in WKHLUSDUHQWV¶ODQJXDJH ODQJXDJH$ DQGWKHSULPDU\ODQJXDJHRIWKHLUQHZ
country (language B), and the third generation is fluent in the language of the country in
which they were raised (language B) and has a limited vocabulary in the language spoken
by her grandparents (language A). Now imagine two Deaf parents who have used genetic
WHFKQRORJ\WREHDU'HDIFKLOGUHQ7KH'HDIFKLOGUHQ¶VJUDQGSDUHQWVNQRZDIHZZRUGVLQ
the signed language used by their family members, but full and direct access to
communication is limited, just as it is with the immigrant family.
There are some differences. In the immigrant family case, the oldest members of
the family are most isolated from the external community by their lack of a second
language, but their children (the middle generation) have always had the ability to
communicate directly with them as first language users. The largest gap in direct and
fully accessible communication is between the oldest and youngest generations, with the
two youngest generations having full access to the language used in the larger
community. In the Deaf family example, the two youngest generations share full
communication access, but the language they use is not the dominant spoken language of
the larger community. The largest gap in direct and fully accessible communication exists
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between the oldest generation and the two youngest generations. The oldest and hearing
generation has full access to this linguistic community, while the middle and youngest
generations have partial access. Are these relevant differences? Do the reasons for the
language and communication gaps make a moral difference?
In the case of the immigrant family, one can assume that the immigrants chose to
immigrate, perhaps due to a desire to seek a better life for their children. As adult
immigrants, they were aware that their partial access to the language used in their new
country could impose hardship upon them. Despite this, they opted to immigrate,
reasoning that overall it would be best for the family. It is important to note that up to the
point of migration, their experience in their home country was one of full access to
language. In the immigrant example, each generation has full and direct linguistic access
to the generation immediately preceding their generation and the generation immediately
following.
Circumstances differ for the hearing grandparents as they did not consciously
choose a life course that could affect language use within their family; there was no
element of choice connected to having deaf children. Since these deaf children eventually
EHFDPH'HDIWKHGHDIFKLOGUHQJUHZXSWRXVHDGLIIHUHQWODQJXDJHWKDQWKHLUSDUHQWV¶
native spoken language. In this example, each generation does not have the experience of
full and direct access with the generation immediately preceding it or the one
immediately following. The first generation of Deaf children is limited to partial access to
language with their parents. (If they are outfitted with cochlear implants from a very
young age, even the most successful cochlear implant does not provide full linguistic
access.) The youngest Deaf generation is similar to the middle immigrant generation in
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having full linguistic access to their parents, but dissimilar in having partial access to the
larger community.
Impeded linguistic access to the dominant community counts as a harm because it
UHVWULFWVRQH¶VIUHHGRPZLWKRXWIXOODFFHVVWRLQIRUPDWLRQRQHFDQQRWEHDZDUHRIWKH
choices that are available. In both examples, this is an instance of a social restriction. One
could imagine a bilingual society in which information is accessible to all. Partial access
to language is not equal in these examples; the immigrant family is presumably all
hearing. Hypothetically, all members of the family could learn the two languages of
discourse used by the family members. The barrier to access is linguistic, not sensory.
The Deaf family members experience a sensory barrier to linguistic access; complete and
full linguistic access to the spoken language is not possible.
There is one more element to this analogy. The creation of a society that supports
full linguistic access in two languages, whether spoken or signed, can be imagined. There
are many places in the world where bilingualism of spoken languages is already the
QRUP1RUD*URFH¶VERRN Everyone Spoke Sign Language Here, illustrates a historic
DFFRXQWRIDVLJQHGODQJXDJHXVHE\FRPPXQLWLHVRQ0DUWKD¶V9LQH\DUG,WLVHDV\WR
assume that Deaf people experienced no barriers to communication access, but this is not
the case. There were spoken and signed languages in this community; bilingualism was
not complete for all language modes as the deaf signing members of the community had
full language access to written English, but not spoken English. The hearing members of
the community had full access to both signed and spoken languages, and could, one
supposes, acquire literacy if they were unable to read or write in English. It is arguable
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then, that in any bilingual environment where Deaf people exist along with spoken
language, that access to language will be partial.
Enforcing social policies of bilingualism in public spaces is not without
precedent. The question of how this applies to private space is another matter ±
particularly private space where the barrier to full access to language is not just linguistic,
but sensory. If one is unable to acquire full access to language because of physical
differences in capability, does this impose a greater linguistic duty upon those who face
no physical or sensory restrictions? Is harm not only done to those who cannot obtain full
access to a language, but also to those who must assume a greater share of the
communication responsibility by learning a second language, not as a child, when
language acquisition is easiest, but as an adult?
Finally, even if the hearing adults in the older generation develop proficiency in a
signed language in order to communicate with their Deaf offspring, the effort required to
adjust to communicating in a visual language mode may be challenging, even frustrating,
at times. Unlike the bilingual immigrant family member, who learns both languages at
young ages and in the same auditory mode, the older hearing second language learner
must learn not only a new language, but a new mode of linguistic communication. Even
those with the best intentions may at times forget visual communication requirements and
H[SUHVVWKHLUIUXVWUDWLRQZLWKWKHGUHDGHGSKUDVH³QHYHUPLQG´ which can be interpreted
by the deaf person as dismissive of the individual, not the content.208 I was unable to
identify any studies that compare the use of second language user behavior who change
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language modes in addition to languages (such as signed to spoken), and so what follows
is speculation, but it seems reasonable to think that signing Deaf people encounter harm
related to partial access to language in two ways. The first is the inability to comprehend
what words are communicated (spoken). The second is partial access based on the
limitations of the second language user communicating in a nonnative mode. Although
one can conclude that partial access to language in the family is a harm associated with
the state of deafness or being Deaf, the degree to which such a harm is experienced will
likely be highly variable and depenGHQWRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VIDPLO\
H arm C aused to Society: Scarce Resources and E lective Disability
A frequently cited objection regarding the creation of Deaf children is that Deaf
SHRSOHXVHGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\PRUHRIVRFLHW\¶VUHVRXUFHVWKDQGRQRQ-Deaf people.209
The good citizen argument maintains that the duty of a citizen is to be prudent when
considering how the consequences of his actions will affect resource allocation within
society, and suggests the choice to deliberately bear a child who will consume a larger
SRUWLRQRIVRFLHW\¶VUHVRXUFHVKDUPVVRFLHW\DQGLVPRUDOO\XQMXVWLILHGIRUWKLVUHDVRQ210
This is not just limited to the costs of educating the Deaf child; the Deaf adult will
continue to harm society by relying on services and accommodations that cost
disproportionately more than those for non-Deaf people, further perpetuating this harm.
On this account, harm to society is primarily a resource allocation problem; those for
whom disability has occurred through no fault of their own are more deserving. Space
and scope considerations prevent a detailed treatment of justice, resource allocation and
209
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disability.211 My object here is simply to note one of the ways in which bringing a Deaf
child into the world can be viewed as harmful.
Another argument that holds deliberately bringing a deaf child into the world is
harmful is a business argument constructed by Cooley, who claims that this action
violates the duty not to harm another community citizen without permission, including
businesses.212 In order to arrive at this conclusion, Cooley appeals to a claim of
reciprocity, stating that businesses are often evaluated in terms of the moral duties they
owe to community stakeholders, but the corresponding obligations of community
stakeholders to business are frequently overlooked. The federal legislation that requires
businesses to provide access for people with disabilities, whether employees or
community stakeholders, imposes one sort of harm on businesses. This includes not only
the costs of providing access, but of creating processes and tracking them.213 Another
harm occurs when businesses (as well as other community members) must pay taxes to
cover the costs of social programs for people with disabilities.
)URPZKDW,FDQWHOO&RROH\¶VDVVHVVPHQWUHJDUGing the economic costs to
businesses of providing accessibility and other kinds of support for people with
disabilities is correct. One small practical objection concerns the numbers of people who
will actually decide to create or select a child with a disability. Studies posing this inquiry
to deaf people indicate this is a very small percentage; the available data from IVF-PGD
See Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, and Mary B. Mahowald, Disability, Difference,
Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Policy (Lanham, MD: Rowman
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clinics indicates that only three percent of couples have sought to use PGD for this
purpose.214
A more pressing obligation is the question of whether businesses ought to have
any role in private decisions about reproduction. Cooley acknowledges this is an issue
and offers two reasons why businesses should not be involved. The first deals with the
question of medical privacy and the second with the burden of establishing the
FLUFXPVWDQFHVUHODWHGWRWKHGLVDEOHGSHUVRQ¶VELUWK215 Since the potential harm to the
innocent in carrying out these tasks is significant, another approach is suggested ± that of
offering incentives. One possible incentive is to offer IVF with PGD, but with the caveat
that embryos to be implanted are regulated.216 This seems to raise more problems than it
solves since it could result in a two-tiered system for IVF with PGD that might impact
reproductive liberty. That is, suppose a couple who needed IVF had the genetic luck to
only have the genetic material to create fertilized eggs that were potentially deaf. If the
choice is reproductive liberty with deaf children or no children at all, this could make for
tricky policy decisions or regulatory interpretation.
Arguments based on economic costs related to Deafness are problematic in
another way. The primary economic expenditures for deaf people can be roughly broken
down into four kinds of costs: the cost of deaf education, the cost of social services for
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Deaf people, and the costs to businesses who hire or serve Deaf people. We have covered
the issue of business, but what of education and social services?
In applying the good citizen argument for Deaf children born to Deaf parents, one
must be careful that the claims about the expense of deaf education apply to this
subgroup. Unfortunately, I was not able to locate any studies that isolated this variable.
Is it more expensive for society to educate Deaf children? That is, children who, unlike
deaf children, have had full access to language in the home. Do deaf children cost more
to educate than Deaf children? Are there significant differences in the educational needs
of Deaf children? Infrastructure? Is it because a higher percentage of deaf children have
other disabilities than is found in the general population of hearing children, thus
compounding the cost of educating this population by increasing the kinds of services
needed? The answers to these questions are complicated, and figure into the calculus of
the good citizen argument.
The costs of interpreters in mainstream programs and of maintaining and staffing
state residential schools that pull together a critical mass of deaf children are expenses
that do not occur when educating hearing children. What is the extent of the costs of
additional resources needed to support language development in young children who
have been language deprived? More than ninety percent of deaf children are born to
hearing parents ZKRGRQRWVLJQ(YHQLIWKHGHDIFKLOG¶VSDUHQWVLPPHGLDWHO\LPPHUVH
themselves in learning a visual language after they discover their child is deaf, the
DPRXQWRIWLPHQHHGHGWRDFTXLUHODQJXDJHIOXHQF\LVFRQJUXRXVZLWKWKHFKLOG¶VSULPH
time for language acquisition. Given this and other factors, there are many deaf children
who arrive at school with limited language capabilities. Is it because a higher percentage
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of deaf children have other disabilities than is found in the general population of hearing
children, thus compounding the cost of educating this population by increasing the kinds
of services needed? In order to evaluate this claim, more information is needed, not only
about how the costs of deaf education are incurred, but also answers to metaquestions
about the assumptions regarding deaf education, including those related to design and
purpose.
In addition to primary through secondary education costs, there are the costs of
social services for deaf people such as vocational rehabilitation, relay services,
emergency notification systems, and emergency interpreter services. Equipment is
expensive. Auditory tools such as hearing aids are frequently not covered through health
insurance and these expenses are often picked up by public social service agencies.
Accessibility equipment such as computers with video relay software functionality and
pagers may be paid for through government vocational rehabilitation programs. The
argument runs like this - it is one thing to provide these services for those who become
Deaf through no fault of their own, but it is another thing entirely to provide services for
those who elect to become deaf through deliberate choices and actions. The Deaf
Wannabe population is an example of such people. An internet group exists for this group
RISHRSOHVRPHRIZKRPKDYH³FURVVHGWKHEULGJH´DQGGHWDLOWKHLUSURFHVVRIEHFRPLQJ
deaf. Upon becoming deaf, several of them report using social services to obtain hearing
aids and other accessibility assistance.217
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Bonnie Poitras Tucker labels those who choose to become (or remain) deaf as
people with elective disabilities.218 Her article focuses on cochlear implants and the deaf
LQGLYLGXDO¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRFXUHUHVWRUHRUDPHOLRUDWHKLVGHDIQHVV6KHDFNQRZOHGJHV
that forcing and individual to have surgery is problematic, but counters this with the
charge that individuals must be responsible for the consequences of their actions.219 She
argues that responsibility not only extends to deaf individuals who might refuse to get
cochlear implants or otherwise treat their deafness medically, but that this should also
extend to parents of deaf children who refuse to obtain cochlear implants for their
children or other medical treatment.
For the deontologist, there is an important distinction between those who
deliberately cause their own deafness (the Deaf wannabes) and those who have had
deafness and Deafness imposed upon them. A society that offers different levels of
SDUWLFLSDWLRQEDVHGRQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VRZQFKRLFHVLVRQHWKLQJDVRFLHty that visits the
³VLQVRIWKHIDWKHUXSRQWKHVRQ´sends a very different sort of message. Preventing a
felon from voting while she is in prison for having willfully committed a crime is
different in kind than punishing a Deaf child by denying him an accessible education
because his parents deliberately brought about his birth as a Deaf child.
Providing closed captions on television and the internet, making emergency
notification services accessible, paying for interpreting services for Deaf employees, and
offering emergency legal and medical interpreting services are just some of the ways that
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public and private entities spend money to make their products and services accessible to
Deaf and deaf people. Some argue that this significant amount of money could be better
spent on other endeavors, and that prohibiting or discouraging people from bearing deaf
children will free up this money. There are three major objections to this line of
argument. The first is the issue of bearing the burden of proof of the circumstances
VXUURXQGLQJRQH¶VELUWKRURQH¶VFKLOG¶VELUWK7KHORVVRISULYDF\IRUWKRVHZKRKDYHQRW
deliberately conceived a deaf child is considerable, and ought to be weighed against the
anticipated social gains of freed up resources. With the small numbers of Deaf people,
and the even smaller percentage of those who would actively seek IVF with PGD to bear
a deaf child, the amount of money saved by not providing services to those who
deliberately selected for a deaf child is likely to be negligible when considering the costs
needed to implement and execute these social services. The second is that for the
foreseeable future, Deaf and deaf people will continue to exist, including those who have
not been deliberately created as Deaf. Since deafness does not have a universal cause, it
is highly unlike that all of its causes will be addressed in the future. The final objection
once again raises the issue of moral agency and punishment ± is punishing a Deaf
individual for his Deafness justified if his parents made this decision and he had nothing
to do with this matter?
Deafness and Moral Good
This chapter has identified a selection of harms associated with the state of being
culturally identified as Deaf, including the audiological condition of deafness.
Discussions about moral justification and the moral permissibility of actions are usually
FRXFKHGLQWHUPVRIKDUPZKHWKHUWKDWLVGHILQHGDVDFKDQJHLQWKHVWDWXVRIRQH¶VZHOO-
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being, the presence of pain, an absence of dignity or another of the other moral virtues, or
UHVWULFWLRQVXSRQRQH¶VOLEHUW\6FKRODUVZKRKDYHLQYHVWLJDWHGWKLVTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHU
the decision to use genetic technology to deliberately bring a deaf child into existence
have focused by considering the harms that might ensue. While the harms of existing as a
Deaf or deaf person in society cannot be discounted or minimized, I would feel remiss if I
were to end this project on this note. For in addition to harms, there are corresponding
benefits. These can be experienced by the Deaf individual in isolation or in community.
These benefits may be intrinsic or instrumental; they may encourage the expression of
liberty by supporting the expression of minority views, they may allow the flourishing of
minority sociolinguistic communities, they may provide insight into the human condition
and create situations in which virtues like compassion can be cultivated.
Of course, many of these benefits are not unique to the signing Deaf community
or to the experience of being deaf. Still, these benefits are frequently not catalogued in
the philosophical or bioethical discussions regarding the question of using genetic
technology to bring about the birth of a deaf child. Even when these benefits are
acknowledged, they are quickly described in terms of belonging to a community or
cherishing a language ± benefits that can be understood by most humans, deaf or hearing.
The benefits are not situated in the uniqueness of this particular sociolinguistic group ±
the signing Deaf community. Dirksen Baumann notes that the signing Deaf community is
about more than flashing lights and text phones; noting the birth of a deaf child into a
IDPLO\ZLWK'HDISDUHQWVSURYLGHV³a visually centered episteme to emerge that results in
lived experiences not predicated on the lack of a sense, but on the plenitude of a visual
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FXOWXUHZLWKLWVRZQQRUPVRIODQJXDJHDFTXLVLWLRQDQGLGHQWLW\GHYHORSPHQW´220 The
benefit of visual culture accrues to the child born to this family in this environment, with
full access to a language DQGDFRPPXQLW\ZKHUHWKHFKLOG¶VGHDIDXGLRORJLFDOVWDWXVLV
not marked as µGLIIHUHQW¶EXWas normal.
To this end, I wish to catalogue some of the benefits that attach to membership in
the signing Deaf community. For purposes of clarification, this is not an attempt to back
into the question of whether it is better to be hearing or deaf ± or even whether it is better
to be Hearing (e.g. a member of a cultural community of people who use a spoken
language exclusively) or Deaf. That is a different question that deserves a more detailed
treatment than space permits. This section simply addresses some of the benefits a Deaf
person may lay claim to.
One benefit associated with Deaf community membership is the benefit of
belonging to a community that is small in number ± similar to the experience of
belonging to any minority community that is situated within a larger community. In
minority language communities with very small numbers there can be considerable
diversity in terms of socioeconomic status and other markers, since the shared language
often trumps these, though the historic record shows that communities with larger signing
Deaf populations had Deaf clubs that were exclusionary based on race, religion, or
ethnicity.221 Two benefits with features that are arguably unique to Deaf community
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membership are the transnational Deaf-World community and the emergence of new
signed languages in Deaf communities.
A benefit for Deaf individuals that is often overlooked is the benefit of belonging
to a transnational community, the Deaf-World.222 Transnational communities with users
who are fluent in different languages are not unusual; what is unique about this
community is that the users of different signed languages are better equipped to
communicate across languages because of the expressive and receptive skills they have
acquired through the use of their native signed language. The Deaf-World holds many
transnational events such as Deaflympics, Deaf Way, World Federation of the Deaf
Congresses, Deaf History International, that are held in different locations on a regular
basis, becoming temporary loci for the Deaf-World to gather.
Deaf anthropologist Hilde Haualand has conducted research on this phenomenon,
ZKLFKVKHGHVFULEHVDV³FKDOOHQJ>LQJ@SURIRXQGDQWKURSROogical assumptions of durable
physical locations as the prime site for identification and belonging³223 One of the
benefits she has identified is the way in which knowledge of one signed language and
participation in a signing Deaf community increases the opportunities for transnational
engagement. Unlike spoken languages, in which knowledge of one language in a
language family can make it possible to communicate with a speaker of a different
language in that family, Haualand argues that sign language users have increased
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RSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWUDQVQDWLRQDODFWLYLWLHVEHFDXVH³VLJQHGODQJXDJHVDUH
PRUHHDVLO\DGDSWHGWRDIRUPRILQWHUQDWLRQDOVLJQFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´224
+DXDODQG¶VSRLQWDSSOLHVWRKHDULQJXVHUVRIVLJQHGODQJXDJHVDVZHOODVWKRVH
who are Deaf. Yet there is an unstated factor that likely increases the ability of Deaf
signed language users to gain facility with international signed communication. The
typical Deaf signed language user has amassed hours of communications experiences
with non-signing individuals. In order to facilitate this communication, the signing Deaf
individual calls upon a variety of communication techniques, including gesture, to
achieve effective communication. In most cases the hearing signed language user, upon
learning that the person with whom she wishes to communicate is using a spoken
language that she knows, will communicate directly in that spoken language. It is the
knowledge of a signed language, plus the hours of experience of communicating with
others through gesture, that contributes to the transnational communication benefit.
Another benefit unique to signing Deaf communities is the potential for revealing
information about language. New signed language communities are more likely to
emerge than new spoken language communities. Sometimes these come into being
because a critical mass of deaf people are brought together by the state, at other times the
presence of genes associated with deafness increases due to mating practices within a
geographically isolated community.225 The opportunity to study a language as it emerges
is relatively rare; this provides linguists with a living laboratory in which to gather
information and test hypotheses about the human capacity to create language and the
224
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evolution of language in a natural environment. (The ethical issues surrounding the
design of a similar experiment using languageless hearing people to generate spoken
language are hugely problematic, for obvious reasons). It is difficult to imagine any
circumstances other than deafness in which a new language could emerge in a natural
setting, since hearing children would have access to the language used by their
community. Given this, the existence of a critical mass of deaf people in an isolated
community and subsequent generations of deaf people appear to be necessary condition
for the emergence of a new language. The benefit of acquiring knowledge about human
language development is both intrinsic and instrumental. All knowledge arguably holds
intrinsic value; the instrumental benefit of such knowledge has the potential to inform
developments in cognitive science and linguistics, as well as related fields.
There are other arguments for benefits associated with the Deaf community. One
is the Diversity Argument, which makes the claim that the presence of numerous diverse
cultures and languages in the world enriches everyone; the unique nature of signed
languages and the cultural communities associated with them increases this diversity.
Another is the Argument from Compassion, which claims that the presence of people
with fewer species-typical features encourages human compassion. (This is also
expressed through examples about disability and can appear patronizing ± e.g. the blind
man in the subway needs assistance finding his way, and this presents me with an
opportunity to express compassion towards him, bordering on munificence more than
compassion). The Beauty of Sign Language Argument, or what I call the Aesthetic
Argument, makes the claim that sign language is beautiful in its form and motion, and the
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experience of watching it is a benefit; the argument also implies this beauty is an intrinsic
good.
Perhaps the most difficult benefit to articulate and argue for is the idea that
deafness and the state of being Deaf can be a gift. This is not the gift of silence, but the
gift of the unbidden. Michael Sandel notes that what theologian William F. May
desFULEHVDV³DQRSHQQHVVWRWKHXQELGGHQ´QRWRQO\LQFOXGHVWKHJLIWVRIOLIHEXWD
willingness to relinquish mastery and control.226 Whether one shops the genetic
supermarket227 or plays the genetic lottery,228 one comes into existence with a particular
VHWRIFKDUDFWHULVWLFV7KHFRPELQDWLRQRIWKHVHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVSOXVRQH¶VHQYLURQPHQW
creates life experiences and opportunities. In other words, the social construction of
disability not only erects barriers, it sometimes removes them in unacknowledged ways.
The lone Deaf person in a family may, by virtue of his deafness and access to state
vocational rehabilitation funds, be the first person in his family to attend college. The
Deaf person who is a pioneer in her field may be singled out for career-making
opportunities because of her unique status as a deaf person in that field. The senior citizen
who attended a state residential school for the Deaf may still be in touch with every living
member of her kindergarten class, due to the small and cohesive nature of the Deaf
community. The talented Deaf athlete may not only compete in the Deaflympics, but
through this transnational experience develop an abiding friendship that transcends
language and endures through communication via International Signs conveyed through
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internet video. The Deaf couple who use IVF and PGD to ensure a Deaf child reap the
EHQHILWRIQRWKDYLQJWRSD\IRUWKHLUFKLOG¶VFROOHJHHGXFDWLRQDVWKH\ZRXOGLIWKH\ZHUH
hearing. For some Deaf people, the social goods that they are entitled to leads them to life
path that otherwise might not have been open to them. For these people, Deafness is
indeed a gift.
In addition to social gains as a benefit of being Deaf, there is a new concept that is
being bandied about in the academy with regard to the state of being Deaf. This is the
idea of Deaf-Gain.229 By inverting the concept of hearing loss, which asks, what does one
lose when one is Deaf, the person engaged in exploring the notion of Deaf-Gain asks,
what does one gain when one is Deaf? The gains may be socially constructed
opportunity, neurological differences stemming from the spatial nature of a signed
language or signed communication system, or they may be something else entirely ±
something as yet unnamed or undetermined.
Conclusion
This project has explored the question of whether it is morally justifiable to use
genetic technology to ensure the birth of a deaf child. I have attempted to show that this
desire for a deaf child emerges in part as a response to history; the educational, medical,
and social experiences of Deaf people form the backdrop to this desire to share what they
cherish with children who could be full-fledged members of this community. I have
considered the question of whether it is morally justified to give nature an assist by using
genetic selection, and concluded that the Non-Identity argument withstands the strongest
229
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objections posed against it. I have considered the question of genetic alteration using a
folk argument drawn from my discourse in the Deaf community, situated this folk
argument using the concept of bodily integrity and have concluded that this does not
provide a conclusive answer to the question of moral justification and more work remains
to be done on this problem. In addition to evaluating the above questions of the moral
justification of genetic selection and genetic alteration, I have also sketched out a brief
response to the question of whether deafness and the state of being Deaf are themselves
moral harms in the final chapter, offering a roadmap for future philosophical work on this
question.
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